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3To understand how married people divide the household work, a wealth 
of research has examined the characteristics of the husband, the wife, and 
their household. A keyword search for housework in Sociological Abstracts 
yields a remarkable 1736 scholarly publications. These studies, however, 
have focused on single-country cases and usually on the United States. The 
research has had little of the cross-national comparison that enlivens and 
informs so much of contemporary sociology. Because “traditional” gender 
relations and the balance of work–family activities are being challenged to 
varying degrees from country to country, the time has come to examine how 
national context affects the very organization of intimate family life. In this 
volume, leading international scholars take a path-breaking turn away from 
single-country studies, extending a rich area of inquiry to show how people’s 
domestic lives are shaped by the country in which they live. The ambitious 
research by our contributors bridges the micro and macro levels of analysis 
to demonstrate how social institutions and national cultures penetrate the 
most intimate aspects of our private lives.
Why study who does the housework? At one time, housework was of 
little scholarly interest outside the field of home economics, a pragmatic 
branch of academia dedicated to bringing the scientific efficiency of mod-
ern industry to the household (Ehrenreich and English 1978). The study of 
housework gained broader legitimacy when labor economists observed that 
men divided their time between market work and leisure, but women also 
spent time in “home production” (Mincer and Polachek 1974). Whether they 
produced tidy homes or polite children or buttered biscuits, their household 
labor contributed to the well-being of their families. Under the banner of 
the “New Home Economics,” neoclassical economists applauded husband–
wife differences in household responsibilities for bringing the efficiencies 
of economic specialization to the family (Becker 1981). Sociologists also 
found much to admire in a system that saw men largely in the labor force 
and women mostly in the home. The most honored American sociologist of 




the mid 20th century, Talcott Parsons, argued that the wife’s expressive role 
within the household complemented the husband’s instrumental one in the 
market; taken together, they were the cornerstone of a functional equilib-
rium in the family (Parsons and Bales 1955).
Feminists, however, have long denounced these differences in gender 
roles as the linchpin of a patriarchal system of inequality that disadvantages 
women not only at home, but also at work, in politics, and in the broader 
culture of the society (Budig 2004). For their part, some contemporary so-
cial demographers point to women’s “double shift” of housework and paid 
employment as explaining why so many women think two children are too 
many (Cooke 2004; McDonald 2000; Torr and Short 2004). Even when 
employed full-time, wives spend many more hours doing housework than 
husbands, and they perform the more tedious tasks (Blair and Lichter 1991; 
Dex 2004). Compared with husbands, wives are more likely to “scale back” 
their career to prioritize family demands (Becker and Moen 1999; Bielby 
and Bielby 1989). Although both women and men say that they would like 
to spend more time with family, it is largely the women who want to work 
fewer hours (Treas and Hilgeman 2007). Wages are depressed by time spent 
in child rearing (Budig and England 2001) and in housework (Hersch and 
Stratton 2002)—or, at least by time spent on “female” chores (Noonan 
2001). Family-accommodating careers lead to lower earnings even at midlife 
(Velsor and O’rand 1984). The imbalanced division of housework has con-
sequences for health and well-being, too. Perceiving the division of house-
hold labor as unfair raises the risk of depression (Glass and Fujimoto 1994). 
Dissatisfaction with a partner’s contributions to housework decreases mari-
tal quality, and it increases marital conflict and thoughts of divorce, particu-
larly for women (Pina and Bengtson 1993; Suitor 1991; Ward 1993).
Couples choose how they will divide the chores, starting from the point 
when they choose to live with one another (Gupta 1999). Most theorizing 
about domestic decision making has centered on the way in which the char-
acteristics of husband, wife, and their household shape this decision making 
(Coltrane 2000). One guiding assumption has been that partners arrive at ra-
tional decisions about who will mind the children, cook the dinner, and pick 
up the dry cleaning. One keen consideration has been whose time is regarded 
as too valuable for this sort of unpaid work. This determination has usually fa-
vored the man, whose job prospects—for a variety of reasons—have exceeded 
the woman’s. With his valuable time devoted to earning a living, his hours left 
over for diaper changing and dusting were limited, and this work fell largely to 
his wife. This general argument is often called the “time availability” explana-
tion for the division of household labor (Shelton and John 1996).
A bigger home may increase the amount of housework required (van 
der Lippe, Tijdens, and de ruijter 2004), but it is the arrival of children that 
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tends to scuttle any egalitarian intentions and press couples into even greater 
gender specialization (Baxter, Hewitt, and Haynes 2008). These consider-
ations point to what has been widely referred to as “demand” (for house-
work) explanations of who does what around the home—albeit a gendered 
demand conditioned on cultural ideals about the relation of mothers and 
their children. Of course, fertility everywhere has fallen, presumably lower-
ing one source of demand for housework—although the time children them-
selves require does not seem to have declined (Bianchi 2000; Sayer 2005). In 
addition, as the value of women’s time in the labor force has increased, they, 
too, are working for pay and have less time to mind the house. The upshot of 
changes in demand for housework and time availability has been a number 
of accommodations. In various countries, these include not only the wife 
doing a lot less housework and the husband doing a bit more (Bianchi et al. 
2000; Gershuny 2000), but also couples outsourcing more chores to hired 
helpers and commercial establishments (Bittman, Matheson, and Meagher 
1999; de ruijter, Treas, and Cohen 2005; Treas and de ruijter 2008; van 
der Lippe, Tijdens, and de ruijter 2004).
Although rational decision making in the face of shifting opportuni-
ties and constraints is a big part of the story, there is another significant 
consideration—namely, personal preferences. Individuals’ attitudes and val-
ues lead them to prefer some sorts of domestic arrangements over others. 
researchers have stressed a distinction between those whose values support 
“traditional” versus “nontraditional” gender roles, although, as some of our 
contributors suggest, this broad-brush description of preferences is an over-
simplification. Studies show that gender role attitudes tend to line up at least 
loosely with the actual allocation of housework (Coltrane 2000), but “tra-
ditional” attitudes are clearly losing ground (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; 
Scott, Alwin, and Braun 1996). There is even some evidence that gender 
ideology matters less to housework decisions than it once did (Crompton, 
Brockmann, and Lyonette 2005). Furthermore, partners do not necessarily 
share the same preferences (Greenstein 1996), which means some element of 
bargaining and negotiation enters into decision making about the household 
division of labor (Bernasco and Giesen 2000; Breen and Cooke 2005; Youm 
and Laumann 2003). In any case, many sociologists regard preferences as 
social products that depend to some degree on institutional structures and 
cultural traditions.
Gender poses one complication to the tidy logic of rational choices and 
predictable outcomes. The outcome of bargaining has long been argued to de-
pend on the comparative clout of the partners, as epitomized by the “relative 
resources” explanation for the division of labor in the household (Coltrane 
2000). These resource discrepancies may manifest in relative earnings, the 
economic dependency of the homemaker on the breadwinner, how credible 
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divorce threats seem, one’s subjective sense of entitlement, and a host of other 
considerations (Baxter and Kane 1995; Breen and Cooke 2005; Brines 1993; 
Major 1993). When it comes to household negotiations, women do tend 
to be at a bargaining disadvantage with respect to most of these factors. In 
fact, disadvantage compounds from level to level so that gender inequality in 
the broader society undermines whatever bargaining power over housework 
is derived by the woman from employment-based resources (Fuwa 2004). 
Of course, some women make more money than their husbands, and their 
numbers are growing (raley, Mattingly, and Bianchi 2006). Despite their re-
source advantage, these women appear to pay a price, because the husbands 
out-earned by their wives defy rational predictions. rather than doing more 
housework so the wife can spend more time in breadwinning, these husbands 
have sometimes been seen to do less (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1993).
Although the significance of relative earnings has been questioned 
(Gupta 2005, 2007), the paradox of husbands doing less housework when 
wives do more paid work brings us to an important idea. Clean laundry, 
accomplished children, and savory meals are not the only things produced 
in the home. As Sara Berk (1985) famously pointed out, the household is 
a gender factory. What economists have called home production includes 
the manufacture of gender through everyday heterosexual interaction (West 
and Zimmerman 1987). In other words, women do housework and men es-
chew housework, in part, to show off the feminine or masculine competence 
desirable for their gender. Known variously as the “gender construction” 
or “doing gender” explanation, this perspective offers an account of the 
relative income paradox in that men who fall short as dominant breadwin-
ners can reassert their masculinity by avoiding “women’s work” around 
the house. Gender construction could also explain women’s tendency to do 
more housework when living with an adult of the opposite sex than when 
living with a same-sex adult or alone (Gupta 1999; South and Spitze 1994). 
Because gender identity is central to personal identity, it is hardly surprising 
that gendered domestic arrangements continue to subvert the most egalitar-
ian impulses. Despite the drudgery, women find things to like about doing 
housework and even resist handing off some of this responsibility to men 
(Allen and Hawkins 1999; DeVault 1991; robinson and Milkie 1998). Few 
married women see a 50/50 division of housework as optimal (Thompson 
1991). In fact, most wives are quite satisfied when their husband shows he 
cares by providing token help with the “woman’s work” around the house 
(Sanchez and Kane 1996).
The discussion of what women (or men) want begs the important ques-
tion of why we want what we want. Theorizing in the social and behavioral 
sciences has moved beyond paradigms that view us as merely the passive 
products of socialization. We are no longer assumed to be captives of our 
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social roles. rather, we are seen as reflective individuals capable of resisting 
imperatives and exercising our human agency to change our lives and re-
make our environments. This is a nuanced view that makes explanations of 
behavior more contingent and problematic, even if there is no denying that 
we are shaped by our experiences. Take the example of childhood socializa-
tion. Growing up with a working mother is associated with more egalitarian 
housework arrangements in one’s own marriage, but only, it seems, under 
certain conditions, such as coming from a two-parent family (Cunningham 
2001; Gupta 2006).
Certainly our environment constitutes the frame that influences how 
housework is organized, because it constrains the set of options that are 
available and, indeed, imaginable to us. “Who washes the dishes” is not just 
an idiosyncratic, personal arrangement. The behavioral options we perceive 
are limited by a force field of normative expectations and societal structures 
that channel domestic activities in predictable directions. This observation 
points outward beyond the immediate household, because it acknowledges 
the influence of the broader context in which we live. Although this context 
surely includes the examples of parents and peers, it also includes pervasive 
cultural models and taken-for-granted assumptions about men and women, 
parents and children. These ideals offer handy prototypes for our lives. Stud-
ies of housework have only begun to grapple with a host of structural fac-
tors that suppress options or make conscious decision making largely irrel-
evant. Focused on the husband, wife, and household, studies of the division 
of household labor have only rarely addressed the broader context within 
which preferences are formed and housework arrangements are worked out. 
remedying this omission is the objective of this book.
The contributors to this volume are among the scholars at the fore-
front of new comparative scholarship on the division of household labor. 
Indeed, the contributors figure prominently in a representation of this field, 
which includes Batalova and Cohen (2002); Baxter (1997); Bittman et al. 
(2003); Cooke (2006); Crompton, Brockmann, and Lyonette (2005); Davis 
and Greenstein (2004); Evertsson and Nermo (2007); Fuwa (2004); Geist 
(2005); Gershuny (2000); Hook (2006); Iversen and rosenbluth (2006); 
Pfau-Effinger (2004); Treas (2008); and Yodanis (2005).
In Dividing the Domestic, the authors embrace the broader social con-
text to advance our understanding of the division of household labor. Le-
veraging on country-to-country differences in domestic organization, they 
systematically relate these country differences in the division of housework 
to national differences in welfare regimes, social policies, employment struc-
tures, cultural expectations, and more. Their chapters not only draw on 
existing theories of gender, culture, and the state, but they also introduce 
novel conceptual frameworks for understanding why the household remains 
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a traditional bastion of gender relations, even as massive social forces of glo-
balization, welfare state retrenchment, and individualism call into question 
existing relations between citizen and state, worker and employer.
Their frameworks integrate contemporary sociological perspectives, in-
cluding some seldom applied to the study of domestic arrangements. Femi-
nist critiques, social policy analysis, labor studies, the sociology of culture, 
and principles of social psychology all find a place in these chapters. Cross-
national comparisons demonstrate that the causes of gender specialization 
in the household cannot be understood without looking beyond the home. 
As the contributors demonstrate, a full accounting of “who does the house-
work” includes the complicity of trade unions, state arrangements for chil-
dren’s schooling, new cultural prescriptions for happy marriages, and other 
factors specific to particular countries. By identifying the critical conditions 
that promote or impede gender parity in the family, cross-national com-
parisons of household labor can also inform policies to advance equality 
between men and women in society.
This necessarily brief introduction to the previous research on the divi-
sion of housework sets the stage for a preview of the substantive chapters 
that define this volume. Drawing on time diaries, cross-national sample sur-
veys, official statistics, comparative policy data, and qualitative interviews, 
these chapters offer timely empirical descriptions and fresh explanations for 
the variation in domestic practices observed across countries.
In “Trends in Housework” (Chapter 2) Liana C. Sayer leads off by chart-
ing changes in time use for men and women in nine countries in western Eu-
rope and North America. Although there are certainly country-to-country 
differences in the onset and size of changes, time diaries going back 40 years 
confirm that women have been doing less housework and men have been 
doing more. In most countries, men are actually doing more of the cook-
ing and cleaning chores that make up the “routine” drudgery of daily life. 
 Despite the remarkable increase in female labor force participation, how-
ever, women continue to do the lion’s share of work around the house in 
all nine countries. Also complicating the picture is the fact that the increase 
in housework for men has stalled in a number of nations. On the basis of 
these trends, it is too early to say to whether the gender convergence in time 
use heralds the dawn of gender equality or the remarkable persistence of 
female domestic disadvantage.
Marriage, parenthood, and paid employment dictate the demand for 
household labor, gender-specific domestic norms, and time available to keep 
house. Thus, as Sayer notes, these three status markers are usually taken 
as good predictors of the amount of housework someone will do. To be 
sure, marriage and parenthood increase women’s housework time, and their 
housework is more sensitive than men’s to being married or a parent. At 
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least in some countries, however, these effects and differences are weaker 
than they once were. Historically, paid employment decreased household 
labor more for women than men. recently, the association of housework 
and employment has become more similar for men and women in four of 
the nine countries. In Sweden, whether one is a paid worker is now unre-
lated to housework. In short, not only has time use generally converged 
between men and women, but there is also evidence that men and women 
have become more alike in terms of the factors determining their housekeep-
ing efforts. Showing that marriage, parenthood, and employment continue 
to matter more for women’s housework in conservative countries than in 
the liberal states and Nordic social democracies, Sayer ushers in chapters 
that explore the significance of this broader social context for gender and 
household labor.
Tanja van der Lippe takes up the issue of cross-national differences in fe-
male labor force participation with “Women’s Employment and Housework” 
in Chapter 3. Although female labor force participation has increased across 
a diverse set of countries, there continue to be marked country-to-country 
differences in the number of hours women are in paid work. Part-time jobs 
are common in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, for in-
stance, but not in the United States or southern European countries. Existing 
theories emphasizing available time, the relative resources of husband and 
wife, and gender ideology all agree that a wife’s full-time job will decrease 
her time spent on domestic duties. Prior theorizing on how the institutional 
context affects the organization of domestic work is less well developed—a 
fact that motivates this volume.
Building on the Esping-Andersen (1990) welfare regime typology widely 
used to characterize nations, van der Lippe takes the first step in the direction 
of theorizing context. As her multilevel analysis of data from the Interna-
tional Social Survey Program confirms, women everywhere do fewer hours of 
housework when they do more hours of paid work. Whatever their personal 
circumstances, however, wives in egalitarian Nordic countries (i.e., the social–
democratic welfare regimes) devote significantly less time to domestic duties 
than their counterparts in conservative welfare regimes such as Austria, Bel-
gium, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Switzerland. This is consistent 
not only with Sayer, but also with van der Lippe’s other findings—namely, 
wives in countries characterized by higher enrollment in child care facilities, 
higher gender empowerment, and higher gross domestic product spend less 
time on domestic work. There is much more variation in housework hours 
within countries than between them, but this analysis leaves little doubt that 
country context matters for women’s (and men’s) housework.
Although van der Lippe points to systematic differences between wel-
fare regime types, Lynn Prince Cooke (Chapter 4) takes aim at the policy 
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differences within regimes that give rise to distinctive divisions of domestic 
work. National education systems, tax codes, and labor laws may seem far 
removed from the dishpan or the laundry hamper, but Cooke’s “The Politics 
of Housework” offers a convincing analysis of how they influence the bal-
ance of women’s and men’s time in the home and the workplace. By reinforc-
ing women’s domestic roles, restricting their access to paid employment, or 
limiting their ability to form independent households, state policies shape 
the context in which rational decision makers opt for relatively traditional 
gender relations.
We might expect Australian, British, and American couples to take 
similar approaches to dividing household labor, because they all reside in 
English-speaking, liberal regimes emphasizing market solutions over the 
state’s responsibility for welfare. Cooke’s tour of three liberal countries, 
however, reveals that they each have distinctive policy packages. Australia 
buttresses men’s advantages in paid employment, Great Britain encourages 
women’s responsibility for unpaid household work, and the United States 
hones to the liberal tradition of minimal state involvement. Not surpris-
ingly, women are twice as likely to work full-time in the United States as in 
Australia, with Britain falling somewhere in between. In all three countries, 
women cut back similarly on housework in response to their employment, 
but nowhere do men truly pick up the slack. Anticipating the chapter by 
Gupta and colleagues, Cooke links gender inequality with class inequality, 
observing that husbands and wives with higher incomes have greater parity 
in their division of household labor.
Lynn Prince Cooke makes a persuasive case for state policies fostering 
the gendered division of household labor. If policies can sustain the gendered 
division of housework, can public policies also eliminate this domestic in-
equality? Chapter 5, “Can State Policies Produce Equality in Housework?,” 
is the provocative analysis by Shirley Dex. She asks whether equalizing 
housework is a feasible or even a particularly desirable policy goal. Dex 
takes the Swedish “Daddy Leave” policy—providing new fathers time off 
work—as a model with obvious implications for household labor. While 
endorsing the policy’s strategic focus at a point in the life course when part-
ners may be more open to renegotiating their roles, she nonetheless describes 
how modest the effects of this state policy intervention have been. Part of 
the problem is that state policy is only one of many institutional and cultural 
forces sustaining a gendered division of household labor, a message of com-
plexity that squares with other chapters in this volume.
According to Dex, the best way to equalize household labor between 
men and women is to equalize their wage rates. This would certainly reduce 
the incentive for men to specialize in breadwinning while leaving women to 
manage the home. Compared with the family-friendly initiatives for paren-
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tal leave, public child care, and child allowances, governments have shown 
little interest in bringing men’s and women’s earnings in line with one an-
other. The benefits of women’s higher wages may be evident—higher house-
hold income, less economic dependency for women in marriage, protection 
against impoverishment in divorce, higher old age pensions, and, at least in 
the United States, health insurance coverage. However, Dex argues, many 
women—a majority in many countries—are highly invested in their domes-
tic and caring responsibilities. They are apparently content with low-paid, 
part-time employment, which offers few advancement opportunities, but 
allows them to meet family responsibilities without major changes in who 
does the laundry. Dex acknowledges that this may not be the worst situa-
tion. Citing time diary studies, she points out that the total hours of paid 
plus unpaid work are nearly the same for men as for women. In line with 
the conclusions presented by Liana Sayer, she also observes the gradual con-
vergence in housework time seen for many countries—a growing equality 
in domestic life that has transpired largely in the absence of state policy 
interventions.
Chapter 6, “Economic Inequality and Housework,” is a fruitful in-
ternational collaboration among Sanjiv Gupta, Marie Evertsson, Daniela 
Grunow, Magnus Nermo, and Liana C. Sayer. Their analysis pioneers a new 
research agenda on household labor by asking about the socioeconomic in-
equalities in the housework that women do. Their studies reveal substantial 
differences between women at the top and the bottom of the earnings distri-
bution in Germany, Sweden, and the United States. This economic inequality 
in women’s time in housework is greatest in the United States, where women 
in the bottom 10 percent of the earnings distribution spend a full hour more 
each day on household chores than women at the top of the distribution. 
Disadvantaged in so many other ways, low-income women face a more oner-
ous burden in keeping up home and family. Because earnings inequality is 
also greatest in the United States, this three-country comparison raises the 
intriguing possibility that macrolevel economic inequality contributes to in-
equalities in the burden of domestic work. Together with Cooke’s finding 
that higher income couples in Australia, Great Britain, and the United States 
achieve a more equitable division of housework, the link between domestic 
gender inequality and class inequality emerges as an important new direc-
tion for research.
Birgit Pfau-Effinger invites a culture turn with Chapter 7, “Cultural 
and Institutional Contexts.” She advocates using cultural schema to provide 
a fuller understanding of cross-national differences in the organization of 
households and, particularly, caring work. Focusing on women with small 
children in eight European countries, she identifies three dominant patterns 
based on women’s employment and the use of formal child care. To explain 
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these behavioral patterns, she turns to four cultural models that embody the 
prevailing values about gender, children, and relations between the public 
and private spheres. Welfare state typologies alone fall short of explaining 
female employment and child care arrangements. For example, we might 
expect high full-time female employment and high usage of formal child 
care to characterize the Nordic social democratic states, which excel at pub-
lic provision of child care. Yet, this pattern characterizes Finland, but not 
Norway. It also characterizes France, a conservative regime that we would 
expect to have limited child care usage and mostly part-time work. What 
unites Finland and France (and postsocialist East Germany, too) is the “dual-
breadwinner/external care provider” cultural model wedded to a societal 
appreciation of gender equality. Although housework differs in some impor-
tant ways from child care, the cultural approach that Pfau-Effinger develops 
holds promise for understanding both kinds of work. As she observes, a 
“servant culture” tradition, which legitimizes using paid housekeepers, of-
fers southern Europeans ways of organizing domestic life that would not sit 
well with many Scandinavians, whose egalitarian values conflict with hiring 
low-paid employees to do their dirty work.
Like Birgit Pfau-Effinger, Maria Charles and Erin Cech examine the 
influence of culture in their “Beliefs about Maternal Employment” (Chap-
ter 8). They are interested in the ideologies of motherhood and the cultural 
beliefs about children that sustain ideals of full-time maternal care for chil-
dren in the home. Drawing on surveys for nearly three dozen countries, 
they demonstrate the cross-national variation in public opinion regarding 
maternal employment. In Denmark, only 2 in 10 women believe mothers of 
preschool children should stay home to care for their youngsters, as opposed 
to 6 in 10 in New Zealand. Even among women who share similar social 
and demographic characteristics, there are marked country-to-country dif-
ferences in attitudes. The familiar welfare state typologies help account for 
some important cross-national differences in women’s attitudes about what 
mothers should do. In conservative welfare regimes, for example, there is 
more support for mothers staying home full-time than in social–democratic 
countries. But analyses also reveal much attitudinal variability within regime 
types. This within-regime variability maps to differences in national child 
care provisions and other gender-relevant policies not typically considered 
by mainstream welfare state scholars. Following Cooke and Pfau-Effinger, 
the insights of Charles and Cech lend further support to feminist critiques 
that have called for greater attention to how specific family policy provi-
sions help shape cultural beliefs about gender roles and family patterns.
While the chapters by Pfau-Effinger and by Charles and Cech both fo-
cus on culture and motherhood, Carrie Yodanis directs our attention to the 
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cultural ideals for marriage in Chapter 9, “The Institution of Marriage.” 
According to Giddens (1992), contemporary marriage is founded on pure, 
albeit fragile, relationships that champion personal fulfillment and indi-
vidual gratification. This philosophy represents a radical departure from 
traditional views of marriage as a practical arrangement for raising children, 
husbanding resources, and gaining the respect of the community. Although 
the 20th-century ideal of companionate marriage may have emphasized the 
institution’s emotional rewards, it deviated from pure relationships, because 
it also called on partners to subjugate personal desires to the common inter-
est and to a fairly conventional division of labor. Yodanis uses survey data 
to rank countries on the importance placed on intimacy in marriage. The 
Americans, Swedes, and Chileans believe intimacy is important to marital 
success. The russians, Japanese, and Portuguese are unconvinced. As Yo-
danis reports, cultures that value closeness and communication in marriage 
are countries that have greater gender equality in the division of housework. 
Carrie Yodanis gives us a lively account of the cultural changes undermining 
the constraints of marriage as an institution while promoting gender conver-
gence on the domestic front.
Johannes Huinink and Alexander röhler also point to cultural changes 
in marital ideals. Chapter 10, “Pair relationships and Housework,” draws 
from the social psychological literature on pair bonding to construct a typol-
ogy that relates couples’ emotional ties and their housework arrangements. 
In affectual–traditional relationships, traditional gender norms determine 
household behavior. In affectual–associative relationships, partners reject 
strict gender roles to share housework equally. Last, in highly individual-
ized affectual–pragmatic relationships, housework is organized to advance 
one’s personal preferences with little or no concern for justice or equality. 
Huinink and röhler draw on qualitative data from West and East Germany 
in a thoughtful comparative analysis of the ways in which a unique historical 
legacy and contemporary circumstances shape the domestic lives of hetero-
sexual couples.
Important differences emerge between East and West. The egalitarian 
affectual–associative type is more common in western Germany, especially 
among highly educated persons. The affectual–traditional type is more 
widespread in eastern Germany, where it is found in all socioeconomic 
groups, in contrast with West Germany, where it is mostly a working-class 
phenomenon. The East–West differences reflect, in part, the postreunifi-
cation persistence of the communal versus individualistic orientations in 
the two societies. The couple differences are also linked to the practical 
demands in East Germany, where wives under socialism were expected to 
work full-time, where postunification hardships continued to require their 
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employment, and where there was less room than in the West for gender 
ideology to determine who does the dishes. Ironically, it is the affectual–
traditional East Germans, not the affectual–associative West Germans, who 
display the most egalitarian sharing of housework. As Charles and Cech 
point out with respect to maternal employment, the differences between 
East and West Germans demonstrate that social policy regimes can have 
enduring normative effects.
In Chapter 11, “Men’s and Women’s reports about Housework,” Clau-
dia Geist turns to cross-national survey data to examine the extent to which 
men and women agree on how much housework each does and how fair 
the domestic arrangements are. research in the United States has observed 
that married men report doing more housework than women credit their 
husbands with doing (Kamo 2000). Whether reporting discrepancies hold 
in other countries is an unexplored question with important methodological 
implications for cross-national survey analyses. Focusing on the gender gap 
in reporting, Geist seizes the opportunity to consider gender inequality from 
a new angle. As she shows, there is an almost universal tendency for men 
to report more housework hours than women think that their partners do. 
Women’s own housework reports both exceed and lag behind their partners’ 
estimations, varying substantially across countries. In countries where the 
sheer volume of domestic work is high, men tend to underestimate their 
wife’s housework hours (or women report doing more than they actually 
do), but women also tend to underestimate their husbands’ hours (or men 
exaggerate their contributions). Like Huinink and röhler, Geist considers 
self-interest in household labor. If, however, men and women inflate reports 
of their efforts and downplay their spouse’s to gain a strategic advantage in 
household negotiations, why would this be linked to the volume of work? 
One possibility is that men are simply less aware of what women do in 
societies where the burden of housework is the greatest, perhaps because 
gender roles are more specialized (and hence partner’s responsibilities are 
poorly understood by the other gender). Or, maybe much housework goes 
unobserved by the husband when it more closely approximates the adage 
that “women’s work is never done.”
rounding off these substantive chapters is the concluding essay by Sonja 
Drobnicˇ (Chapter 12). To her falls the important task of integrating the 
research in this volume, and she makes clear that the book is more than the 
sum of its parts. Focusing on several overarching themes, she demonstrates 
how they are informed by the research reported in particular chapters. She 
also points out the new research findings that emerge from the cross-na-
tional study of the division of household labor. As our book makes clear, 
housework remains a strategic site for the study of gender inequality, micro/
macro linkages, and cross-national differences.
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The pervasive stylized fact that, across the world, women do more house-
work than men obscures substantial national differences in gender inequal-
ity in housework. Comparative studies indicate the—at first blush—immu-
table relationship between gender and housework is deeply conditioned by 
a country’s gender ideologies and opportunity structures (Breen and Cooke 
2005; Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005). These factors differ because of macrocultural 
orientations regarding the appropriate interrelationship of family, market, 
and state (Sainsbury 1999). recent comparative work indicates that gender 
differences in housework have diminished over time (Gershuny 2000; Hook 
2006), but little is known about cross-national differences in the timing and 
level of trends in gendered housework and how these are related to eco-
nomic, demographic, and normative shifts.
Second demographic transition trends, such as delays in union forma-
tion and parenthood, narrowing gender differences in education and em-
ployment, and eroding cultural support for the once-dominant separate 
spheres ideology, are evident throughout the western world (Lesthaeghe 
1995; McLanahan 2004). These shifts appear to have reduced gender dif-
ferences in housework. Both country-specific and cross-national trend 
studies indicate a widespread pattern of men doing more housework and 
women doing less (Geist 2005; Gershuny 2000; Hook 2006). Nonetheless, 
conflicting interpretations of whether change among men is meaningful—
and whether housework remains emblematic of gendered behavior despite 
transformed demographic, economic, and ideological environments—have 
generated vigorous debate.
Proponents of the thesis that women and men are slowly but steadily 
marching toward androgynous time use emphasize the extent of change 
rather than contemporary levels of gender inequality in housework. These 
scholars predict further attenuation of gendered housework because second 
demographic transition trends mean younger cohorts with more equiva-
lent resources, and expectations of symmetry in adult roles are replacing 




older  cohorts characterized by more gender-specialized resources, expecta-
tions, and time patterns. Continued behavioral change among individuals 
at all stages of the life course should also occur because of technological 
advancements and economic disruptions (Gershuny and robinson 1988). 
Hence, dissimilarities in women’s and men’s housework should continue to 
narrow.
In contrast, other scholars juxtapose women’s rapid movement into paid 
work and continued responsibilities for domestic work against the stub-
bornly low amounts of men’s housework. These studies posit that the gender 
revolution in household labor is “stalled” or even reversing, especially when 
viewed in tandem with plateaus in employment, wage, and occupational 
gender equality (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2004; Hochschild 1989). 
The reasoning is that progress toward gender equality is thwarted by the 
deeply intertwined nature of gendered family processes with extrafamilial 
gendered institutions that together mutually reinforce the gender division of 
housework.
The two perspectives are not mutually exclusive, because of the perva-
sive effects of gender within families and societies (risman 2004). Women’s 
and men’s housework time is affected both by microlevel characteristics (in 
particular, family structure, employment, and education) and by macrolevel 
factors (such as access to education, employment, and political institutions). 
Hence, gender figures into identities, family interactions, and societal norms 
and opportunity structures, but the extent of this configuration varies both 
temporally and spatially. Existing comparative research is limited in shed-
ding light on gender differences in housework, because most is restricted 
to couples and assesses relative measures of which partner typically does 
housework tasks, which may be affected by social desirability and introduce 
bias into comparisons across countries. research that examines the chang-
ing effects of microcharacteristics on housework for all women and men 
can begin to discern whether trends are the result of alterations in composi-
tional characteristics or cultural swings. Furthermore, demographic trends 
mean a much greater proportion of women’s and men’s lives are spent living 
alone, and gender affects individuals whether partnered or solo. Hence, to 
understand how the gendered division of housework affects other aspects of 
gender equality, research needs to examine all women and men.
In this chapter, I use nationally representative time diary data spanning 
four decades from nine western industrialized countries to analyze trends 
and gender differences in housework. Countries included in the analysis are 
the United States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, 
the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. These comparison countries have di-
verse time-related outcomes, varied policy environments, and trend data on 
time use. They can also be grouped into distinct welfare state  regimes (Castles 
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and Mitchell 1993; Esping-Andersen 1999), with the United States, Canada, 
the United Kingdom, and Australia representing liberal, English-speaking, 
market-oriented states; Germany, France, and the Netherlands represent-
ing conservative European states; and Norway and Sweden representing so-
cially egalitarian Nordic states. An extensive literature documents that the 
welfare regime typology developed by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) does 
not correspond exactly to cross-national variation in gender inequality (see 
Orloff 1996; Sainsbury 1999). However, distinctions among welfare states 
generally reflect the extent to which policies and programs regulate working 
hours and promote or inhibit gender-differentiated time allocation and thus 
offer an appropriate framework for this chapter (Castles and Mitchell 1993; 
Gornick and Meyers 2003).
The chapter begins by documenting greater similarity in women’s and 
men’s housework time resulting from declines in women’s and increases in 
men’s housework. results point to anomalous patterns of change across 
welfare state regimes that have produced greater similarity in women’s and 
men’s housework. However, the data also reveal a consistent cross-national 
stall among men and continued greater investment of women in housework. 
Furthermore, the factors that influence the absolute amount of women’s 
and men’s housework are distinct from those that influence the gender gap 
in housework. Absolute levels of both women’s and men’s housework ap-
pear to flow more from cultural standards of housekeeping and feedbacks 
between microlevel characteristics and specific state environments, whereas 
the gender gap in housework appears to be associated more with regime-
related work and family policies, and support for gender equality.
a note on child care
An examination of child care time is beyond the scope of this analysis be-
cause the focus is gender differences between all men and all women, rather 
than among parents. Still, child care and housework are clearly related be-
cause children add to cleaning, laundry, and meal preparation demands, and 
child care activities themselves may reduce time available for housework. 
Studies of trends in mothers’ and fathers’ child care activity time point to 
two notable findings. First, across western industrialized countries, parents’ 
primary child care time has increased since 1965, although trends were 
nonlinear in some countries, such as the United States and France. Second, 
gender differences in parental child care time have narrowed, because of 
substantial jumps in fathers’ child care time coupled with smaller increases 
in mothers’ child care time (Bianchi, robinson, and Milkie 2006; Bittman 
1999; Gauthier, Smeeding, and Furstenberg 2004; Gershuny 2000; Sayer, 
Bianchi, and robinson 2004). Mothers appear to have preserved child care 
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time by reducing housework time, whereas fathers have reallocated time 
from sleep and leisure to child care activities (Gauthier, Smeeding, and Furst-
enberg 2004; Sayer 2005). The extent of parents’ reallocation of time to 
child care activities may be understated, because time diary trend data are 
activity based, meaning they do not assess time parents spend supervising 
or monitoring children, nor do they include time with children. The wide-
ranging shift upward in parental child care time suggests extensive recon-
figuration of cultural standards of parenting toward time-intensive practices 
(Bianchi, robinson, and Milkie 2006; Gauthier, Smeeding, and Furstenberg 
2004). Nonetheless, the magnitude of increases in child care time vary across 
countries, likely because of diverse work–family policy environments, socio-
demographic characteristics of parents, and cultures of motherhood and 
fatherhood. As discussed later in this chapter, these same contextual and 
individual factors figure heavily in the story about trends and gender differ-
ences in women’s and men’s housework.
background
Two theoretical explanations of the gendered division of housework predom-
inate in the literature: the economic perspective and the gender perspective. 
The first emphasizes rationality and the reasons men’s and women’s house-
work should have changed in response to new economic, demographic, and 
normative conditions. The second instead emphasizes the resiliency of the 
gender system and elements that work against change. Scholars who posit 
additional attenuation of the gender housework gap favor economic/social 
exchange theoretical explanations; those that emphasize a stalled gender 
revolution generally favor the gender perspective.
Economic Perspective
Economic models of time use posit that households rationally and efficiently 
allocate resources to optimize their outputs and utility, commonly through 
specialization of one partner in paid work and the other in unpaid work. 
Specialization in certain types of activities is more efficient because it yields 
greater output, and women generally specialize in unpaid household labor 
and men in paid market labor because of human capital and biological dif-
ferences that generate comparative advantages for each in their respective 
concentrations (Becker 1991). A variant of the economic model is the “time 
availability” perspective that employment demands—in particular, hours of 
paid work—affect how much time is “left over” for housework. According 
to this perspective, employment reduces housework because it sets param-
eters on time available for other activities (Coverman 1985).
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Bargaining models, which are grounded in social exchange theory in 
sociology and applications of game theory in economics, are based on sim-
ilar propositions but incorporate the role of power differentials between 
men and women in determining the division of labor (Lundberg and Pollak 
1996). In this view, men’s higher resources from education and employment 
allow them to get out of housework, not because it is more efficient for them 
to do market work instead, but because of their bargaining power. Women 
are generally more dependent on resources provided by men as a result of 
societal gender stratification and thus may be less able to opt out of less 
prestigious and perhaps less rewarding unpaid work (Howard and Hol-
lander 1997; Sabatelli and Shehan 1993). Nonetheless, bargaining models 
assume a gender-neutral process in which either partner, male or female, can 
use resources to negotiate favorable outcomes.
Historically, women have done more housework than men because 
socialization practices and physiological differences linked to childbearing 
worked together to maximize returns to women’s specialization in house-
hold work and men’s specialization in market work. Second demographic 
transition trends—older age at marriage, higher levels of cohabitation and 
divorce, lower levels of marital fertility—have reduced the benefits and 
increased the costs of women’s specialization in housework. Women’s in-
creased educational attainment and employment levels should also have 
strengthened their ability to leverage resources into more favorable bargains 
about the division of labor. Cultural ideologies have also evolved toward 
promoting men’s involvement in household labor, further reducing their 
ability to opt out of housework entirely. Hence, according to the economic 
perspective, dissimilarities in women’s and men’s housework should con-
tinue to narrow.
Gender Perspective
In contrast to economic/bargaining models, the gender perspective contends 
that the division of labor is based on demarcating “men’s” time from “wom-
en’s” time (Twiggs, McQuillan, and Ferree 1999). The premise is that the 
purpose of the gendered division of housework is not efficient production of 
household goods and services, but the creation and justification of unequal 
power relations between women and men (Thompson and Walker 1995). 
In essence, women’s performance of housework is a display of subordinate 
status whereas men’s avoidance of (most) housework is a display of their 
structural and cultural power (Brines 1994). Moreover, women’s and men’s 
socialization, human capital investments, and gendered identities and cul-
tural mores about appropriate adult roles of women and men are embedded 
in historically and geographically specific gendered contexts.
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An emerging literature using a variety of methods, measures, and sam-
ples documents that context matters. Furthermore, the theoretical mecha-
nisms emphasized in the two theoretical perspectives function in tandem. 
In other words, contextual factors condition both expectations of gendered 
behavior and gendered processes related to acquisition of human capital and 
other resources, as well as factors that determine time availability. Gendered 
assumptions about how employment and household work should be divided 
between women and men are particularly salient in influencing welfare state 
variation in the gendered division of housework.
English-speaking or liberal welfare states are characterized by low levels 
of state support for maternal employment, child care programs, and early-
childhood education. State programs are generally need based and residual 
in nature, and the market provides the majority of family services, such 
as nonparental child care. Furthermore, the gendered division of labor is 
thought of as an individual—not a state—concern. There are salient dis-
tinctions across English-speaking countries, however, regarding the extent 
to which each conforms to the prototypical liberal ideology; support for 
the male breadwinner model; and levels of support for maternity, paternity, 
and parental leave; child care; and early-childhood programs (Gornick and 
Meyers 2003).
Conservative welfare states are characterized by the principle of subsid-
iarity, meaning social support is deemed a family or community responsibil-
ity rather than a state responsibility, and entitlements to social assistance 
are linked to earnings and occupation. Strong norms that young children 
require in-home maternal care have resulted in modest maternity leave poli-
cies for employed mothers of young children, ranging from 12 to 16 weeks 
of leave at full pay. Conservative countries have inclusive, accessible early-
childhood programs, but entitlements to the system are available only for 
children 2 years of age and older.
Nordic welfare states are characterized by universal and comprehensive 
state-supported family programs, often created with an explicit goal of re-
ducing gender differences in employment and caregiving. Entitlement pro-
grams are linked to social rights, and family and child services are universal, 
providing cash benefits, paid and job-protected parental leaves, and child 
care. Nordic countries also have the most generous employment benefits for 
mothers, and fathers’ care work is promoted by offering specific benefits to 
them that are not transferable to mothers. These “use or lose” aspects of 
Nordic programs have increased the rate at which fathers take advantage 
of these benefits, but their take-up rate remains considerably lower than 
mothers (Gornick and Meyers 2003). Subsidized child care programs are 
widely available and accessible. Nordic countries, particularly Sweden, also 
provide stronger regulations of employment hours and part-time work that 
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are explicitly motivated by desires to reduce tensions between workplace 
and family obligations; in contrast, “family-friendly” workplaces policies in 
conservative regimes are motivated more strongly by concerns with declin-
ing fertility (Gornick and Meyers 2003).
Historically, levels of inequality in housework time have varied across 
western industrialized countries, with less equal housework time in states 
that favor male breadwinner, female caregiver work and family arrange-
ments (e.g., Germany), and more equivalent time in states that favor either 
dual-earner arrangements (e.g., the United States) or dual-caregiver arrange-
ments (e.g., Sweden) (Baxter 1997; Davis and Greenstein 2004; Fuwa and 
Cohen 2007; Geist 2005).
The effects of marital and parental status, employment, and education 
also vary cross-nationally. Marriage and children increase the demand for 
housework because of higher standards of cleanliness and meal prepara-
tion. Children also increase laundry loads and the need to tidy up the house 
more frequently. Historically, marriage and children increased women’s and 
decreased men’s housework. Currently in the United States and the Neth-
erlands, marriage still increases women’s and decreases men’s housework, 
whereas in France, marriage increases housework for both women and men, 
although effects are typically larger for women. Children also increase gen-
der specialization in housework in some countries (France, the United States, 
Australia), but decrease it in others (the Netherlands) (Bittman 1999; Sayer 
2005). One cross-national trend study of men’s housework reports that men 
do more housework in countries with high levels of maternal employment 
and availability of parental leave for men, but less housework in countries 
with long maternal leaves (Hook 2006).
Across countries, more time in employment reduces women’s and men’s 
housework, because of less available time and more income available to 
outsource, albeit effects are typically stronger for women. research reports 
mixed results about how employment effects vary cross-nationally. Fuwa 
(2004) reports that women’s employment has a more equalizing effect on 
housework time in liberal welfare states whereas Geist (2005) finds that em-
ployment has more equalizing effects on housework division in conservative 
countries. Both analyses use International Social Survey Program data, but 
slightly different specifications of housework, which may account for the 
different findings. One study also reports that women’s full-time employ-
ment has stronger effects on shrinking the gender gap in housework in more 
egalitarian countries (Fuwa and Cohen 2007).
In sum, research provides support for the economic perspective in that 
marital and parental status and employment influence women’s and men’s 
housework time. research also strongly indicates that the effect of these mi-
crolevel characteristics is conditioned on macrolevel factors such as women’s 
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access to employment, political and economic power, and societal norms 
about roles for women and men. Discovering how the gender division of 
housework has changed across welfare state regimes and whether the effects 
of marriage, parenthood, and employment on housework have attenuated 
within and across regimes are questions to which this analysis now turns.
data
Data are from surveys archived in the Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS) 
from the mid 1960s to the early 2000s. The MTUS provides harmonized data 
files on time spent in paid work, unpaid work (housework, child care, and 
shopping), personal care, and leisure, with further disaggregations available 
in some categories. This study focuses on three measures of housework time, 
each in minutes per day: routine housework (cooking, cleaning, and laun-
dry), nonroutine housework (general house and yard maintenance and re-
pairs, care of adults, pet care, and household paperwork), and the summed 
time in routine and nonroutine housework. The analytic sample for this 
study is limited to women and men ages 20 to 49, because of age restrictions 
in some of the earlier surveys archived in MTUS. Given their prominent role 
in differentiating historically women’s and men’s time use, the associations 
of marriage, parenthood, and employment status with housework are of 
primary interest in the multivariate analyses.
Each study includes a time diary that collects information about all ac-
tivities that occur in a 24-hour period, when the activity began and ended, 
where the activity occurred, who else was doing the activity, and, in some 
countries, other activities that were occurring concurrently. The time diaries 
were administered using different methods across countries and over time. 
Studies were administered in different years in most decades, which compli-
cates comparative trend analysis. This chapter takes the tack of reporting 
data for all available time points and noting when trends track different 
spans. Methodological differences in sample design and survey administra-
tion also raise the possibility that data are not entirely comparable across 
countries, and scholars differ in their interpretation of whether these differ-
ences compromise conclusions about country-level differences in time use 
(Folbre et al. 2005; Gershuny 2000). In general, methodological studies in-
dicate that recall diaries (such as those used in Canada and the United States) 
underreport activities of short duration, and hence brief periods of some 
household activities may be missed. However, estimates of activities that 
occur on a routine basis, such as cooking and cleaning, have been found to 
have high validity across different types of survey instruments and method-
ologies (Juster 1999). The latter type of activities comprises the majority of 
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housework time and there is no indication that methodological differences 
vary systematically by gender. Hence, methodological differences should not 
be a source of significant bias in this analysis. Additional technical details on 
sample populations and survey administration across the various countries 
are available online at the MTUS data archives (www.timeuse.org).
results
Table 2.1 shows trends in women’s and men’s routine, nonroutine, and total 
housework by country. The four liberal countries are presented (the United 
States, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom), then the three con-
servative countries (Germany, France, and the Netherlands), followed by 
the two Nordic countries (Norway and Sweden). Discussion focuses first 
on change over time in women’s housework, then turns to trends in men’s 
housework, and then to how the housework gender gap has changed over 
time and across countries. results indicate three key findings. First, women’s 
housework has declined and men’s housework has increased (except in Swe-
den, where data are available only for the 1990s and 2000s), but the timing 
and level of change reveal intraregime as well as interregime variation. Sec-
ond, the gender gap in housework has attenuated, but at high levels. Third, 
factors influencing absolute levels of women’s and men’s housework are 
different than those influencing relative levels of housework.
Across all countries, the time women devote to housework has declined. 
For example, between the 1970s and early 2000s (the time span featuring 
the largest number of countries), decreases in housework range from about 
40 minutes (the United Kingdom, France, and Norway) to 70 minutes (the 
United States, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden). Australia 
is distinct, with a much smaller 21-minute-per-day decline. Contemporary 
Australian women spend the most time in housework across countries, de-
voting 219 minutes compared with French women’s 173 minutes and Swed-
ish women’s 100 minutes, the lowest amount of housework of the nine coun-
tries. Estimates for the mid 1970s also indicate that Australian women did 
more housework than other women at earlier time points (but sample and 
methodological differences between the 1974 and 1997 surveys complicate 
drawing firm conclusions about Australian trends). Cooke (Chapter 4, this 
volume) suggests Australian women’s higher housework time results from 
the combination of the high cost of outsourcing, vestiges of historical em-
ployment discrimination against women, and high paid work hours among 
well-educated men. Furthermore, Australian women’s high housework time 
is closer to levels in Germany (197 minutes), a conservative state, than to the 
other liberal states. Canadian, British, Dutch, and Norwegian women spend 
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ta b l e  2 . 1
Trends in women’s and men’s average daily minutes of housework by country






female male female male female male
United States
1965 213a 19a 28a 23a 240a 42a
1975 156b 25a 26a 36b 183b 61b
1985 145c 52b 15b 25a 160c 76c
1998 130d 74c 8b 20a 138d 94d
2003 98e 36d 36c 45c 133d 81c,d
Australia
1974 209a 16a 31a 44a 240a 60a
1997 172b 52b 47b 58b 219b 110b
Canada
1971 194a 28a 20a 33a,c 214a 61a
1981 133b,d 42b,c 20a,b 31a,c 153b,c 73b
1986 139b,c 31a 16a 27a 155c 58a
1992 145c 38b 25b 47b 170d 85c
1998 127d 47d 30c 38c 156e 86c
United Kingdom
1975 188a 15a 18a 40a,b 206a 55a
1983 173b 39b 21b 37b 194b 76b
1987 135c 39b 28c 46c 164c 85c
1995 137c 38b 23d 40b,c 160c 78b,c
2000 137c 47c 28c,d 36b,d 165c 83c
Germany
1965 234a 13a 45a 53a 278a 65a
1992 151b 36b 46a 55a 197b 91b
France
1965 239a 23a 34a 41a 272a 64a
1974 213b 36b 15b 26b 228b 62a
1998 159c 43c 14b 38a 173c 81b
Netherlands
1975 184a 29a 43a 36a,c 227a 65a,c
1980 180a 31b 39b 38a 219a 68a,c
1985 168c 37c 38b 44b 206c 81b,c
1990 148d 36c 32c 32a,c 180d 69a,c
1995 131e 41d 34c 40a,b 165e 81b,c
2000 124e 45d 33c 29c 157e 74c
Norway
1981 175a 41a 20a 45a 195a 87a
1990 128b 37b 39b 59b 168b 95b
2000 132b 61c 15c 32c 147c 93b
Sweden
1981 139a 55a 28a 44a 167a 99a
2001 72b 35b 28a 36b 100b 71b
n o t e :  Comparing across survey years within gender, estimates in columns with different letter sub-
scripts are significantly different, for example, estimates of nonroutine housework for American women 
in 1975 and 1985 are significantly different whereas estimates in 1985 and 1998 are not significantly dif-
ferent. Comparing within year, all gender differences are significant except nonroutine housework in the 
United States 1965, Germany 1965, and the Netherlands 1980, 1990, and 2000.
s o u rc e :  Multinational Time Use Studies, versions World 5.5.2 and World 5.0.0.
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about a 1.5 hours per day in housework, with the former two representing 
liberal states and the latter two representing a conservative and a Nordic 
welfare state, respectively.
Women shed time in routine cooking and cleaning more than in non-
routine household tasks, such as household repairs, animal care, and yard 
care. Sharper declines in routine compared with nonroutine housework are 
not surprising, because the majority of women’s housework is spent cooking 
and cleaning. In France and the Netherlands (both conservative countries), 
nonroutine housework time also fell 10 to 20 minutes between the 1970s 
and 2000s. However, in liberal states, nonroutine housework increased 
about 10 minutes, with higher levels in Australia. The latter is theoretically 
unexpected and may reflect the higher rates of “singlehood” and thus less 
availability of a household man to take care of these chores.
Table 2.1 also reveals substantial variation across countries in the tim-
ing of women’s declines in housework that reveals as much within-regime 
as between-regime variation. For example, in Canada and the United King-
dom, two of the liberal countries, steeper declines occurred prior to the mid 
1980s, and average housework minutes from the most recent time point 
are virtually identical to those from the 1980s. In contrast, between the 
1980s and 2000s, American women’s housework declined an additional 27 
minutes, Norwegian women’s declined 21 minutes, and Swedish women’s 
declined 67 minutes. Dutch women shed housework in smaller but steady 
increments (between 8 and 26 minutes each five-year interval), but this pat-
tern could be the result of the closer spacing of the Dutch surveys compared 
with the longer time spans between surveys in other countries.
Turning to trends for men, their housework time increased between 
1965 and 2000, in all countries except Sweden, for which data are avail-
able only for the 1990 to 2000 period. Swedish men’s housework declined 
from 99 minutes per day to 71 minutes per day, with drops in both routine 
and nonroutine housework. Declines in Swedish men’s—and women’s—
housework during the last decade are interesting, because they occurred 
after technological improvements that reduced time demands for labor and 
policy tweaks designed to encourage men’s involvement in household la-
bor. Consequently, decreased standards or increased outsourcing may play a 
larger role in Sweden than in other countries, or women and men in Sweden 
may be investing domestic time in children more so than in housework.
Increases in men’s housework are more substantial in the liberal and two 
of the conservative countries—20 to 30 minutes in the United States, Canada, 
the United Kingdom, Germany, and France; and 50 minutes in Australia—
compared with modest increases of about 10 minutes in the Netherlands and 
Norway. However, the smaller increase in Norway needs to be examined in 
light of higher levels of men’s housework there. For example, Norwegian men 
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devoted 87 minutes to housework in 1981 and 93 minutes in 2000, compared 
with Canadian men’s 73 and 86 minutes at roughly comparable time points. 
Similar to women, contemporary Australian men devote the most time to 
housework, clocking in at 110 minutes, and Swedish men the least time, at 
71 minutes per day (closely trailed by Dutch men at 74 minutes). The current 
cross-national variation in men’s housework time is starkly different from the 
historical picture of similarity. For example, in the mid 1970s, men in both 
conservative and liberal countries alike spent only about an hour a day do-
ing housework. Unfortunately, data earlier than 1981 are not available in the 
MTUS for the Nordic countries, so whether men there also spent comparable 
time in housework in the mid 1970s cannot be ascertained.
Historically, men’s housework time was disproportionately spent in the 
more discretionary, less time-consuming nonroutine tasks (e.g., repairs and 
yard work). Their lack of involvement in daily cooking and cleaning was 
interpreted to symbolize greater male privilege in households. Table 2.1 in-
dicates this pattern has reversed in six of the nine countries. In Canada, the 
United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Norway, men now spend 
more time in routine housework than in nonroutine: about 45 minutes 
versus 30 to 38 minutes in the liberal and conservative countries, and 61 
minutes in Norway. In addition, Australian and Swedish men spend about 
the same time in routine and nonroutine housework: 52 and 58 minutes in 
routine and nonroutine, respectively, in Australia; and 35 and 36 minutes 
in Sweden. Increases in men’s housework time were concentrated in routine 
housework in the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Norway, 
whereas both routine and nonroutine housework increased in Australia and 
Canada. In Germany, with 1992 as the latest data available through MTUS, 
men continue to spend more time in nonroutine tasks, but the difference has 
narrowed from 40 minutes in 1965 (53 minutes in nonroutine compared 
with 13 minutes in routine) to 19 minutes in 1992 (55 minutes compared 
with 36 minutes). Hence, more recent data might show more equal invest-
ments in routine and nonroutine housework. In the United States, however, 
the trend data indicate that in 1985 and 1998, U.S. men devoted more time 
to routine than nonroutine tasks (27 minutes in 1985 and 54 minutes in 
1998); but, in 2003, this pattern reversed, with men spending 45 minutes 
in nonroutine and only 36 minutes per day in routine housework. It is not 
possible to determine whether this reversal indicates a real change or instead 
reflects methodological differences between the 1985, 1998, and 2003 U.S. 
surveys (earlier surveys were conducted by the University of Maryland with 
smaller samples, the 2003 survey was conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau 
with much larger samples). Critics of the hypothesis that gender differences 
in housework have attenuated have pointed to men’s lack of involvement in 
routine chores as a sign of continued gender inequality, because men were 
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selectively investing time in more rewarding tasks, leaving women to tend to 
the less pleasant, routine chores. Excepting the United States and Germany, 
for which data limitations preclude firm conclusions, results in Table 2.1 
suggest that men are relinquishing some male privilege and getting more 
involved in daily cooking and cleaning. Future analyses of data from the 
late 2000s on U.S. and German men’s housework should clarify trends in 
these countries, particularly whether U.S. men are moving against the tide 
in terms of the gender equality in routine housework.
The sanguine trend of men’s greater involvement in housework belies 
the fact that the increases have stopped in most countries. In Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and the Netherlands—all countries with data spanning 
the 1980s to 2000s—men’s housework time has not budged significantly 
since the 1980s, with current levels at about 80 minutes a day. Increases in 
Norway between 1981 and 1990 were significant but not substantive, with 
men’s housework moving from 87 to 95 minutes per day. Moreover, in the 
United States, after topping out at 94 minutes a day in 1998, men’s house-
work fell to 81 minutes in 2003, only slightly higher than the 76 minutes 
men devoted to household work in the 1980s. As noted earlier, in Sweden, 
men’s housework declined 29 minutes (99 minutes to 71 minutes) during 
the past decade. Hence, men’s greater time in routine housework appears to 
have come from a reallocation of time from nonroutine housework instead 
of additional time being spent on household chores.
How have trends in men’s and women’s absolute housework time af-
fected the gender gap in housework? Across countries, women still do more 
housework than men, but the gap has attenuated substantially. This is shown 
in Figure 2.1, which presents ratios of women’s to men’s housework minutes 
by decade and country.
Generally, during the 1970s, women did more than 3.5 times as much 
housework as men, whereas during the late 1990s and early 2000s, they 
devoted 1.5 to 2 times as many hours. Unlike absolute levels of women’s 
and men’s housework, which point to anomalous patterns within regimes, 
the gender housework gap during the 1990s and 2000s corresponds closely 
with the welfare state regime typology. It is smallest in the Nordic countries 
and largest in the conservative countries, with English-speaking countries 
arrayed in the middle. In 2000, the ratio of women’s to men’s housework 
time is the same in Norway and the United States, with women doing 1.6 
times as much housework as men, compared with a ratio of 2.1 in France 
and the Netherlands. In Sweden, thought to be the most egalitarian state, 
the housework ratio is the lowest at 1.4.
In sum, trends shown in Table 2.1 indicate that women’s and men’s ab-
solute levels of housework vary as much within regime as between regime. 
Among women, housework levels are highest in Australia (a liberal country) 
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and France (a conservative country); they are lowest in the United States and 
Sweden, a liberal and Nordic country, respectively. In addition, Australian 
women spent as much time doing housework in the late 1990s as women 
in the other three liberal countries did in the 1960s and 1970s, and trends 
in Norway are more similar to those in the Netherlands than they are to 
those in the Sweden. Among men, although historical data indicate low 
housework levels across regime types, contemporary data show that Aus-
tralian and Norwegian men’s levels are most similar. Furthermore, the larg-
est difference in contemporary levels is found when comparing Australian 
men with their counterparts in the other liberal states, because Australian 
men perform the most housework. In contrast, the relative gender gap in 
housework tracks regime type closely, because it is smallest in the Nordic 
countries and largest in conservative countries. These results suggest that 
absolute levels of housework are influenced more by cultural housekeeping 
standards and country-specific feedback loops between individual and state 
characteristics, whereas the gender gap may be influenced more strongly by 
a regimes’ collective embrace of gender equality in time use.
To explore determinants of housework more closely, I estimated a series 
of ordinary least squares regression models separately for women and men 
in each country. Pooled models tested whether the associations of marriage, 
parenthood, and employment with housework changed over time (results 
available from author). Model coefficients were then used to derive regres-



















































Figure 2.1. Trends in the housework gender gap by country, 1970s to 2000s.
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parenthood, and employment. results not shown indicate that marriage and 
parenthood increase women’s housework across regime types, but in three of 
the nine countries (Australia, the United Kingdom, and Germany), positive 
effects of both have attenuated. In addition, marriage increases housework 
less today than in the 1970s in Canada, and parenthood has a smaller effect 
on women’s housework in the United States. Among men, married men do 
more housework than single men, except in Australia and Sweden, where 
marriage is not significant, but effects are modest. Parenthood, however, 
increases men’s housework only in Sweden.
Figure 2.2 shows regression-adjusted housework minutes by employ-
ment status and country for women (the first two sets of bars) and men (the 
last two sets of bars). The figure shows that, in contrast to marriage and 
parenthood, which continue to increase women’s housework more strongly 
than men’s, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, employment reduces 
women’s and men’s housework time in similar ways in four of the nine coun-
tries—the U.S., Australia, Norway, the Netherlands—and, in Sweden, em-
ployment has no effect on either women’s or men’s housework. In the United 
States and Australia, employment depresses women’s and men’s housework 
by about 70 minutes, whereas in Norway and the Netherlands, employed 
women’s and men’s housework is about 30 minutes less compared with their 
nonemployed counterparts.
Figure 2.2. regression adjusted housework time by employment status and coun-


































results not shown indicate that, historically, employment affected wom-
en’s housework more strongly than men’s in the United States, Australia, the 
Netherlands, and Norway (albeit the attenuation of employment effects for 
U.S. and Norwegian women is not significant). In the remaining countries, 
employment continues to decrease women’s housework more strongly than 
men’s. In Canada and the United Kingdom, employed women do about 
62 minutes less housework than nonemployed women, compared with the 
30-minute or so decline among Canadian and U.K. men. In Germany and 
France, employed women do about 70 minutes less housework compared 
with nonemployed women, but German employed men reduced their house-
work by only 42 minutes and French men by about 28 minutes. Employ-
ment exerts less downward pull on Canadian, U.K., German, and French 
women’s housework in later decades compared with the 1970s in Canada 
and the United Kingdom, and the 1960s in Germany and France.
conclusion
In sum, when cross-national changes in women’s and men’s absolute house-
work time are evaluated, there is less concordance with the liberal, conserva-
tive, and Nordic welfare state regime, but when the relative gender gap in 
housework is assessed, the correspondence is much closer. Data also indi-
cate that levels of housework and timing of women’s declining housework 
vary cross-nationally. Women in Germany and Australia spend more time 
doing housework compared with women in all other countries. Germany 
and Australia have historically favored male breadwinner, female caregiver 
family arrangements, and housework trends suggest gender specialization 
in paid and unpaid work remains relatively strong. Housework levels are 
more similar in the liberal regimes of Canada and the United Kingdom, and 
Norway, a Nordic welfare state, at about 160 minutes a day, than they are 
when compared with the United States (133 minutes), the other liberal wel-
fare state, and when compared with Sweden (100 minutes), the other Nordic 
state. Norwegian men have consistently spent more time doing housework 
than men in liberal and conservative states, but in 2000, they also spent 
about 20 minutes more than men in Sweden. Moreover, data from 2000 
indicate fairly similar housework allocations among men in the English-
speaking countries, France, and Norway, and far less time among Dutch 
and Swedish men.
Nonetheless, the housework gender gap is smallest in the more egalitar-
ian Nordic countries and largest in the conservative countries, with the gap 
in English-speaking countries at intermediate levels. The positive association 
of marriage and parenthood, and the negative association of employment 
with women’s housework—as well as the gender difference in effects—is 
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generally stronger in conservative countries compared with Nordic and 
liberal countries. For example, the ratio of women’s to men’s housework 
is the largest in Germany, with women doing more than twice as much 
housework, and the smallest in Sweden, with women doing 1.4 times as 
much housework as men. Multivariate results also indicate that parenthood 
and employment affect Swedish women’s and men’s housework in more 
similar ways than their effects in the other countries, in particular when 
compared with Germany. In addition, although marriage increases Swed-
ish women’s housework and has no effect on Swedish men’s housework, 
the positive association of marriage on women’s housework is smallest in 
Sweden. Among the English-speaking countries, marriage, parenthood, and 
employment are more strongly associated with women’s housework, vis-à-
vis men’s housework, in Australia and the United Kingdom, compared with 
Canada and the United States. Historically, the United Kingdom and Aus-
tralia have promoted gender differences by instituting regulations and pro-
grams that encourage a strong male breadwinner, female caregiver model, 
whereas Canada and the United States have tilted toward encouraging an 
earner–caregiver model. Hence, the closer clustering by welfare state regime 
of the relative levels of women’s and men’s housework (e.g., the gender gap 
in housework within country) suggests that gender differences in housework 
are influenced more strongly by work and family policies, and aggregate 
levels of gender equality. Although exploring policy effects on housework is 
beyond the scope of this analysis, results point to the importance of policies 
meant to encourage women’s employment and, perhaps, encourage men to 
do housework. In contrast, cultural standards of cleanliness and country-
specific cross-level interactions between microcharacteristics and macroen-
vironment may play a larger role in influencing women’s and men’s absolute 
levels of housework.
In sum, the overall picture is of greater similarity in women’s and men’s 
housework time, with more progress made on equalizing time investments 
in Nordic countries. However, trend data also indicate that movement to-
ward comparable time investments in housework has stalled in the United 
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Norway. Wom-
en’s housework did not decline significantly and men’s housework did not 
increase significantly after the mid 1980s in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Women’s housework time decreased through 
the 1990s in Canada and Norway, but men’s housework did not change sig-
nificantly after the 1980s. Only in France and Sweden do the data suggest 
further convergence in women’s and men’s housework time, and if data from 
the 1980s were available from France, a different conclusion about con-
vergence might be in order. The lack of three time points for Germany and 
Australia preclude assessing whether further convergence will occur there.
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Technological advances, such as dishwashers, clothes dryers, micro-
waves, and prepackaged food, and increases in the prevalence of “eating 
out” do appear to play a part in the reduction of women’s unpaid work time 
in western industrialized countries (Gershuny and robinson 1988). Data 
presented here suggest that sociodemographic changes matter, such that de-
clining levels of marriage and later age of marriage and smaller family size 
have reduced the demand for housework at the same time that increases in 
women’s employment and education have reduced their available supply of 
housework time. The environmental context in which microcharacteristics 
are embedded is also salient. The lack of change in recent decades in Eng-
lish-speaking and conservative countries suggests that further reductions in 
women’s housework may not be possible without threatening the production 
of household goods and services necessary to maintain a sanitary, healthy 
home environment and personal appearance. Thus, additional normative 
shifts in gender relations that would work to increase men’s housework are 
necessary. Moreover, although men’s greater involvement in routine house-
work indicates they have relinquished some of the perks that accrue from 
“being the man of the house,” trend data suggest all but Swedish men may 
be reluctant to ratchet up housework to levels equivalent to women’s time 
investments. Hence, in liberal and conservative states, the gendered nature 
of marriage and parenthood work together with extrafamilial gendered in-
stitutions to mutually reinforce women’s greater and men’s lesser time in-
vestments in housework. Although to a lesser extent than the 1970s, gender 
is still the most potent determinant of who’s doing the housework.
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At the beginning of the 21st century, women are more likely to have a paid 
job than to be housewives in almost all industrialized countries, a statement 
one could not imagine just after World War II. The increased participation 
of women in the labor market has had clear implications for family life and 
work at home (Moen 2003; van der Lippe and Peters 2007). Women’s time 
spent on domestic duties is related to their involvement in paid work, as 
many studies have shown (Bianchi et al. 2000; Shelton and John 1996). It 
is likely that men are also affected by the change in labor force participa-
tion of women in society, but studies are less conclusive on the effect of 
women’s working hours on the involvement of men in the household (Davis 
and Greenstein 2004; Shelton and John 1996).
Despite the overall increase in levels of women’s employment, large dif-
ferences exist between countries, as has been illustrated in many Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and other compara-
tive reports (European Commission 2006; OECD 2006). Given the variety 
of employment experiences, is the effect of employment for men and women 
on domestic duties the same in all countries? Although individual charac-
teristics have been shown to be important for hours of domestic work, men 
and women make their domestic work-related decisions in the country where 
they live, with its own economy, policy regulations, and culture. For instance, 
the availability of child care facilities, the economic regime, and the gender 
culture might influence household decisions of men and women. Although 
many studies have been performed in single countries, comparative studies of 
the relation between employment and housework are scarce (Geist 2005) and 
seldom test the influence of the macro context (Davis and Greenstein 2004). 
In this chapter we aim to get more insight into the relation between work 
hours of women and housework hours of both men and women.
The chapter starts with an overview of women’s employment in OECD 
countries: their participation rates, wage differences, and occupational segre-
gation (including in management positions). After this macrolevel overview, 
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we continue with an explanation of the influence of women’s employment 
on housework. Both microlevel and macrolevel explanations are combined 
in one model. Hypotheses are tested using International Social Survey Pro-
gram (ISSP) data with information on household labor in 33 countries. In-
stitutional data offer a test of whether the effect of women’s employment on 
household work differs for countries that differ in terms of welfare regime, 
child care policies, and gender culture.
women’s employment
The most common indicator used to describe and compare women’s posi-
tions in the labor market is the female economic activity rate. Nordic coun-
tries, such as Sweden and Denmark, have had higher levels of female labor 
force participation than other western countries for a long time, as Table 
3.1 shows. The Anglo-Saxon countries like the United States and the United 
Kingdom were runners up, whereas in Italy, only half the active female 
population had a paid job in 2006. The Netherlands has had a low level of 
women’s employment for a long time, but recently the number of working 
women increased sharply. As a result of their communist regimes, which 
promoted universal employment, the female labor force participation rate 
in eastern European countries in the 1970s was high compared with western 
countries, and it remained stable until the transition from socialism. Activity 
rates of both men and women decreased in these countries, as can be seen 
in Table 3.1, and they are now among the lowest in Europe. In Japan and 
Korea, female activity rates have been increasing, but to a lesser extent than 
in the European and Anglo-Saxon countries. Female activity rates in Mexico 
remain at a low level. In contrast to women, activity rates of men have re-
mained high and stable during the past 35 years and are fairly comparable 
between countries.
Despite the overall increase in the level of women’s employment, there 
are considerable differences between countries when it comes to the number 
of hours per week that women work for pay. Although part-time work for 
women is common in European countries such as Germany, Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, employed women in Greece, Spain, 
and Portugal more often work full-time, as can be seen in Table 3.2. In 
eastern European command economies, part-time work simply did not exist 
before the political turnover. Almost 20 years later, full-time work is still 
the rule in the postsocialist countries (van der Lippe and Fodor 1998). Be-
tween the Anglo-Saxon countries, differences exist in the part-time rates of 
women. In Australia, part-time rates are high, whereas in the United States, 
part-time work for women is an exception. In Japan, many working women 
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in nearly all countries, as can be seen in Table 3.2. Only in Norway, the 
Netherlands, and Australia more than 15 percent of the working men have 
a part-time job.
Despite the increasing number of women in the labor market, women 
still have fewer managerial positions and earn less than men. This is espe-
cially the case in Japan and Korea, as Table 3.2 shows. Also, in western 
European countries, women are overrepresented in jobs with lower wages, 
and they have less authority in the workplace than men (Wright, Baxter, 
and Birkelund 1995). Only in the United States are there nearly as many 
female managers as male managers. This figure goes along with the high 
full-time labor force participation rate for American women. Although in 
Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden high participation rates of women 
ta b l e  3 . 2











in Earnings,  
2004Men Women
Denmark 12.0 24.9 23 14
Finland 7.9 14.8 27 20
Norway 16.0 32.9 25 —b
Sweden 8.5a 20.8a 29 14
Austria 4.8 29.6 28 —
Belgium 6.2 33.1 19 9
France 5.3 23.3 — 12
Germany 7.4 39.4 27 24
Ireland 6.8 34.8 34 20
The Netherlands 15.3 60.9 27 29a
United Kingdom 10.0 39.3 33 20
Greece 3.0 11.1 25 12
Italy 5.3 29.2 19 14a
Portugal 5.9 14.4 32 19
Spain 4.2 22.2 32 16
Czech republic 1.6  5.5 26 19
Hungary 1.8  5.0 34 13
Poland 7.1 17.4 33 11
Turkey 3.2 13.4  9 —
United States 7.8 18.3 45 21
Canada 10.8 26.9 35 22
Australia 15.7 41.7 26 14
New Zealand 10.2 35.3 38  6
Japan 14.2 42.3  9 32
Korea 6.5 12.5  5 40
OECD employment outlook (www.nationmaster.com, www.OECD.stat), ILO, several years.
aYear nearest to 2004–2005.
bNot available.
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also exist, women are less visible in executive positions in these countries 
(Mandel and Semyonov 2006). In eastern Europe during the socialist era, 
the gender gap in earnings, as well as the difference in authority levels, was 
substantial but not as large as in western European countries (van der Lippe 
and Fodor 1998). The current differences in eastern Europe are similar to 
those in western Europe.
Probably the most striking resemblance between all countries is the fact 
that regardless of women’s position in the labor market, women remain 
responsible for the family (Fuwa 2004). regardless of their employment 
status, women still do more housework than men (Bianchi et al. 2000; Ger-
shuny and robinson 1988). Of course, as we have seen, women do not 
participate in the labor market at such high levels as men, and they often 
have part-time jobs. However, when they have full-time jobs, their domestic 
workload still tends to be heavier than that of men. This was even the case 
during the socialist period in eastern Europe, when both men and women 
were working full-time. Given the variety of female paid employment figures 
in countries, and the cultural and economic differences between countries, 
one may expect that there will be differences between countries in the rela-
tion between paid and household work.
the influence of women’s employment 
on household work
Microlevel Explanations
A rich body of literature is available on the influence of females’ paid work 
on men’s and women’s allocation of domestic time. Although housework 
and paid work are decided upon simultaneously according to the economic 
literature, this chapter assumes that paid work is influencing domestic work. 
According to the existing theories in the field—available time (Bianchi et 
al. 2000; Shelton and John 1996; Stafford, Backman, and Dibona 1977), 
human capital and relative resources (Becker 1981; Coltrane 2000; van der 
Lippe 1994), and gender ideology (Perrucci, Potter, and rhoads 1978; Shel-
ton and John 1996)—a wife’s full-time job would decrease her time spent on 
domestic duties. Less time is available for household work when a woman 
is employed, and presumably her time has become more valuable in the 
labor market anyway. Not only does a wife’s full-time job affect her own 
household work, but her husband’s household work will also be influenced. 
Because the wife is less available at home, more tasks need to be performed 
by the husband. Working full-time increases her human capital in the labor 
market, which will indirectly increase the husband’s time in the household. 
Women’s employment would make them less economically dependent on 
their husbands, and this leads to less domestic work by the wife and more 
46 The Political Economy of Housework
by the husband (Brines 1993). Having a full-time job would go hand in hand 
with more egalitarian norms, resulting in less domestic work by the wife as 
well. Moreover, when the wife has a full-time job, egalitarian gender norms 
will direct the husband to do household duties. Doing gender perspectives 
argue, though, that household duties are perceived as “women’s work,” 
so that the effect of full-time paid work of women on male participation 
in household work might be less than expected. Although most research 
has focused on testing these individual-level explanations, one cannot as-
sume that these mechanisms studied in single-country cases are similar in 
other countries (Geist 2005). It can be expected that these mechanisms on 
the individual level differ between countries, implying the need for a test of 
cross-national differences.
Macrolevel Explanations
Theory formulation on the influence of the institutional context on indi-
vidual choices tends to use a typology of welfare regimes, the behavior of in-
dividuals being influenced by different types of welfare states, with different 
features and characteristics that more or less exclude one another. The most 
familiar typology for capitalist countries is undoubtedly that of Esping-An-
dersen (1990, 1998). This typology holds that countries can be classified 
by their degree of “decommodification” (the extent that social insurance 
has become a right) and the way in which solidarity between citizens takes 
shape. Other typologies base their classification of different institutional 
contexts on the degree of gender equality in paid and unpaid labor (Lewis 
1992; Orloff 1993) or on the basis of culture (Hakim 2003).
In this study we use the typology of Esping-Andersen, albeit somewhat 
adjusted. research indicates that this typology is a fair predictor of a mul-
titude of behaviors of men and women in the labor market (van der Lippe 
and Van Dijk 2002) and at home (Geist 2005). According to the Esping-An-
dersen typology, the Scandinavian countries belong to the social–democratic 
cluster, which is characterized by widespread government services to assist 
families in caring for their dependents, equal rights for men and women, 
and major support to ensure everyone a livelihood. There are few limita-
tions on women spending a lot of time in the labor market. The conservative 
cluster contains a group of western European countries, like Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Germany. In this type of welfare state, the male breadwin-
ner ideology is central, there are tax incentives aimed at promoting mother-
hood, and the costs of women participating in paid labor are usually high. 
These high costs are usually visible through tax policies or a lack of public 
child care. The third type of welfare state is liberal, like England and the 
United States; men and women are perceived as equal in these welfare re-
gimes, but the government is passive when it comes to facilitating women’s 
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paid labor. For Europe, we add another two clusters (Blossfeld and Drobnic 
2001; Ecorys 2005): a Mediterranean cluster that is strongly family oriented 
and where there is little government intervention; and a postsocialist cluster, 
where full-time work for men and women has been central. In general, it is 
found that men’s housework hours increase in postsocialist countries when 
both spouses have a paid job, although the results by Davis and Greenstein 
(2004) show contrary findings. They find that families in Poland and Slo-
venia have a more equal division of housework than in the United States, 
whereas couples in russia have a less equal division of tasks. Because we 
have data for Asian and Latin American countries available as well, we in-
clude an Asian and a Latin American cluster.
Although it is possible to formulate hypotheses on the influence of the 
welfare regime on housework (Geist 2005), it is more difficult to formu-
late hypotheses on the influence of paid labor on housework hours for the 
welfare regimes. Is it, for example, mainly cultural differences between the 
countries that influence men’s and women’s cost–benefit considerations re-
lating female’s paid work to their participation in housework? Or, do such 
considerations take place under the influence of the (often insufficient) child 
care provisions?
To examine how regimes play out in the relation between women’s paid 
and unpaid labor, we need to go to the underlying dimensions of the welfare 
typology. Here we will focus on three indicators of the typology—namely, 
the culture, economy, and policy. A more equal division of paid work and 
housework is encouraged more in some countries than in others. In Den-
mark, for example, it is common for men to help with housework, whereas 
in Spain it is odd for a man to be involved with the housework. Gender 
culture is reflected both by the prevailing gender belief, and by the social and 
structural conditions in society (Fuwa 2004). With respect to gender culture, 
we will focus on the structural integration of women in society. The extent 
of gender differences in educational attainment, wage rates, career trajecto-
ries, and political power indicates the inclination of structural integration 
of women in society. With more structural integration, men will spend more 
time on housework and women will spend less time on housework. Fur-
thermore, the effect of employment of wives on domestic hours of husbands 
can be expected to be higher in countries with more structural integration 
of women. Men will tend to do relatively more housework. We are also 
inclined to believe that women benefit with respect to their time spent in 
domestic duties from working full-time in countries with more structural 
integration of women. Studying differences in cohabitation and marriage, 
Batalova and Cohen (2002) argued that a more progressive gender culture 
would lead to a more equal division of housework when people cohabit 
before marriage. They found that even people who did not cohabit before 
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marriage have a more egalitarian division of labor if they live in countries 
with a progressive gender culture.
With respect to institutional conditions, our focus lies on a crucial fea-
ture of social policy: the attention given to child care in a country. This type 
of social policy facilitates favorable conditions for women in terms of their 
time use in the labor market (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Gornick, Meyers, 
and ross 1998; Stier, Lewin-Epstein, and Braun 2001). We are referring 
specifically to public child care facilities. When ample child care facilities are 
available, it becomes less of a problem for mothers to work full-time. They 
do not worry about their children when they are at work, and they are able 
to spend less time on housework than if their children were home during the 
day. So we expect that in countries where the public expenditures on child 
care are large, full-time working women will do fewer domestic duties. Men 
might react by performing more housework, but also by doing less because 
household tasks can be outsourced using the working wife’s earnings (Treas 
and de ruijter 2008).
With regard to the influence of economic circumstances, we expect that 
in countries with highly developed economies—manifest, for example, in 
a high gross national product—full-time working women are able to out-
source their domestic duties more than in countries with a lower gross na-
tional product, and so they will spend less time on domestic work. Their 
husbands do not need to spend more time on housework either.
data
The 2002 Family and Changing Gender roles III module from the ISSP is 
used for analysis (Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung 2006). The 
ISSP is a cross-national collaboration that focuses on important social issues 
in various domains each year. The annual program in 2002 covers attitudi-
nal measures about family values, gender ideology, life and job satisfaction, 
as well as behavioral measures about number of hours devoted to household 
labor and the labor market. The original questionnaire is translated and 
fielded independently by local research institutes across 33 countries. We 
focus in this chapter on married couples between 18 and 65 years, because 
we are interested in the effect of female employment hours on males’ and 
females’ housework. After removing cases with missing values on key vari-
ables, we are left with a sample of 21,458 respondents.
The dependent variable, housework, is measured using the question: On 
average, how many hours a week do you personally spend on household 
work, not including child care and leisure time activities? Unlike many other 
studies, we focus only on strictly domestic duties and not on caring activities, 
which are not addressed in the ISSP. Paid work by women is measured by the 
number of hours worked per week. The control variables at the individual 
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level are hours of paid work by husband, male and female education, age, 
household income, and the presence of young children ages 0 to 5 years and 
6 to 17 years. Gender ideology is measured using the following four items:
1. A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.
2. All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.
3.  A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and 
children.
4.  A man’s job is to earn money; a women’s job is to look after the home 
and family.
All the indicators are presented on a 5-point scale, with higher sores indicat-
ing that the respondent has a more egalitarian gender ideology. Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.74 shows satisfactory internal consistency of the scale. As one 
may note, many of these control variables are also used in common explana-
tions of housework.
The welfare regimes are measured with seven clusters: the conservative 
(Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland), social–
democratic (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), liberal (United Kingdom, 
United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia), Mediterranean (Portugal, 
Spain, Cyprus, Greece), postsocialist (Hungary, Czech republic, Slovakia, 
Poland, russia, Latvia, Slovenia), Asian (Japan, Philippines, Taiwan), and 
Latin American (Mexico, Brazil, Chile). For child care, we used the enroll-
ment of young children (age 0–2 years) in child care (World Education Fo-
rum, 2000; Kamerman, 2000). Structural integration of women in society 
is measured by the gender empowerment measure (GEM)—a summary 
measure of the general macrolevel inequality, particularly in economic and 
political life. The GEM is an index obtained from the Human Development 
Report of the United Nations Development Program (2006). This index 
increases as the following four measures increase: (1) women’s percentage 
share of parliamentary seats; (2) women’s percentage share as legislators, 
senior officials, and managers; (3) women’s percentage share as professional 
and technical workers; and (4) ratio of women’s to men’s earned income, 
with a higher value reflecting a higher level of gender equality at the soci-
etal level. We start the analysis by explaining the cross-national differences 
between macrolevel indicators and household work before turning to the 
testing of the macro differences.
results
Cross-National Variation in Housework
The welfare regime of the country where men and women live is related to 
the time spent on housework (Table 3.3). Women in Latin American coun-
tries spend a lot of their time on domestic duties compared with the other 
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countries. In social–democratic and liberal countries, they spend less time 
on housework. For men, a comparable picture shows up. In Latin American 
countries, they spend much time on domestic work; in western regimes, 
less. In social–democratic, liberal, and Mediterranean regimes, tasks are 
more equally divided between husbands and wives than in the other re-
gimes. remarkably, Asian countries (known for their traditional culture) are 
where men spend more time on household duties than women. This might 
be caused by other factors not controlled for in this bivariate analysis.
The other three macrolevel indicators show a clear connection to do-
mestic work as well. When child care enrollment is high, women spend less 
time on housework. One may imagine that it is easier also to spend less time 
on domestic duties when children are cared for by others. For men, it seems 
to be important that there is some child care, but not too much; they spend 
more time on housework when child care enrollment is in the middle range 
than when child care enrollment is low or high. As with the other indica-
tors, child care enrollment might stand for another macrolevel indicator. 
ta b l e  3 . 3
Weekly hours of domestic work for husbands and 








Latin American 28.7 35.0
Asian 24.5 22.6
Child care
 Low 15.2 24.1
 Middle 23.4 24.4
 High 12.5 18.8
Gender empowerment
 Low 20.8 24.3
 Middle 15.9 21.9
 High 15.2 20.9
Gross domestic product
 Low 19.8 27.4
 Middle 17.1 21.0
 High 14.8 19.7
Paid work by wives
 0 hours/week 20.0 28.5
 1–24 hours/week 13.5 20.1
 25–35 hours/week 13.3 17.1
  >35 hours/week 14.8 17.3
N = 21,458
s o u rc e :  ISSP 2002
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Ample child care facilities often go hand in hand with a gender egalitarian 
culture and high economic development. We tried other measures of child 
care provisions, such as the availability of child care for young children, 
but the results do not change. The explanatory analyses described later will 
show whether, indeed, the effect of child care enrollment remains, control-
ling for other factors. A high GEM, indicating the structural integration of 
women in society, is clearly related to less domestic duties for both men and 
women, and the same can be said for high economic development. With 
respect to the GEM, the differences in domestic hours between a low and 
high GEM seem to be larger for men than for women. With respect to the 
gross domestic product (GDP), the housework hours differences seem to be 
larger for women.
Paid Work of Women and Domestic Work of Men and Women
Our main interest is in the relation between paid work of women and time 
spent on domestic work. In the second half of Table 3.3, this relation is 
shown. Women in the countries studied spend less time on domestic work 
when they have a paid job. Having a paid job is more important than the 
number of hours they spend on their paid job. If they do not have a paid 
job, they spend 28 hours a week on domestic work; if they work full-time 
(35 hours or more weekly), they spend 17 hours on domestic work. The 
housework time of the husband is much less related to the hours their wives 
spend working. When wives do not have a paid job, husbands even tend to 
do more in the household. Of course, this could also be caused by other fac-
tors, such as the presence of children in the home.
To give more insight into cross-national variation in the relation between 
paid work and domestic work by women, Figure 3.1 shows this relation for 
different welfare regimes. In liberal, social–democratic, and Asian regimes, 
the more time working wives spend on paid work, the less time they spend 
on housework. In the other regimes, the largest difference is found between 
housewives and working women, rather than between working women em-
ployed different numbers of hours. Furthermore, housewives in Mediter-
ranean and in Latin American regimes spend the most time on housework. 
Although not reported in a separate figure, husbands are less influenced 
by their wives’ employment. For example, partners in liberal, social–demo-
cratic, and Mediterranean regimes spend as much time on housework when 
the wife has a full-time paid job.
Micro and Macro Context: Multilevel Analyses
Multilevel analyses, during which we control for the fact that individuals 
are nested within countries, are needed to show whether the results remain 
when we control for other variables (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Analyses are 
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performed separately for husbands and wives. We first test a model without 
variables to show how much variance exists in housework at the individual 
and country levels. The second model includes the individual indicators; the 
third model adds the macrolevel regime variable. We also report our results 
with the other macro indicators, but without showing a table. Because of 
the small number of countries, complicated models with many macrolevel 
variables are not feasible. Individual coefficients change only slightly when 
different macro variables are entered. The results are shown in Table 3.4.
There clearly exists cross-national variation in hours of housework for 
husbands and wives. The variance components indicate, however, that there 
is much more variance at the individual level than at the country level. For 
husbands, only 10% of the variance in housework hours [74.37/(651.38 
+ 74.37)] is the result of variance between countries; for wives, this figure 
is nearly 18%. In other words, there is much more individual variation in 
domestic work within countries, perhaps resulting from differences in fam-
ily circumstances, educational levels of spouses, and gender ideologies, than 
there is variation in domestic work between countries.
The Influence of Microlevel Indicators
First, let us turn to the amount of paid work by wives. As we might ex-
pect, hours of paid work have a strong negative effect on their time spent 
on housework. The more time wives spend in the labor market, the less time 







































Figure 3.1. Wives’ weekly housework hours by paid work hours for wives in 
seven welfare regimes.
n o t e :  Con, Conservative; Lib, Liberal; Soc–dem, Social–democratic; Med, Mediterranean; 
Postsoc, Postsocialist; Latin Am, Latin American.
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we also have performed an analysis for which we studied full-time and part-
time working wives compared with nonworking wives. Full-time work has 
a large negative effect on the number of housework hours compared with 
the nonworking wives, but part-time work also has a negative effect on their 
domestic hours.
For husbands, the wives’ working hours have less effect. Whether the 
wife has a full-time paid job is hardly of any importance for the husband’s 
housework hours. The other way around, the amount of paid work by the 
husband positively influences the time the wife spends on domestic work. 
Again, it is not related to the husband’s own housework time. So absolute 
housework hours by females are influenced by their own and male paid 
working hours, but for husbands’ housework hours this is not the case. In 
a further analysis with the relative share of housework by husbands as the 
dependent variable, hours of paid work by the wife do have a positive effect 
ta b l e  3 . 4




(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Individual level
 Hours paid work,  
  women
–0.04+ –0.04+ –0.15** –0.16**
 Hours paid work,  
  men 
0.03 0.03 0.04** 0.04**
 Education, wife –0.57 –0.54 –1.20** –1.12**
 Education, men –1.14* –1.07* –0.04 –0.07
 Age 0.14* 0.14* 0.14** 0.14**
 Children age <6 y –1.36 –1.45 1.64* 1.58*
 Children age 6–17 y 0.70 0.61 1.54** 1.45**
 Egalitarian norms –1.40* –1.20* –1.45** –1.34**
 Income –0.04 –0.02 –0.02 –0.01
Institutional level
 Welfare regime
  Conservative  
   (reference)
  Liberal 1.30 –2.57
  Social–democratic –0.30 –4.11+
  Mediterranean 18.50** 3.24
  Postsocialist 4.85+ 3.42+
  Latin American 14.52** 12.50**
  Asian 12.93** 1.48
  Intercept 16.77** 17.44** 11.33** 21.99** 23.10** 20.98**
 Variance components
  Individual level 651.38** 609.37** 609.14** 215.79** 179.62** 179.68**
  Country level 74.37** 57.94** 19.84** 47.96** 28.34** 8.09**
s o u rc e :  ISSP 2002
+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
54 The Political Economy of Housework
on the husband’s share; hours of paid work by the husband has a negative 
effect. But, of course, this is a relative measure.
Nearly all the other indicators at the micro level are important for wives. 
Egalitarian norms lead to less domestic work for women, and family status 
also has a significant influence. Younger children increase the amount of 
domestic duties, an effect we find only for wives. As is the case in many other 
studies, men’s behavior is influenced less by individual and family character-
istics. Our analysis forms no exception.
The Influence of Macrolevel Indicators
The effects of microlevel indicators do not change much when the mac-
rolevel indicators are included in Table 3.4. However, the macro indicators 
do explain some of the variation at the micro and the macro levels. The 
regime indicator gives some interesting results. Wives in social–democratic 
countries spend significantly less time on domestic duties than their counter-
parts in conservative countries. For men, there is variation in domestic du-
ties only in the countries not belonging to Esping Andersen’s original typol-
ogy. In Mediterranean, postsocialist, Latin American, and Asian countries, 
men spend more time on housework than in conservative countries. These 
results support the report by Geist (2005), who did not find many differ-
ences between liberal and social–democratic welfare regimes in the domestic 
division of labor.
Analyses have been conducted for the other macro indicators (results 
not shown). As expected, wives in countries characterized by high enroll-
ment in child care facilities, higher gender empowerment, and high GDP 
spend less time on domestic work. For husbands, high levels of gender em-
powerment and GDP also have a negative effect on their time spent on 
housework. This is not what we would have expected, especially not for 
the GEM. As an indicator of structural integration, the GEM should lead 
to more time on housework by men! We have studied other more cultural 
indicators of gender culture, such as the percentage of all respondents who 
voiced support for full-time employment by mothers with preschoolers. This 
more cultural indicator shows no conclusive effects. More important, in 
an analysis with all macro indicators, only the effect of the GEM remains 
statistically significant for wives; for husbands, both gender empowerment 
and GDP are significant.
Interactions between Macro and Micro Contexts
Last, we studied interactions between the individual level of hours worked 
by the wife and the macrolevel indicators. Although Geist (2005) reported 
that women in conservative countries experience greater gender parity for 
specific household tasks with each additional hour worked than their coun-
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terparts in liberal and social–democratic countries, we were not able to rep-
licate the findings for hours of housework. The GEM does not interact with 
hours of paid work, implying that the effects of wives’ working hours on 
their housework do not differ between more or less structural gender equal-
ity in society. Fuwa (2004) and Geist (2005) do find effects of the GEM 
on housework, but this might be the result of the fact that they use a task 
measure, whereas an hour measure is used in this chapter. For the other 
two macrolevel indicators, we do not find significant interactions either. 
For husbands, the effect of the wife’s hours of paid work on the husband’s 
domestic duties becomes less negative when there is high child care enroll-
ment. This implies that husbands tend to spend more time on domestic du-
ties in high child care enrollment countries compared with husbands who 
have their partner working in a country with less child care facilities. This 
is an unexpected finding, but note that we are only focusing here on domes-
tic work and not on child care. Having ample child care facilities in your 
neighborhood might free up time for housework, because child care can be 
outsourced. Also, children who are in child care facilities are not at home 
creating messes that must be cleaned up.
conclusion
During the past few decades, women’s employment has been increasing in 
nearly all OECD countries, although the number of hours women are work-
ing in the labor market still differ quite a lot between countries. Women 
have fewer managerial positions and earn less than men all over the world, 
although these differences between, for example, the United States and Ja-
pan are huge. Just as there are marked differences in women’s employment 
patterns from country to country, our analysis shows that there are cross-na-
tional differences in hours of housework. Studying the relation between paid 
work hours and housework hours in various countries, we can conclude 
that the paid work of wives has a negative influence on their time spent on 
domestic duties, but its significance differs between countries. Especially in 
Mediterranean and Latin American countries, the differences in housework 
hours between full-time housewives and full-time working wives are large. 
In liberal and social–democratic countries, fewer differences in housework 
hours exist between these two groups of women. Surprisingly, a wife’s paid 
hours have little or no influence on her husband’s hours of housework in 
the 21st century. Although bivariate analyses suggest that husbands do more 
housework when their wives work full-time, these effects do not hold in 
multilevel analyses that control for individual- and country-level character-
istics. These results show the importance of studying the absolute volume 
of housework hours. Although researchers in the field (Batalova and Cohen 
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2002; Geist 2005) argue in favor of studying the share in housework, the in-
sensitivity of the husband’s housework to female working hours would not 
be apparent when studying only the housework share. The observation that 
the determinants of absolute and relative housework differ also corresponds 
with results that Sayers reports in Chapter 2. Perhaps a longitudinal design is 
needed, because men are showing larger increases in domestic work in suc-
cessive years in response to changing employment patterns in the household 
(Gershuny, Bittman, and Brice 2005).
Our analysis is not conclusive regarding which of the macrolevel indi-
cators is most important in explaining housework hours of husbands and 
wives. Structural integration of women in society seems to have the stron-
gest direct effect on housework hours. Similarly, Batalova and Cohen (2002) 
showed the importance of a gender egalitarian culture for a more equal 
division of household labor. More research is needed to come up with more 
definite answers. We argue that it is therefore necessary to collect more pre-
cise macro indicators—cultural, economic, and policy related—to gain bet-
ter insight into the influence of country characteristics. Moreover, because 
of the limited number of countries, regional variation in macro indicators 
might be useful to include in subsequent analyses of housework.
In this chapter we did not pay attention to the demand side of the labor 
market. Paid work by wives is viewed as a given. However, cross-national 
variation can exist in the demand for female labor force participation, draw-
ing women out of the home and away from housework. New analyses need 
to study the relation between the demand and supply of paid labor by wives, 
because this may help us to understand the division of housework between 
husbands and wives. As a result of data limitations, child care by parents 
is also excluded from the analysis. A fuller accounting of gendered labor in 
the home would need to understand whether individual- and macro-level 
indicators affect child care in the same way as housework. Housework tends 
to consist of different flexible tasks, most of which can be performed at one’s 
own chosen hours and moments of the day and the week, whereas child 
care consists of much less flexible tasks, with the timing driven by children’s 
needs and school schedules. Although we would expect that the wife’s em-
ployment would be negatively associated with her time in child care and 
housework, it seems likely that child care rendered by the husband might 
be more responsive to the wife’s work than his housework has been shown 
to be. And, although we have speculated that countries with high child care 
enrollments permit men to do more housework because they do less child 
care, this macrolevel mechanism invites an empirical test.
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Love occurs in context, yet the dominant theories of how couples divide up 
housework model the interactions between two adults as if they occurred 
in a social cocoon. For example, bargaining or social exchange theories fo-
cused on the power derived from paid work and predicted women’s in-
creasing employment would lead to men performing more domestic tasks.1 
However, an increase in men’s domestic share during the past decades stems 
primarily from the dramatic decline in women’s housework hours, not 
substantial increases in men’s.2 The persistence of the gendered division of 
housework regardless of a woman’s employment supports the gender per-
spective that our daily activities reflect and reinforce normative expectations 
of masculine and feminine behavior (West and Zimmerman 1987). These 
normative expectations vary across social classes or ethnic groups, as well 
as across countries, reflecting gender regimes (Connell 1987) or cultures 
(Pfau-Effinger 1998). Norms also evolve over time, albeit more slowly and 
less spectacularly than we had first anticipated. In sum, how couples might 
divide paid and unpaid labor in the household varies across class, ethnic, 
temporal, and country contexts.
Only recently, however, have researchers begun to explore how couples’ 
sharing of housework varies within its sociopolitical as well as temporal 
contexts. This research has yielded somewhat conflicting evidence, in part 
because theory development linking context with individual behavior lags 
behind the available international data. Most analyses to date have focused 
on policy effects on women’s equality in the public spheres such as educa-
tion, employment, or political representation (Baxter 1997; Fuwa 2004). 
Equally important and intertwined with equality in the public sphere is 
whether policies reinforce women’s normative responsibility for the private 
sphere. In this chapter I outline how a broad range of policies influences 
women’s access to paid work as well as their continued responsibility for 
unpaid domestic activities, illustrated with examples from Australia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. These three countries are based in 
c h a p t e r  f o u r
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British common law and share a liberal political ideology vis-à-vis reliance 
on the market over state provision of welfare, similarities that would lead 
us to expect common policy effects on the gendered division of labor across 
them. When comparing specific policies, however, the countries vary more 
in the degree to which the state shapes gender equality, so that we might find 
greater variation in how housework is divided within and across couples.
housework in context
researchers frequently model the division of housework using time avail-
ability for housework measured with paid work hours and/or relative re-
sources measured with absolute or relative wages of the partners. Both ap-
proaches predict that women’s increasing labor force participation should 
have led to a revolution in women’s and men’s domestic roles, a revolution 
Hochschild (1989) deemed “stalled.” regardless of employment or earn-
ings, U.S. women increase their housework hours when they move in with a 
man, whereas men decrease their hours when they move in with a woman.3 
The earliest comparative work reported little cross-country variation in ei-
ther the gendered division of housework or the effects of relative resources 
or time availability on altering this division.4 Despite this lack of significant 
variation, Baxter (1997) concluded any gains in gender equality in the home 
would result from women’s greater access to individual resources.
Breen and Cooke (2005) elaborate on this bargaining perspective using 
game theory to highlight the importance of alternatives to a relationship 
when deriving relative power in household negotiations. Only when women 
have economic resources sufficient to ensure their well-being outside of the 
relationship might they credibly threaten to leave households in which men 
refuse to participate in housework—a threat that increases their relative 
bargaining power. Under the normative gendered division of labor, Breen 
and Cooke (2005) argue, most men assume the average woman in their 
pool of possible partners has neither the inclination nor resources to leave. 
Consequently, an individual woman’s relative employment hours or earn-
ings predict only minimal increases in men’s housework. What is necessary 
before observing greater equality is that the proportion of economically au-
tonomous women must be sufficiently high to change men’s beliefs about 
what a partner would expect in the domestic sphere, and men must be will-
ing to act on those beliefs to maintain the relationship.
Some recent evidence supports the argument by Breen and Cooke 
(2005). Fuwa (2004) compared couples’ sharing of domestic responsibili-
ties in 22 industrial and transitional economies, controlling for aggregate 
country equality differences with the United Nations’ gender empowerment 
measure (GEM). The GEM includes the percentage of parliamentary seats 
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held by women; the percentage of women in administrative, managerial, and 
professional or technical positions; and women’s share of earnings income. 
Fuwa (2004) found time availability and gender ideology effects stronger 
or weaker for women in more versus less egalitarian countries, respectively, 
supporting that greater overall equality enhances the impact of individual 
resources on the division of housework. Hook (2006), using time diary data 
from 20 countries over several decades and controlling for the percentage 
of married women employed, women’s work hours, public child care slots 
for infants, and weeks of parental leave, found that men over time had in-
creased their total domestic hours (household tasks and child care) by about 
6 hours per week. Within this trend, a country’s greater aggregate female 
employment rate predicted men’s greater time in domestic tasks regardless 
of his partner’s actual employment.5 So we are accruing empirical evidence 
of linkages among policy, women’s employment, and how housework is 
divided up in the home.
The role of the state in shaping the gendered division of labor has grown 
as a subject of theoretical as well as empirical interest, in part following the 
growth in theories of the welfare state. Mainstream welfare state theories 
focus on worker–citizens, a definition that excludes women in their roles as 
dependent wives or mothers (Pateman 1988). Jane Lewis (1992) suggests, 
instead, examining women’s position in the labor market, social security, 
and tax systems to classify countries as ranging from “weak” to “strong” 
male breadwinner states by the extent to which policy relies on women’s 
responsibility for unpaid care work. Ann Orloff (1993) applies a gender 
lens to expand dimensions within Esping-Andersen’s (1990) widely cited 
welfare regime typology6 to include how the state affects women’s access to 
paid work, as well as her ability to establish an autonomous household. The 
approaches by Lewis (1992) and Orloff (1993) suggest that a much broader 
range of policies affects gender relations inside and outside the home than 
has been explored in cross-national analyses of housework to date.
policy effects on the gendered division of labor
Paid or Unpaid Work?
The three dimensions of policy effects on gender relations—reinforcement 
of women’s domestic roles, access to paid work, and ability to form au-
tonomous households—overlap and result in competing effects on women’s 
range of choices.7,8 For example, education and training systems can pre-
pare women to pursue careers similar to those of men, with recent evidence 
revealing women’s educational attainment beginning to equal or exceed 
men’s (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 
2004). Yet, the structure of public education often inhibits women’s ability 
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to participate in the labor force. Compulsory schooling does not start until 
children reach the age of 6 or 7 years, so without parental leaves, public pro-
vision of preprimary care, or child care tax credits, new mothers are more 
likely to exit employment upon childbirth. At the same time, extensive paid 
maternity leaves increase the incentive to interrupt employment for longer 
periods of time, particularly among low-skilled women (Jaumotte 2003). In 
some public educational systems, school hours vary, students are sent home 
for lunch, or school schedules include long or frequent vacations.9 These 
policies encourage part-time employment to accommodate school schedules 
that are out of sync with standard employment schedules, with women, not 
men, historically adjusting their paid work to family demands. Even well-
paid part-time employment reduces accrued work experience, increasing the 
gender wage gap. When conflict between work and family persists, the gender 
wage gap leads to couples making the “rational” decision that the woman 
should be the one to exit employment, perpetuating one basis of that gap.
Labor laws directly affect women’s access to paid work and the wages 
she might earn. In most industrialized countries, the first labor regulations re-
stricted women’s access to employment, often in hopes of improving working 
conditions for men and the working class more generally.10 These restrictions 
resulted in occupational segregation and gender wage differentials increasing 
late in the 19th century while married female employment rates plummeted 
among the new, white middle class. Pushed by second-wave feminists dur-
ing the 1960s and ’70s, industrial societies subsequently passed equal pay, 
antidiscrimination, or affirmative action policies supporting greater equality 
in women’s economic roles. This legislation painted over, but did not funda-
mentally restructure, the gendered foundations, so aggregate levels of gender 
employment inequality persist in different ways across countries.
Tax provisions also affect women’s access to paid work. High marginal 
tax rates, where a second earner’s income gets taxed at a higher percent-
age, discourage female employment among couples—an effect that becomes 
more acute under progressive tax systems as household earnings increase. 
Tax credits for dependent spouses also discourage married women’s employ-
ment, more markedly among higher earners if calculated as a percentage 
of income, or among lower income families if a lump-sum amount is suf-
ficiently high to make available female employment a less desirable option. 
Similarly, family allowances discourage employment among the least-skilled 
women, particularly in countries where child care is limited or expensive. 
The employment disincentive becomes more extreme when family allow-
ances or other transfers are means tested and cease abruptly when earnings 
exceed some modest threshold, leading to a poverty trap and reliance on 
state transfers.
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To achieve gender equality, education, labor, and tax policy must sup-
port women’s access to paid work on all dimensions simultaneously; support 
for only one or two aspects leads to some element of a gendered division 
of labor being perpetuated. For example, high relative wages but extensive 
female part-time employment reduces women’s accrued experience relative 
to men’s. High relative wages coupled with tax policies supporting married 
male breadwinner families might encourage growth in nonmarital house-
holds so that dual-earner couples can reap the gains from the market with-
out incurring government penalties. Good employment prospects but little 
financial support for child care exacerbates the tension between family and 
work, and class differences among women as well. Thus, gender equality 
remains elusive within a patchwork of competing policy effects on women’s 
choice between paid and unpaid labor.
Economic Alternatives to a Relationship
The better a partnered woman’s options in lieu of a coresidential relation-
ship, the greater her bargaining power within a relationship when negotiat-
ing housework with her partner. Across industrialized countries, however, 
female-headed households are worse off than male-headed households, and 
are at greater risk of poverty in large part because of women’s inferior ac-
cess to paid work. However, transfers from the state can close the gender 
earnings gap across different household types.11 These include tax credits 
for lower income earners, child care credits, family allowances, housing ben-
efits, or social transfers not tied to employment. Such provisions enhance 
women’s—or at least mothers’—economic alternatives; but, as noted earlier, 
they discourage employment when they provide income unrelated to paid 
work. The availability of transfers, however, minimizes class differences 
among women and strengthens lower income women’s relative resources 
within the family, because they provide access to income that otherwise 
might not be available.12 This enhances a woman’s bargaining power when 
couples negotiate housework.
rules for entitlement to work-related contributory benefits such as 
unemployment or pensions also influence women’s access to resources. In 
some countries, a woman’s entitlement is linked to her husband’s contribu-
tions rather than her own, with women losing access to these benefits upon 
divorce. A more common problem is that employed women pay insurance 
contributions as individuals, but the household is used as the basis for ben-
efit entitlement. As a result, a woman who loses her job might not have 
access to her unemployment benefits when her partner’s earnings maintain 
the household income above the required threshold. In keeping current with 
changing family demographics, many countries apply the household test to 
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cohabiting as well as legally married couples, although in some countries, 
such as Australia, only heterosexual couples fall under these rules.
Laws governing the division of marital assets and private postmarital 
payments also shape women’s ability to establish their own households. Di-
vorce law changes during the 1960s and ’70s were heralded as an advance 
for women’s right to leave unhappy marriages. Yet these laws also limited 
women’s right to spousal support, frequently expecting a woman to be eco-
nomically independent, regardless of whether she had been employed during 
the marriage. Child support payments can ease financial pressures when 
mothers establish their own households, but the amount of support and/
or the likelihood a mother receives it remain low even in countries such as 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, where central govern-
ment took control over award levels or collection.13 Because these laws and 
provisions affect women’s postrelationship economic situation, they alter 
her relative power within the relationship and influence the negotiated divi-
sion of housework.
Detailing the myriad of policy effects on gender relations highlights a 
key problem when comparing the division of housework across countries: 
Statistically, it is impossible to control for all of these effects. We quickly 
run out of country degrees of freedom in the hierarchical linear models in-
creasingly favored for conducting such multinational comparisons. An al-
ternative approach used here is to combine comparative and quantitative 
analytic methods. The comparative method is used to select countries that 
are similar on key dimensions, and to detail their historical and current 
policy differences, with quantitative individual-level analyses subsequently 
used to explore whether the pattern of aggregate variation yields differences 
observed at the individual level. Together, the different approaches advance 
our understanding of how context shapes couples’ private lives.
contrasting cases:  australia, united kingdom, 
and the united states
Esping-Andersen (1990) categorizes liberal regimes as those countries of 
British political heritage where an ideology of market capitalism dominates 
over state welfare provision.14 Consequently, the welfare state in these coun-
tries is less developed than in other regime types, with a greater expectation 
of individual responsibility for one’s well-being across the life course. Mod-
est, means-tested cash transfers are more common than government provi-
sion of services. Given the presumed minimal state reinforcement of hierar-
chies, women should have greater equality in these countries compared with 
the corporatist–conservative regimes found on the European continent that 
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reinforce gender hierarchies, but perhaps less than in social–democratic or 
former socialist countries actively encouraging education and employment 
equality, and assuming greater state responsibility for child care. A broad 
categorization of liberalism, however, overlooks the influence other institu-
tional actors have in setting and reshaping the state foundation of equality.
Australia
The powerful Australian trade union movement achieved men’s preferential 
employment access with the 1907 Harvester Judgement of the Common-
wealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court. This ruling established a family 
wage supporting a man, his dependent wife, and three children, regardless of 
an employer’s capacity to pay. Women’s access to employment was restricted 
with the 1912 court ruling distinguishing between men’s and women’s work, 
leading to greater occupational segregation. The gender wage gap became 
law with a 1919 ruling setting the female wage to approximately half the 
male wage. During the 1920s, feminists lobbied for equal pay and mother-
hood endowments to remove the pretext of a family wage, given that 60 
percent of working men were single with no dependents. Payment of the 
family wage was defended, however, on the grounds that single men had to 
purchase services provided to married men gratuitously, including house-
work (Lake 1993).
Beginning in the late 1960s, Australia passed a series of equal pay and 
comparable worth statutes that narrowed the gender wage gap compared 
with other countries, although these statutes did not rectify the occupa-
tional segregation.15 Australian government support for gender equality 
increased a bit further during the 1970s and ’80s, with the introduction of 
commonwealth funding for long-day child care places, 52 weeks of unpaid 
maternity leave, and equal rights in child custody and property settlements 
after divorce. Affirmative action became law in 1986, but penalties for non-
compliance remain negligible and the law applies only to private sector busi-
nesses with 100 or more employees, or less than 10 percent of Australian 
employers. Single mothers’ high reliance on government transfers led to the 
1988 Child Support registration and Collection Act, which established a 
new agency that would calculate child support awards and collect support 
payments. For similar reasons, the United States, in 1974,16 and the UK, 
in 1990, passed similar laws. Despite these efforts, less than three quarters 
of the Australian child support due is actually collected (Baker 2001), with 
similar lackluster results in the United Kingdom and the United States.17 As 
of the mid 1990s, about half of Australian single mothers lived in poverty, 
comparable with the proportion in the United Kingdom, but much less than 
in the United States. These high poverty rates are driven in large part by 
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single parents who are outside the labor force. Among nonemployed single 
parents, 42% in Australia, 65% in the United Kingdom, and more than 
93% in the United States live in poverty (Forster and Pearson 2000).
A conservative coalition took control of the Commonwealth govern-
ment during the 1990s, implementing more liberal market policies eroding 
the male wage while simultaneously reinforcing women’s domestic responsi-
bility. The 1996 Workplace relations Act introduced family caregiver leave 
and increased incentives for women to work part-time to balance employ-
ment and family demands better. The Family Support reform of 2000 in-
troduced Child Care Benefit to provide cash assistance to families rather 
than continued expansion of public child care, along with a two-part means-
tested allowance comprised of a general allowance and an additional allow-
ance for households with a single breadwinner. In perhaps one of the more 
stark modern examples of reinforcing women’s place in the home, a Baby 
Bonus was introduced in 2002 that offers a refundable tax offset of up to 
$2500 annually for up to 5 years if one parent reduces or exits employment 
upon the birth of the first child.
So despite the gender wage gains from the 1970s resulting in one of the 
narrowest current gender wage gaps for full-time workers at 89 percent (al-
though much larger when including part-time workers), most Australian poli-
cies reinforce a gendered division of labor. In addition, more young Australian 
women than men go on to university, but more women than men also fail to 
complete secondary schooling. The employment gap between women and men 
is 20 percentage points, and among Australian women who are employed, one 
third work part-time with lower wages and less access to benefits.18
United Kingdom
British policy reinforces separate spheres through continued reliance on 
women’s unpaid work in the home. William Beveridge (1942), architect of 
the modern British welfare state, premised a gendered system, because “. . . 
the great majority of married women must be regarded as occupied on work 
which is vital though unpaid, without which their husbands could not do 
their paid work and without which the nation could not continue” (p. 50). 
This premise led to a series of restrictions on married women’s independent 
access to work-related contributory benefits such as unemployment or pen-
sions, leading many women to opt out of making any contributions. After 
the insurance system changed in 1977 to require full contributions, the low-
paid, part-time work in which women dominate often fell below the Lower 
Earnings Limit, so that many women still remained uncovered by contribu-
tory insurance.19
Britain’s affiliation with the European Union (EU) advanced gender 
equality further than would have likely occurred otherwise. In anticipation of 
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joining the EU, Britain passed the Equal Pay Act of 1970 to be compliant with 
provisions under the 1957 Treaty of rome. The 1975 Sex Discrimination Act 
established the Equal Opportunities Commission, which subsequently took 
cases to the European Court to put pressure on the national government to 
comply with gender equality directives. For example, the 1975 Employment 
Protection Act granted maternity leave before and after birth, some of which 
was paid at 90 percent of prior wages, and some of which was paid at the flat 
sickness benefit rate. These maternity leave provisions are the most generous 
among the three countries discussed here, but until the 1990s, qualification 
parameters meant that only a fraction of British women were eligible. EU 
pressure led to improvements in these provisions to cover more women, in-
cluding rulings on Parental Leave (1984), Pregnancy (1990), and Working 
Time and Part-time Work (2000) (Walby 2001).
New Labour came into power in 1997 and introduced a series of New 
Deals emphasizing labor activation, although not necessarily away from a 
male breadwinner model. Some argue the Working Families Tax Credit dis-
courages employment of second earners, thus reinforcing a male breadwin-
ner model (Bennett 2002; Walby 2001). New Labour introduced a child care 
tax credit for working families for up to 70 percent of actual expenses and 
has expanded public preprimary child care, but only with part-time slots of 
limited help to mothers desiring full-time work. This reflects New Labour’s 
focus on women’s part-time employment as the key work–family reconcili-
ation strategy. Consequently, the gender employment gap at 14 percentage 
points is somewhat smaller in Britain than in Australia, but a similar propor-
tion of employed women work part-time. Lacking Australia’s comparable 
worth policies, however, the British gender wage gap is among the largest 
across industrialized countries, with British women who work full-time earn-
ing on average just 75 percent of what British men earn (OECD 2002).
United States
Ideological adherence to liberal tenets delayed and blunted development of 
a U.S. welfare state; decentralized trade unionism coupled with the nip and 
tuck of litigation reduced the degree to which gender inequalities became 
embedded within the state. U.S. employers effectively exploited the separa-
tion of powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of gov-
ernment to overturn early trade union legislative gains in the courts. So in 
contrast to Australian and British trade union movements, the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) severed itself from what it considered a pater-
nalist state, choosing instead to fight for employee benefits via traditional 
market-based actions. This decision led to the development of corporate 
rather than state welfare programs. The AFL also opposed lobbying for 
family wages on grounds that it would undercut union power, and it took 
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the formal stance of gender equality in employment at the national level 
while turning a blind eye to local-level discrimination.20 Among the three 
countries, the United States was the last to pass protective legislation that 
limited women’s access to employment opportunities.
After World War II, U.S. women’s equal access to paid work arose as a 
civil rights issue. Passage of Title VII of the Civil rights Act of 1964 made 
discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, sex unlawful in all aspects of employ-
ment and training in firms of 25 or more employees. The Act also established 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to enforce antidis-
crimination laws, although the Commission was deemed a “toothless tiger” 
until 1972, when Congress gave it litigation enforcement authority. With this 
authority, the EEOC could file lawsuits not just on specific complaints against 
employers, unions, and employment agencies, but also on what the Commis-
sion viewed as patterns of discrimination. EEOC efforts through the courts 
and political lobbying led to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, re-
quiring employers with disability policies to include pregnancy, and the 1980 
Guidelines on Sexual Harassment ruling that employment decisions condi-
tional upon sexual favors or hostile employment environments created by un-
welcome sexual conduct were prohibited under Title VII. Successful litigation 
of complaints brings award of damages. For example, in a recently settled 
case, a 17-year-old female kitchen helper charged she had been subjected to 
sexual harassment for 3 months despite complaints to managers. She received 
$12,000 in back pay and another $168,000 in compensatory damages.21
U.S. policy support within the home remains the least generous of all 
industrialized countries. At no point did the United States introduce univer-
sal family allowances as in other countries. Instead, working persons receive 
tax deductions based on number of children, a policy expanded in the mid 
1970s to include additional tax credits for low-earning families, and a child 
care tax credit for 20% to 35% of actual expenses up to a set maximum, 
compared with the 70% now covered under British provisions. Although 
some U.S. women had access to maternity leave as part of a corporate dis-
ability program, parental leave only became a right with the 1993 Family 
and Medical Leave Act, which allows up to 12 weeks unpaid parental leave, 
the least generous program among the OECD countries (Jaumotte 2003).
Under this corporate-driven welfare system, the U.S. gender gap in em-
ployment is just 15%, similar to that in the UK. Unlike the UK, however, 
U.S. women’s part-time employment as a share of women’s total employ-
ment has been steadily declining since the mid 1960s and is just 12% of all 
U.S. female employment.22 The freer rein of market mechanisms also yields 
greater income inequality more generally in the United States compared with 
Australia, being more similar to the UK’s along with a similar gender wage 
ratio of 78%.23
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So with their divergent policy profiles, the three countries have different 
equality structures than a simple liberal regime label suggests. Australia cod-
ified men’s privileged access to high-wage work, whereas the UK reinforced 
women’s domestic responsibility. Under greater adherence to liberal prin-
ciples, U.S. policy intervened less to restrict women’s access to paid work, 
and a woman’s normative responsibility for the domestic sphere is neither 
reinforced nor alleviated.
liberal divisions of household work
I use data from the 2002 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) to ex-
plore whether the more subtle policy differences across the three liberal re-
gimes yield divergent divisions of housework as found by Fuwa (2004) and 
Hook (2006) across widely differing societies. The 2002 ISSP module is the 
third on family and changing gender roles, but the first to include respon-
dents’ estimates of each partner’s weekly housework hours (excluding child 
care). From the 2002 ISSP, I select cohabiting or married couples where 
the respondent is younger than 60 years of age to look at differences in the 
household division of labor across countries and income brackets.
Table 4.1 displays partnered women’s employment participation. More 
U.S. partnered women are employed full-time than in the other two coun-
tries, whereas more Australian women are out of the labor force. Among 
partnered women who are employed, 34% in the United States, 44% in 
Britain, and more than half in Australia work part-time.24
Men’s and women’s average housework hours at different levels of wom-
en’s employment are displayed in Figure 4.1. Men and women in the UK 
and the United States spend about the same amount of time on housework, 
whereas Australian women and men each spend appreciably more than their 
counterparts in the other countries. Apart from these differences, trends 
across the countries are similar. Men’s average housework hours do not 
vary significantly with women’s employment, although women across the 
countries reduce their housework hours to a similar degree as their employ-
ment hours increase.25 A British or U.S. woman working full-time spends, 
ta b l e  4 . 1
Women’s employment in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States
Country Full-time, % Part-time, % Out of Labor Force, %
Australia 22 23 55
United Kingdom 34 27 39
United States 40 21 39
s o u rc e :  Calculated from 2002 ISSP data on married or cohabiting couples, where respondent is 
younger than 60 years of age.
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on average, 10 fewer hours per week on housework than a housewife. An 
Australian woman working full-time spends about 12 fewer hours, but still 
devotes 5 more weekly hours to housework compared with her British and 
U.S. employed counterparts.
If men do not increase housework hours to compensate for the reduc-
tion in women’s housework as they increase their employment hours, this 
suggests dual-earner couples either forgo some domestic production (i.e., 
tolerate dirtier homes) and/or purchase more services on the market for 
it.26 Market provision includes hiring domestic personnel, or purchasing 
time-saving appliances, laundry services, restaurant or pre-packaged meals, 
and so on. If this is the case, greater equality in men’s relative share (but not 
hours of housework) is made possible with the household’s reliance on out-
side labor to produce domestic goods historically fashioned with women’s 
hourly input. This depicts a shift between hours in paid and unpaid labor oc-
curring at macro as well as micro levels, which together form what Glucks-
mann (1995) has referred to as the “total social organisation of labour.”
Any macrosocial organization of labor necessarily reflects the labor reg-
ulations and policies affecting not only women’s, but men’s, access to paid 
work. For example, the strength of the Australian working class movement 
that led to the Harvester Judgement and to greater gender employment in-
equality also resulted in skilled workers winning an 8-hour workday during 



























Figure 4.1. Women’s and men’s housework hours at different levels of women’s 
employment for couples in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
for 2002.
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day (Sutcliffe 1967). The greater time Australian men and women spend 
in housework might thus reflect fewer hours spent in paid work. With the 
higher Australian wages, however, services would be more expensive. As a 
result, the poorest Australian households might not be able to afford mar-
ket-produced domesticity, whereas higher income households might require 
more time in paid work to purchase services compared with similar families 
in the UK and the United States. So although men’s housework hours vary 
little across partners’ employment status, how the household organizes the 
total of its paid and unpaid labor should vary substantially across the coun-
tries and across social classes within the countries.
I map these simultaneous dynamics in Figure 4.2, which displays part-
nered women’s and men’s average employment and housework hours across 
income quartiles within each country. The ISSP only surveys a single respon-
dent within a household, so these are not couple reports, but estimates as 
reported by individual women and men for themselves and their partner. 
See Chapter 11 (Geist, this volume) on international differences in what he 
says versus what she says are the hours each spend in housework. Nota-
bly, the nature of poverty appears different in Australia, because women’s 
and men’s employment hours among couples in the lowest income quartile 
are miniscule compared with the UK or the United States. This suggests 
that the poorest Australian families rely more heavily on state transfers, 
whereas the poorest British and U.S. families are the working poor, with U.S. 
wives’ greater employment hours not necessarily ensuring the couple escapes 
Figure 4.2. Women’s and men’s average weekly employment and housework 
hours in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States by income quartile. 
Based on author’s calculations of the 2002 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) for 
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relative poverty. Among the poorest first quartile of Australian households, 
men and women devote appreciably more hours to housework, but their 
combined household time in employment and housework is significantly less 
than the poorest British or U.S. households. Not surprisingly, the moderately 
poor (second quartile) in all three countries achieve this greater economic se-
curity when women and men spend more hours in paid work and, perhaps, 
slightly less time in housework.
The relative time in paid and unpaid work across the countries reverses 
among upper income households. Some couples in the UK and the United 
States work smarter, but not harder; the total household time in employment 
and housework among British couples in the third income quartile and U.S. 
couples in the fourth is not appreciably greater than for second-quartile 
income couples in those countries. In contrast, Australian women and men 
spend more hours in paid work as well as housework as their household 
income increases. Consequently, those policies proclaimed a boon for work-
ing class Australian men during the 19th century might prove to be a bust 
for dual-earner couples in the 21st.
conclusion
As this book attests, there is increasing interest in how couples in different 
countries negotiate the division of housework when women are employed. 
Comparisons across socialist, former socialist, and more advanced industrial 
economies have revealed variation in men’s hours or share of housework, 
and some variation in the effects of women’s relative resources on shifting 
this division further (Fuwa 2004; Hook 2006), but comparisons across more 
similar countries have found no significant differences (Baxter 1997; Kalle-
berg and rosenfeld 1990). Here I detailed how a broad range of policies 
affects the household division of labor, comparing the similar country cases 
of Australia, Great Britain, and the United States. These three countries 
share a common political heritage and ideological adherence to minimal 
state interference in citizens’ private lives, but vary more markedly in how 
policy has reinforced men’s preferential access to employment (Australia), 
promoted women’s responsibility for unpaid work of the domestic sphere 
(United Kingdom), or adhered to liberal tenets of minimal state interference 
in either (United States).
I found very little variation in men’s housework hours across the coun-
tries regardless of their partners’ employment, but greater variation in the 
total household organization of labor, which highlights further equality di-
lemmas. In all three countries, more equitable housework divisions among 
upper income couples derive in part from a reduction in total housework 
hours, undoubtedly in part by purchasing domestic services in the market. 
Service sector jobs producing domesticity tend to be more poorly paid and/or 
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part-time such that gender equity among the upper classes is made possible 
by class and wage inequality. The hierarchical relations remain gendered as 
well, as women dominate part-time and lower wage work. In Australia, early 
class gains leveraged against female employment, and subsequent compara-
ble worth policies that kept average wages higher extracted costs at each end 
of the income continuum. Lower income couples cannot afford to purchase 
domestic services and spend a greater number of hours performing the tasks 
themselves, likely leading to greater work–family conflict among the work-
ing poor. Australian couples in the higher income brackets spend more total 
hours in paid employment and housework than couples in the other two 
countries, suggesting greater time poverty at the upper end of the income 
range. The data used here do not include time spent in child care, which we 
can assume only increases the time or financial pressures on families.
In weighing the relative equality effects of different policy approaches to 
the household division of labor, restricting access to paid employment in a 
market-based economy yields the most extreme penalties within and across 
households. In contrast, policy reinforcement of women’s responsibility for 
the domestic sphere as in the United Kingdom still allows women the agency 
to reduce their domestic commitments.27 Today, governments express little 
concern over untidy houses, but a great deal of concern over declining birth 
rates, because this affects future economic growth. Together, results indicate 
that policy planning needs to be more holistic than has been the case to date, 
with greater awareness of policy linkages among gender equality, financial 
poverty, time poverty, and family outcomes.
notes
1. These theories include exchange dynamics depicted in Blau (1960) and 
Blood and Wolfe’s (1960) seminal works, and the work of neoclassical economist 
Becker (1981), who modeled couple life as a market exchange.
2. Detailing these dynamics requires that each partner’s actual housework 
hours are compared over time, not just the relative share. The articles by Bianchi 
et al. (2000) and Sayer (2005) detail this for the U.S. case, whereas Hook (2006) 
looks at changes in men’s hours across time and countries. In all cases, there has 
been a modest increase in men’s housework hours, but a larger decrease in wom-
en’s. Across time, child care hours have increased for both women and men, but 
the gender gap is even larger.
3. There is ample U.S. cross-sectional evidence of the persistent gendered 
division of housework, summarized by Shelton and John (1996). Gupta (1999) 
and South and Spitze (1994) used U.S. longitudinal data to illustrate how each 
gender’s share changes with their partnering status.
4. See Baxter (1997), who compared Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, 
and the United States; and Kalleberg and rosenfeld (1990), who compared Can-
ada, Norway, Sweden, and the United States.
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5. Hook (2006), however, concludes this evidence does not support bar-
gaining dynamics as suggested by Breen and Cooke (2005), although her data 
precluded assessing them because they are collected on individuals but not their 
partners. I discuss these competing conclusions in more detail (Cooke 2007a).
6. In Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen (1990) con-
trasts welfare states along three dimensions. The first is state–market relations, 
reflecting the welfare mix of private and state provision; the second is the degree 
to which the state grants social rights equal status with property rights; and the 
third dimension is the degree to which the state reinforces existing hierarchies. 
From this classification, he argues there are three regime types: liberal regimes 
that rely on the market for individual welfare, corporatist–conservative ones 
that provide more universal provisions but maintain status hierarchies (including 
gendered ones), and social–democratic regimes that share a policy goal of greater 
equality and solidarity through more universal provisions.
7. I first discuss and diagram some of these proposed effects in Cooke (2007b) 
and expand upon them in Cooke (2007a), but since writing those articles, I have 
increased my emphasis on how policy and other institutional effects reinforce 
women’s domestic responsibility, regardless of the support for public equality.
8. This is an old debate—how much a gendered division of labor reflects 
women’s individual choice, a perspective in the fore in the work of Becker (1981) 
or Hakim (2000), versus the degree to which her choices are socially constructed 
in part by state policies, the argument applied here and also assessed more di-
rectly in Cooke (2006).
9. Gornick, Meyers, and ross (1997) as well as Buchmann and Charles 
(1995) detail these different school effects across several industrialized countries, 
and the effect of such policies on mothers’ employment (Gornick, Meyers, and 
ross 1998).
10. The volume edited by Wikander, Kessler-Harris, and Lewis (1995) dis-
cusses the history of protective legislation in Australia, Europe, and the United 
States.
11. Daly and rake (2003) use Luxembourg Income Study data to illustrate 
that transfers in Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany result in the income in fe-
male-headed households being 90% of male-headed household income compared 
with just more than 70% in the United Kingdom and the United States.
12. Using the National Survey of Families and Households, I found U.S. 
women’s transfer income and employment earnings each predict husbands’ share 
of housework (Cooke 2007b).
13. See Phipps and Burton (1995) on the relative levels in Australia, Canada, 
the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States as of the 
mid 1980s.
14. Canada is also classified among the liberal regimes, but the analyses here 
are part of a larger research project that excludes Canada, because that country’s 
panel dataset excludes questions on domestic labor.
15. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of women in the Australian 
state, see Baldock and Cass (1988) or ryan and Conlon (1989).
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16. The early U.S. legislation was updated in 1984 and followed in 1988 by 
the Family Support Act, whereas collection became coordinated across state lines 
in the 1996 Personal responsibility and Work Opportunities reconciliation Act.
17. In Cooke (2007b), I discuss the progression of child support enforcement 
in the United States, as well as the effects of more effective enforcement on the 
division of housework.
18. These figures are compiled from the Organisation for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD) Employment Outlook (OECD 2002, Tables 2.1, 
2.5, and 2.15), OECD Education at a Glance (2004), and annual data published 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2005).
19. Dex and Shaw (1986) argued that Britain’s employer tax policies also 
encouraged the growth in employer’s preference for offering part-time jobs com-
pared with the United States, where two part-time employees are more costly 
than a single full-time one.
20. See Sklar (1993) and Skocpol (1992) for an overview of the dynamics 
among gender and class during this period, and Mink (1986) for discussions of 
gender, class, and race.
21. EEOC v. Steak ’n Shake Operations, Inc. No. 4:04CV00880 SNL (E.D. 
Mo. June 22, 2006).
22. See Drobnicˇ, Blossfeld, and rohwer (1999); and Kalleberg, reskin, and 
Hudson (2000).
23. For income inequality at different points in time, see the Luxembourg 
Income Study website (www.lisproject.org/keyfigures/ineqtable.htm).
24. These percentages are calculated as follows: percent part-time ÷ (percent 
full-time + percent part-time). They contrast somewhat with the OECD statistics 
for all women age 15 to 64 years, because the ISSP sample is comprised of only 
partnered women younger than 60.
25. The visual differences were confirmed statistically regressing men’s and 
women’s housework hours on the respondent’s age, number of children, religion, 
education, and household income. After including an indicator variable for the 
United Kingdom and one for Australia (referent = United States), the Australian 
indicator variable was positive and significant for both genders, but women’s em-
ployment intensity did not predict any significant shift in men’s housework hours, 
only women’s. Interaction terms for country ¥ wife’s employment were also not 
significant, so effects are consistent across countries.
26. See de ruijter, Treas, and Cohen (2005) for evidence on outsourcing in 
the U.S. case.
27. Lundberg and Pollak (1994) suggest a similar solution at the couple level 
in their noncooperative bargaining models (i.e., when left with the entire domestic 
burden, women reduce it to a level that is manageable on their own).
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It is a well-known fact that men and women have unequal pay and status 
in labor markets across industrialized countries. There are many contribu-
tors to the disadvantaged positions in which most women find themselves, 
but one of these is women’s lower amounts of paid work experience com-
pared with men’s. Periods out of paid work can occur for men as well as 
women through becoming unemployed or long-term illness. These reduce 
the amount of human capital or prevent its accumulation, because signifi-
cant human capital is only acquired during periods of paid work, education, 
or training. Women are known to spend more time than men away from the 
labor market to bear and rear children, periods during which they specialize 
in unpaid domestic and child care work in the home. Such periods of un-
paid work depress their wage rates (Budig and England 2001; Hersch and 
Stratton 2002). Even when women in couples are employed, they often still 
perform a larger share of unpaid work in the home—the so-called double 
burden. This uneven share has also been argued to prevent women from 
competing effectively with men in the workplace promotion stakes. While 
women go home earlier to fulfill their domestic duties, men can stay later, be 
seen in the office after hours, attend early evening or breakfast meetings, go 
for a drink after work with colleagues, and network to find out more about 
company opportunities and useful contacts.
If we desire to have greater equality in the paid work market between 
men and women, should we consider ways of trying to equalize women’s 
and men’s unpaid workloads in the home? There is a long tradition of so-
cialist interventions to reduce the housekeeping labor burden that women 
disproportionately carry (communal dining halls in Chinese collectives, 
19th-century American utopian communities, and Israeli kibbutzes). On the 
whole, western governments have been reluctant to make policies that are 
directly aimed at changing behavior in the home, which has been regarded 
as a private sphere. Nonetheless, the women’s agenda has been the subject 
of policy making in some countries, with an effort to equalize men’s and 
c h a p t e r  f i v e
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women’s contributions to caring for children, either indirectly or, in a few 
cases, directly. However, it is not clear that such policy interventions have 
had any significant or sizeable effects on unpaid work; Mandel and Semyo-
nov (2005, 2006) suggest the effects are, at best, contradictory and mixed. 
The aim of this chapter is to consider whether it is possible to devise realistic 
and effective policies that will equalize men’s and women’s contributions 
of unpaid work. It puts forward a provocative argument, possibly even ex-
treme, to focus more policy attention and discussion on this issue in future.
We need to note from the outset the possible ways in which equality in 
men’s and women’s shares of unpaid work could be achieved. Assuming the 
amount of unpaid work is constant, equality in shares could be achieved 
by reducing the unpaid hours women currently do without changing men’s 
hours or by increasing men’s hours of unpaid work while women’s hours 
decline or stay constant. This second approach would require less change 
in women’s hours than the first approach. Alternatively, equality could be 
achieved by reducing the total hours of unpaid work done, and then reduc-
ing women’s hours by more than any reduction in men’s hours, or reducing 
women’s hours while men’s hours stayed constant. Last, equality could even 
be achieved, in principle, by increasing the total hours of unpaid work, but 
with men’s hours of unpaid work growing far more than women’s hours; 
the latter might even stay constant or decrease as long as men’s total unpaid 
hours increased substantially. Some approaches to getting equal shares for 
men and women are more (or less) likely to be achievable than others. The 
approaches that require more change in men seem to be less possible than 
routes that rest on more change in unpaid hours for women. Because of 
these possible routes to equal shares, it means that attention should ideally 
be paid to the total amounts of unpaid work done by households and not 
just to the shares between men and women.
The first part of this chapter examines the sorts of approaches to policy 
making that have been tried and their effects on behavior. This chapter fo-
cuses mostly on policy making by state governments. Of course, there are 
other agents generating time use policies—namely, employers and communi-
ties. Unfortunately, space constraints do not permit us to give a thorough 
treatment to employers and communities in this chapter. The later sections 
of the chapter consider the arguments about whether it is realistic to try to 
change time spent and shares of unpaid work through policy interventions. 
A number of such arguments can and have been advanced, based on reason-
ing and empirical studies. These arguments include the following: state in-
terventions of the sort that are politically realistic will not work; changes in 
the share of domestic work and time spent on it have been occurring without 
intervention; interventions to equalize men’s and women’s domestic work go 
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against what couples, both women and men, prefer or choose; and we would 
not want to coerce men to this degree, even if we could. The chapter ends 
with a discussion of policy interventions that have not been tried, followed 
by an overall conclusion assessing whether policy intervention to change 
men’s and women’s shares of unpaid work is possible or realistic.
time use policies
In this section we consider the types of policy interventions used by govern-
ments that might, in principle, change unpaid work behavior within house-
holds. There are at least two broad traditions of policy discussion relating 
to time use and gender shares that consider unpaid work. As illustrated by 
Sayer’s chapter in this volume (Chapter 2), one is time use research, largely 
based on time use diaries, which are available over vast historical periods as 
well as in cross-country comparisons (Gershuny 2000; Gershuny and Sul-
livan 2003; robinson and Godbey 1997). Such studies show unpaid work 
time changing over time, with a slow convergence of women’s and men’s 
hours of unpaid work in most capitalist countries by women reducing their 
hours of domestic work as they increased their hours of paid work and 
men increasing their hours of domestic work. Gershuny, Bittman, and Brice 
(2005) describe this as a process of lagged adaptation. Almost all policies are 
seen as relevant to time use decisions by such studies (consumption, produc-
tion, welfare, income support, and so on).
Another research tradition that focuses on policies relevant to unpaid 
work occurs within the discipline of social policy (Cooke’s Chapter 4 is an 
example). This discussion grew out of research on the way nation states 
organize welfare and income support for their vulnerable citizens. Stud-
ies of welfare within countries extended to cross-national comparisons as 
the potential for comparative research and comparative data became more 
available during the 1980s. Esping Anderson’s (1990) classification of the 
different types of capitalist welfare states had a large influence on this area 
of research. His set of three categories of welfare state has been well received 
and popular. However, it has also attracted a large amount of criticism from 
feminists as a result of his failure to consider women’s place in drawing up 
his welfare schema. The European Commission (later the European Union 
[EU]) has also played an important role in facilitating social policy research 
in this tradition within Europe, as it commissioned many cross-national re-
search projects and organized much collection and collation of comparable 
country data. Out of this social policy discourse, there is now a lively set of 
feminist researchers who discuss the issues of reconciling work and care—
or work–family balance—and, in particular, the policies that may or may 
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not assist this balance without detracting from gender equality. The type of 
unpaid work that is given most attention within this tradition is care work, 
encompassing child care but also care for older adults.
Both of these traditions recognize the changes that have been occur-
ring in families’ participation in paid work and unpaid caring across in-
dustrialized countries—namely, the rise of the dual-earner couple, based on 
increased participation in paid work by married women and mothers with 
young children. The time use tradition has considered child care as a specific 
type of unpaid work, but it has not specifically considered care for older 
adults as well. The social policy discourse builds on some of the results of 
the time use diary research, but without necessarily considering its historical 
and period changes in unpaid work.1 Social policy discussions of care work 
and domestic work often fail to differentiate between these types of unpaid 
work. This is not the case for Gershuny (2000) and other time use diary 
researchers, who point out that the data on the various categories of unpaid 
work (personal care, shopping, child care, core domestic) have not all fol-
lowed the same historical trends, in terms of time allocation and their gender 
shares. This is an important point that should be given greater prominence 
and attention in future research.
Despite some of these differences in level of analysis and definitions of 
unpaid work underlying these two traditions, there are many overlaps in 
their policy discussions. This is not surprising, because both traditions are 
talking about gendered time use. Both are agreed that the differences in state 
policies set a framework for household decision making that leads to impor-
tant variations in the amounts of unpaid work done and in the gender shares 
of unpaid work. Both believe that policies that regulate working time and 
the extent to which there is flexibility in working time, or that relate to child-
bearing and early child care, are likely to affect time use decisions within 
households. Both also see the circular effects of unequal wage rates on men’s 
and women’s decisions about paid work and unpaid working hours.
Gershuny’s (2000) policy discussion is differentiated from that in the 
social policy tradition, because it goes on to locate household day-to-day 
time use decisions within a much broader framework that covers institutions 
and infrastructure as well as policy. He paints a canvas whereby there is a 
“. . . systematic interconnection of patterns of consumption and production, 
the interdependence of daily life and employment structure, . . . as well as 
of its more empirical reflection in the changing nature of work–leisure bal-
ance in developed societies, [and this] suggests the potential for some really 
rather substantial divergences between States” (p. 33). Gershuny’s list of 
relevant state policies for considering differences in time use include a much 
larger set than is considered in the social policy discussions. In addition to 
those discussed in the social policy tradition, Gershuny (2000) argues for the 
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need to consider policies that cover both the regulation of production, but 
also the regulation of consumption, because he recognizes that they are all 
interrelated, as the previous quote illustrates. The regulation of production 
covers the legal framework for corporate activity, the development of sys-
tems of industrial relations and employment protection (maximum working 
hours, parental leave, holiday entitlements), the provisions for maintenance 
and development of skills suitable for current technology and management 
practices, the provision for incentives for investment and taxation of prof-
its, and the development of a system of publicly coordinated research and 
development. Policies under the heading of “regulation of consumption” in-
clude its infrastructure (domestic electricity, gas, and water supplies; cultural 
sports; social care facilities), the direct regulation of paid work (the length 
of the workday, school leaving ages, retirement ages), transport systems, 
the labor market; policies for income taxation and social security; as well 
as redistribution policies that affect the distribution of disposable incomes 
across a society. Finally, nation states vary on the extent to which state in-
tervention is acceptable or planned in various aspects of life, the economy, 
and its infrastructure. This is a very large agenda. It is not possible in this 
chapter to examine all these cross-country differences in detail, although 
some of the chapters in this volume offer detailed comparisons. The policies 
given most consideration in this chapter are those more directly related to 
balancing work and care.
As Lewis (2008) and others have pointed out, the policy regimes of 
many industrialized countries were designed and devised around the model 
of a male breadwinner family in which the man worked full-time and the 
women cared for the family and was not expected to be employed. This male 
breadwinner behavior, in its pure sense, is hardly visible in industrialized 
countries of the 21st century because of the huge increases in women’s em-
ployment that have taken place.2 However, social policy analysts argue that 
this model for policy still exists, albeit in a modified form. A popular modi-
fied form is for the male partner to be in paid work full-time and the female 
partner to be in paid work part-time. A range of models underlying policy 
has been suggested by authors, as set out in Table 5.1. Policies have grown 
up in very different ways in different countries, and the logic underlying the 
policies also varies considerably by country, even when they look the same. 
Lewis (2008) has also pointed out that policy regimes in some countries have 
adapted to the new models of family behavior that have emerged, but other 
countries have been slow to adapt.
In principle, there are two extremes for state policy regimes. They can 
either support adults, undifferentiated by gender, as paid workers, or they 
can acknowledge men and women as likely to offer different levels of con-
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worker position, but the United States came pretty close to this in only 
offering women rights to unpaid maternity leave since 1996. Scandinavian 
countries are often heralded as being more focused on providing equal op-
portunities to women and men, but policies also allow women’s employ-
ment contribution to be different from men’s in having longer parental leave 
and long periods of part-time work following childbirth. As soon as policies 
allow or promote women to behave differently in terms of their employ-
ment participation or their hours of work, inequalities in the home and in 
domestic contributions are likely to emerge. This is evident in the numbers 
of women still spending more time on domestic work than men in Scan-
dinavian countries, despite their espoused commitment to gender equality 
(Table 5.2). Swedish women have more choice about combining work and 
care, but this is at the expense of equality. In the Swedish labor markets, 
there is a very high degree of occupational segregation. The approach of 
allowing “gender difference” within a policy regime will usually lead to 
gender difference in time spent on domestic work and then further reduction 
in women’s time spent in paid work.
Authors have argued that the only way around this is to have policies 
that address fathers’ labor market participation and, in particular, get men 
to spend less time in paid work and more time at home. More recently, at-
tempts to change men’s behavior have been tried. The EU issued a directive 
in 1995 (to become a legal requirement in 1996) to offer each parent a non-
transferable right to a period of parental leave to look after young children. 
However, because this does not have to be paid leave, only a minority of 
parents, especially fathers, can afford to take it.3 Some EU member countries 
also offer paternity leave to counterbalance maternity leave entitlements for 
women; this leave is also paid in some cases (Britain since 2003, Belgium, 
Norway), but usually is a very short period of days, in comparison with 
maternity leave entitlements (e.g., 18 or more weeks of paid leave).4 In many 
ways, these new policies have been largely symbolic gestures. Although there 
has been some take-up, especially in the public sector, it is not looking prom-
ising that shares of domestic working time in the home can be radically 
changed by these sorts of policies.
In Sweden (2.5 months), Norway (2 months), and Iceland (3 months), 
fathers of young children are offered an individual entitlement to a period 
of paid leave that only he can take at a high level of replacement earnings.5 
Often referred to as Daddy Leave, it is lost to the household if he does not 
take it. Parents do not generally take leave simultaneously, but tend to stag-
ger it. Although very short in time (a month or two), the theory is that men 
will be more likely to bond with their children if they spend time caring for 
them from an early age. In this way, fathers will be sent a signal that the 
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doing unpaid work is okay for men (Leira 1998). The policy is focused on 
intervening at a critical point in men’s lives: the time they become fathers. 
This is a point when men may be more open to change. However, it is also 
a point, typically, when traditional gender divisions of work in the home as-
sert themselves, even when there was more equality up to this point.
Has Daddy Leave changed the shares of unpaid work in the home? 
The take-up of this leave by Swedish fathers has increased slowly from its 
initiation in 1995,6 but only a minority of fathers take this leave. The share 
of leave taken by men reached 17% by 2003, even in a society regarded as 
the most committed to gender equality over a very long period and where 
replacement wage rates are at their highest (90% for much of the time). 
Figures from time use diaries (see Table 5.2) show Swedish men spending 
the highest number of minutes (56) doing core domestic work among men in 
the countries represented, and Swedish women spending the least time (143 
minutes). When other unpaid work time is added to core domestic, Swedish 
women spend the same time as U.K. and Canadian women (289 minutes), 
which is a larger amount of time spent by Danish and Finnish women, al-
though Swedish men still have the highest men’s totals for unpaid work time 
(173 minutes). One could argue on the basis of these figures that Swedish 
policy encouragement of men to be more involved in domestic work in the 
home has had a small impact. Equality of unpaid domestic work hours, 
although not total hours spent working (paid plus domestic), is still a long 
way off.
There is the added question of whether taking time off to care for chil-
dren around the time of their birth leads to greater child involvement by 
fathers later or better outcomes for children. Ekberg’s (2004) quantitative 
evaluation of the effects of Daddy Leave in Sweden suggested that it did in-
crease father’s use of parental leave, but this increase in leave was not trans-
lated into an increase of fathers looking after sick children when time off 
work was needed by a parent to do this. Dex and Ward (2007) examined this 
issue up to age 3 using U.K. data and found fathers who took some parental 
leave around the birth of a child (not Daddy Leave) were more likely to read 
to the child on a daily basis when the child was age 3 than fathers who did 
not take any leave (53% to 60% vs. 43%). Also, they found a correlation 
between fathers taking parental leave and the 3-year-old child having fewer 
behavioral and emotional problems.
Policies on (paid) working time are clearly important to time spent in 
paid work and therefore to the time potentially available to share in un-
paid work. Here again the EU social policies have taken initiative to direct 
members to limit hours of paid work to a maximum of 48 hours per week. 
However, this limit is very high and still allows men to work relatively long 
weekly hours. When travel time to and from paid work is added in, it is 
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even less likely that men will make a major contribution to domestic work. 
The United Kingdom even decided to allow opt-outs from this 1993 di-
rective when it enacted it into its own statutes. It is not mandatory in the 
United Kingdom for all of its workers to comply with the 48-hour rule. Not 
surprisingly, the United Kingdom now has the highest mean weekly paid 
working hours among men in Europe. Some countries have allowed parents 
the right to reduce their hours of work (e.g., Sweden, Netherlands), but it is 
primarily women who use this ability to work part-time. In 2003, the United 
Kingdom offered parents of a child younger than 6 years of age the right to 
request flexible working arrangements of their choice (about to be extended 
to more parents in 2009). Employers were given a serious duty to consider 
their request. This marked a new idea in U.K. industrial relations, moving 
away from voluntarism, but not as far as making this a statutory require-
ment. Although such requests can be made by either parent, surveys show 
it is mainly women who make the requests and are offered flexible working 
arrangements (Holt and Grainger 2005; Palmer 2004).
Part-time paid work among women is extensive across many European 
countries during the 21st century. Employers have played a large role in ini-
tiating part-time paid working arrangements, and part-time work has been 
increasing in the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, and Spain, and was already high 
in Denmark and the United Kingdom (Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development [OECD] 2001). This has led to the dominant family 
economy being based on either a 1.5-earner couple in the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, and Germany, where women adopt shorter part-time paid hours, 
or a 1.75-earner couple in Sweden, Finland, or Norway.7 On the whole, 
outside of Scandinavia, the form of family economy chosen by couples has 
been selected without state policy inputs or encouragement. Where policies 
have emerged, they have tended to follow, rather than precede, families’ de-
cision making. Service and distribution sector employers have played an im-
portant role in the part-time employment revolution. Since the 1960s, they 
have created many part-time jobs as a way of targeting a cheap, available, 
and reliable workforce of women with children. More recently, full-time 
dual-earner couples have also been on the increase in the United Kingdom, 
although many are childless, which is also a growing phenomenon. Their 
motivation appears to be to pursue a full-time career instead of raising a 
family. Again, it is not work–life policy that has produced the decline in 
fertility evident in most countries. Fertility has declined in some countries 
(e.g., France) even despite serious policy efforts to prevent it. However, edu-
cation policy undoubtedly has contributed. As women have increased their 
educational qualifications and earning power, they have decided they want 
a career rather than children, or found out too late, after delaying fertility, 
that they cannot have children.
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is  it possible for policies to influence 
gender shares of unpaid work?
Having reviewed the main policies that have been used to address work–
family balance during the past two decades, one could not argue very con-
vincingly that they have had a significant or sizeable effect on the share 
of unpaid work within households. They have affected whether and when 
women and men are in paid work over periods of childbirth and family for-
mation. Studies have found women’s returns to work after childbirth have 
been sensitive to the conditions of their maternity or parental leave period 
(Brewer and Paull 2006; ruhm 1998). In some cases, and with the most 
recent policies, it is perhaps too early to say that they have not achieved the 
goal of changing shares of unpaid work. However, in the case of the policies 
based on difference, one could argue that they give to women with one hand, 
but take away with the other, as they reinforce gender divisions. Clearly, 
the in-principle effects of a particular policy rely heavily on the details. It 
is one thing to offer a generous leave arrangement, but if it is not paid, it 
is not much of an offer and take-up is likely to be low. Many of the policy 
provisions are of this kind. Nonetheless, there are enough examples where 
offers of support to families are backed with resources (e.g., in Scandinavia 
and France) for us to see that they have moved the position slightly toward 
men doing more and women doing less domestic work. Policies to affect 
fathers’ behavior have the most potential to address the gap in shares of un-
paid work, but these are so minimalist in their aims that one might even say 
they are token gestures. The evidence suggests that there is some effect on 
men’s behavior from these policies, perhaps because they intervene at critical 
points, but it is hard to believe they can offer the seismic shift necessary to 
equalize shares of unpaid work. It is notable that there have been no sizeable 
attempts to change the wage ratios of men and women through income tax 
or other policies to weight household decision making in favor of women 
doing more paid and less unpaid work while men stay at home to do more 
unpaid work.8 This issue is discussed again later.
As Lewis (2008) claims in her review of such policies: “State policies are 
but one determinant of those terms and conditions [under which a shift to an 
adult worker family model might take place], and a causal relationship be-
tween them and behaviour is remarkably difficult to demonstrate” (p. 274). 
It is, of course, less difficult to claim causality. Lewis’ conclusion is consis-
tent with Gershuny’s, claiming that a huge range of policies, institutions, 
infrastructure, and behavior patterns all overlap and reinforce each other. 
Gershuny could be argued to be suggesting that unless one can change the 
whole show, then marginal changes in one or another particular policy will 
not make any demonstrable difference. Despite the small amount of change 
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that can, at best, be expected to result from any one policy, he thinks that it 
is still worth having policies that encourage men to do a share of domestic 
and care work as a signal from the state that this is a good idea (personal 
communication with J. Gershuny).
One last point that needs to be considered under this heading is that 
we still have differences in both the amounts of unpaid work and in the 
gender shares across countries. Does this not imply that country-specific 
factors, even policy differences, are at work to explain some of the differ-
ences? Although it cannot be ruled out that policies are explaining some of 
the differences, we also have to recognize that policy and legal differences 
reflect differences in national populations’ values, attitudes, and preferences. 
People make and support the institutions under which they live. The na-
tional differences are likely to reflect, therefore, the whole host of elements, 
infrastructure, institutions, policies, and preferences that Gershuny argues 
lay beneath and structure individuals’ time use decisions.
These arguments amount, therefore, to the view that one policy change 
alone is unlikely to have a realistic chance of producing equality in the shares 
of unpaid work within households. This is because the scale of the task is 
very ambitious, and policy changes mostly have to be incremental to be po-
litically acceptable. However, pressure from policies, when it coincides with 
changes such as lagged adaptation, may help to move things a bit more in 
the direction of equality, but there is no hard evidence about this.
is  equality in unpaid work what women want?
Some authors have argued that equality in domestic work is not what the 
majority of men or even women want. The case for preferences driving deci-
sions about paid work has been argued, mainly about the United Kingdom, 
by Hakim (2000), although this preference argument is not without critics 
(Crompton 2006). Hakim argues that it is possible to divide the female 
population into three groups according to their preferences: there are the ca-
reer women who are focused on paid work; there are the homemakers who 
are focused on unpaid work and care; and, between these two, there is the 
adaptive group who will do paid work, probably part-time, but will give it 
up when it gets in the way of family commitments, because these have prior-
ity. The adaptive group is argued to be the majority of women among whom 
part-time paid work is very popular. It is certainly the case that part-time 
paid hours are popular among some women, despite part-time work being 
predominantly low paid and low skilled in many countries. There is also evi-
dence in many countries that many women who are in full-time paid work 
would prefer to work fewer hours per week, although many men would 
prefer to spend fewer hours in paid work too (OECD 2001). The desire for 
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flexibility in working hours and for extending maternity leave rights and 
pay have also been popular in Britain, especially among women (DTI 2000). 
In expressing support for such options, women are indicating that they are 
happy to adopt the difference approach to being paid workers, with fewer 
hours, less attachment, less work experience, and, presumably, less pay and 
less career promotion. Such policies facilitate an accommodation to gender 
inequality and a continuation of the unequal domestic division of unpaid 
work, because they do not require the household boat to be rocked.
Counter to this claim that a redistribution of unpaid work is not what 
women want, other commentators would point out that the so-called choices 
that parents make are still being made on a playing field that is not level 
or equal between genders. There are a range of other policies that support 
the (higher paid) male partner working longer paid hours than the female, 
and then there is still the unequal wage rate issue. Nonetheless, we cannot 
totally discount people’s expressed preferences. Parents like part-time paid 
work, they like flexibility in their working hours, and they are generally 
happy with the care policies that acknowledge that women are different and 
treat them differently. It seems unlikely that equality in unpaid work will 
come from such preferences. However, societal attitudes have clearly been 
changing as mothers have done more paid work (Scott 2008), and this may 
continue to have an associated affect on shares of domestic work within 
households.
the time spent on domestic and 
unpaid work is changing anyway
Another argument against policy intervention is that the time spent on un-
paid work by women has been decreasing without policy interventions. We 
now have many detailed time use studies of men’s and women’s time spent 
in unpaid work, which go across years and across countries and years. Such 
data reinforce the picture that women in a large range of countries spend 
more time and do a greater share of unpaid work than men (see Table 5.2). 
However, there are other “stylized facts” about domestic work:
• Adding up women’s and men’s paid and unpaid work leads to near 
equality in the amounts of total work done by men and women, or men do-
ing slightly more total work than women (see Table 5.2) (Jacobs and Gerson 
2001). Such figures show that claims of the “double burden” carried by 
women who are employed and do the larger share of unpaid work are not 
often supported. In fact, Sullivan and Gershuny (2003) have shown that there 
is little evidence that the double burden exists for the vast majority of women. 
If anything, it is a temporary phenomenon or one based on perceptions rather 
than total amounts of time spent on both paid and unpaid work.
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•	 The average amounts of domestic work and paid work vary by country 
as well as by gender (see Table 5.2 and Geist, Chapter 11, this volume).
•	 Although women appear to do more of the unpaid work hours and to 
have a larger share than men (see Table 5.2), the calculations of the amount 
of hours spent on unpaid domestic work have also been found to depend on 
which tasks and work items are included in the calculations. When gardening 
and maintenance or odd jobs are included, the gap between men and women 
in number of weekly hours spent on unpaid domestic work narrows substan-
tially (Gershuny 2000).
•	 There are no notable gender divisions in time spent in personal care or 
in shopping (Gershuny 2000).
•	 There have been changes over time and by country in the amounts and 
the shares of unpaid work (Gershuny 2000; Jacobs and Gerson 2001; rob-
inson and Godbey 1997). The time spent on domestic household work by 
women has been declining over time in many countries (Bianchi et al. 2000; 
Gershuny 2000; Harkness 2008). The time spent on domestic work by men 
has increased, but not as fast as the increase in women’s paid work. Gershuny, 
Bittman, and Brice (2005) have demonstrated that moving from being out 
of paid work into paid work, especially if it is full-time, is associated with 
women doing fewer hours of domestic work. Corresponding increases in 
men’s hours of domestic work are visible when they move out of paid work or 
when their wives make the opposite transition.
•	 Early during the 20th century, increases in women’s paid work were 
matched by a decrease in time spent on domestic work. However, for every 
2-hour increase in paid work, domestic work declined by 1 hour. Later in the 
century, this process continued with every 2-hour increase in paid work being 
associated with a 1.5-hour decline in unpaid work. More recent 21st-century 
British data suggest that declines in women’s domestic work are continuing, 
but now the decline in domestic work time exceeds the increase in paid work 
time (Harkness 2008).
•	 Gershuny (2000) describes this combination of changes in women’s and 
men’s paid work and domestic work times as movements toward a gender 
convergence in time spent on the different types of work. He also presents 
evidence that this move toward convergence is apparent in a large number of 
countries.
One conclusion we could draw from these detailed analyses of time use 
diaries is that, over time, and without any particular state policy interven-
tion, women’s unpaid domestic work has been declining while men’s contri-
butions have been growing. The changes in men’s unpaid contributions have 
admittedly been smaller than changes in women’s paid work, but they have 
changed nonetheless. Gershuny, Bittman, and Brice (2005) are optimistic 
that this process of lagged adaptation in men’s behavior will continue to lead 
to further changes and toward equality in shares of domestic work. As we 
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noted earlier, equality in shares could be achieved by a continued reduction 
in total hours of the kind that has been occurring, with women’s hours of 
unpaid work decreasing more than those of men—a trend documented from 
time use diaries.
The forces that appear to have brought about these changes, as far as 
commentators can tell, are as follows. It has been suggested that techno-
logical change in household appliances has offered labor-saving efficiency 
in carrying out some of the core domestic tasks. However, detailed attempts 
to measure the time gains from labor-saving appliances have not identified 
definitive gains (Bittman, rice, and Wajcman 2004; van der Lippe, Tijdens, 
and de ruijter 2004). Another suggestion is that declining fertility has led 
to smaller families across the industrialized world, and this has reduced the 
amount of unpaid domestic work. Numbers of children as well as their ages 
have been found to be positively correlated with amounts of time spent on 
unpaid work (Gershuny 2000). It is also possible that women have reduced 
their unpaid work because of doing paid work, either because they are more 
tired, have lowered their domestic standards, or can afford to outsource more 
jobs. However, declines in domestic work are also visible among women 
who do part-time paid work and among those who are not employed (Ger-
shuny 2000). Last, economic mechanisms have also been offered as part 
of the explanation of the changes. Here, the mechanism is that as women’s 
wage rates have increased in response to their greater education and human 
capital, the opportunity cost of doing unpaid work instead of paid work 
increases and women are likely to switch from one to the other. Over time, 
however, there have been relative price changes, particularly price increases, 
in purchased goods and services (paid cleaners or housekeepers). This price 
increase would lead us to expect that women would substitute their own 
cheaper housework production for the more expensive purchases of goods 
and services. However, the increasing incomes that have also occurred over 
time mean that people will prefer leisure to unpaid work, and will switch 
to purchasing goods and services to reduce their own housework. It is the 
greater effect of increasing incomes that has been winning over substitution 
effects. This argument, essentially, is that the progress of modern economies 
has built into it, given technological progress but subject to business cycle 
fluctuations, forces that are leading to declining work (paid and unpaid) 
and increasing leisure. These forces are not policy driven and are likely to 
continue into the future without policy assistance.
However, there are groups who do not fit this pattern, especially in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Increasing weekly hours of paid work 
is evident among some groups of managers and professionals (Jacobs and Ger-
son 2001; Kodz et al. 2003), even if the majority are having greater leisure.
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mechanisms that determine the amounts 
and shares of unpaid work
We can pursue the issue of how far policy can hope to change the amounts 
or shares of unpaid work by considering the determinants of the amounts of 
unpaid work and how these are shared. Table 5.3 sets out the main factors 
that are likely to affect the number of hours of unpaid work for a household 
by type of unpaid work, alongside the main factors affecting the gendered 
share of unpaid hours by the type of unpaid work. The amounts of unpaid 
work are rarely discussed except at the mean, but these vary considerably 
across households. People need to shop, cook, eat, wash themselves and 
their clothes, and iron their clothes. They also need to do at least some clean-
ing of their living space. In addition, where there is a garden and a car, time 
ta b l e  5 . 3
Scheme of types of unpaid work and factors affecting 
its number of hours and gender shares
Type of 
 Unpaid Work Determinants of Its Total Hours
Determinants of Gendered Shares in 
Hours of Unpaid Work
Child care Hours will increase with number 
of children, age of youngest child, 
whether child is a teenager, class
Wages rates of male/female partners 
will influence decisions/negotiations on 
partners’ hours of work
Availability of male/female partners af-
ter hours of paid work decisions made
Preferences about child care will be 
built into decisions on number of 
children, and decisions about hours of 
paid work of partners
Cleaning Hours will increase with the size of liv-
ing space, the number of children, be-
ing in a rural location (where children 
probably spend more time outside, 
have more freedom, and get dirtier), 
and preferences about standards 
of cleanliness; and hours vary with 
income level (ability to substitute sub-
contracted cleaning)
Availability of male/female partners 
after hours of paid work made
Attitudes of male partner
Preferences about standards of male/
female partners
Maintenance 
(care of house 
fabric, clean 
car, DIY)
Hours will increase with ownership of 
house/flat compared with renting, size 
of house, house compared with apart-
ment, older age of property, number of 
cars, preferences about DIY projects; 
and hours vary with income (higher 
income allows subcontracting this 
work)
Preferences about maintenance, built 
into choice of housing and cars
Availability of male/female partners af-
ter hours of paid work decisions made
Gardening Hours will increase with living in a 
house versus an apartment, the size 
of the garden, and preferences about 
gardening
Preferences about gardening of male/
female partners will be built into 
choice of housing
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can be spent keeping a garden, and maintaining and cleaning a car. All these 
activities can be done extensively or in a minimalist way. People can walk to 
a local store to do their shopping or drive to a larger out-of-town supermar-
ket, cook ready-made bought food or buy ingredients to do the preparation 
and cooking themselves, iron all of their clothes or put some on wrinkled. 
Cleaning the house and cooking are probably the elements of domestic work 
that are more varying in the time that can be committed to them, according 
to personal preferences about cooking and household cleanliness. The main 
determinants of total time spent on domestic work can be argued, therefore, 
to be related to personal preferences about standards of cleanliness, food 
and cooking, do-it-yourself home repairs and improvements, gardening, the 
numbers of people in the house weighted by whether there are children and 
ta b l e  5 . 3  ( c o n t i n u e d )
Scheme of types of unpaid work and factors affecting 
its number of hours and gender shares
Type of 
 Unpaid Work Determinants of Its Total Hours
Determinants of Gendered Shares in 
Hours of Unpaid Work
Shopping Hours will increase with the number of 
adults and children in the household
Shopping for personal items (e.g., 
clothing) done by male/female partners
Other shopping may have detailed gen-
dered expectations






Hours will increase with the number of 
adults and children in the household, 
according to the preferences about fast 
food versus home-cooked meals, pref-
erences about level of elaboration of 
meals/ironed clothes.
Gendered attitudes of male/female 
partners to washing and ironing
Availability of partner after hours of 
paid work decisions made
Management Affects work intensity rather than re-
quiring more hours; Accomplished by 
multitasking alongside other unpaid or 
paid work activity
Preference between partners about 
who wants to be the manager; this may 
be built into decisions about paid work 
hours
This work may naturally gravitate to the 
partner who spends most time at home
Emotion Mostly does not involve additional 
hours of work, except in times of 
upset and conflict when hours may be 
allocated to it
Studies suggest that women do most 
of this work, but no reasons have been 
offered. It may be related to women’s 
preferences, which if not met, cause 
them more problems than they cause 
men, who may have different prefer-
ences. It is also possible that this is a 
biological difference between men and 
women, not sociological or a result of 
culture differences.
Many items also vary by class, but this can also influence unpaid work through preferences, income, and choices 
of housing and family size. DIY, do-it-yourself.
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how many; the number of rooms in the house; the location of the house in 
an urban or rural environment; and the level of household income.
Shopping, ironing, washing, and cooking times would be expected to 
increase, all things being equal, with the number of adults and children in 
the household. Cleaning time would be expected to increase, all things be-
ing equal, with the size of the house, with owning a car, with the number of 
children, and with being in a rural location where children probably spend 
more time outside, have more freedom, and get dirtier. High standards of 
cleanliness or cooking will increase the unpaid work. The amount of unpaid 
work time does not increase substantially, I would argue, for the manager 
of the household, because it is likely to be done while multitasking, but the 
intensity of work may well increase as a result (Hochschild 1989, 1997). 
However, one can imagine that the manager, who is most often the woman, 
thinks that the time spent is greater or her share is greater when she accepts 
more responsibility. This may help to explain why women tend to over-
state their own contributions to unpaid domestic work and understate men’s 
contributions (Kamo 2000; Lee and Waite 2005; Geist, Chapter 11, this 
volume). It may also mean that women fail to recognize, as time use diaries 
show, that there is mostly equality in the total of paid plus unpaid work time 
that men and women contribute to the household.
For some households, the amount of unpaid work that women would 
like to do (to achieve their standards of cooking or cleaning, to display 
femininity, or to fulfill their ecofriendly values) might even be the key driver 
of the gender share in total unpaid domestic working hours. For example, 
if there is a strong preference for a lifestyle that involves a high amount of 
unpaid work time, then this implies the need for reduction in paid working 
hours within the household. The desirable number of hours of unpaid work 
may be a preference or value that both partners have agreed upon when 
they entered into their partnership; or, alternatively, in some households, it 
may be a cause of conflict. For example, a couple that has a high standard 
of cleaning (or that wants a large family or that prefers time-intensive home 
cooking to fast food or that wants to live in a huge mansion) will have to 
decide that one of them needs to have fewer paid working hours to fulfill 
their preferences. For such couples, the decision to have unequal shares of 
unpaid and paid work follows automatically from their values or prefer-
ences, although there are clearly deep gendered feelings from tradition that 
underpin these preference as well as hard economic facts and relative wages. 
The majority of couples will be making decisions about their houses, family 
size values, and preferences jointly. Women are, therefore, implicated in the 
amounts of work that result from these decisions. Gershuny, Bittman, and 
Brice (2005) also point out, as do others, that there are routine elements to 
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the shares of domestic work and who does what, and inertia sets in after 
routines have become established. Couples will be influenced by gender cul-
tures, which are fairly widespread across countries, in which many domestic 
jobs are implicitly understood to be women’s work.
But wouldn’t the preferences and decisions of any one couple be differ-
ent if the majority of couples were egalitarian in the division of paid and 
unpaid work time? This may well be the case. However, it is still likely that 
policy interventions will not find such factors easy to change. Policy as a 
route to changing the preferences that underpin the amounts of time spent 
on unpaid work and its shares is likely to be unrealistic. However, it may be 
the case that preferences or circumstances change after couples get together, 
and male and female partners may change in different directions (Gerson 
1985, 1993). When this occurs, policies encouraging men to spend more 
time on unpaid work may be suddenly in tune with their personal changes 
and have more impact. Similarly, there may be critical times in couples’ lives 
when change is more possible—for example, when a second or third child 
arrives and more parenting time is required, or when the male partner loses 
his job. So policy influences may be able to have greater effects at these criti-
cal times, and in such cases.
After decisions are made that commit the male partner to paid work 
for longer hours than the female partner, shares of unpaid work during 
which the female partner does more are likely to result. One could even 
argue that fairness demands that women do more unpaid work in the home 
if they are going to do less paid work outside it. The female partner could, 
in principle, do more paid work, but the wage rates are against this choice 
and in favor of women’s specialization in home work (Becker 1991). Men 
are able to earn more per hour, on average, than women. So it is more ef-
ficient for the man to work, and thus, he accumulates more human capital, 
which will bring him higher wages in the future. But this just reinforces the 
unequal wage rates for men and women, and locks women into the unpaid 
home work. Does this really matter? After all, the couple has committed 
to living together as a unit, and they gain additional family income by this 
specialization. In the past, couples were happy to do this, but times have 
changed. It is now seen as riskier for the woman to compromise her earning 
potential. If she is going to have to do paid work in the future, she needs to 
maintain her earning potential to cope with uncertainties, such as the man’s 
unemployment or divorce, and to be able to have a reasonable pension in 
old age, or, in the United States, to have employer-based health insurance. 
So, is it possible to change the wage ratio to make a more level playing field 
for men and women’s intrahousehold decision making? This is considered 
in the next section.
98 The Political Economy of Housework
would it be a good idea to force 
men to do more unpaid work?
Were the means available to coerce or force men to do more unpaid work, 
would this be a good idea? This brings up another of the arguments against 
more coercive policy interventions for fathers to do more caring. This is-
sue has been raised by authors such as Baldock and Hadlow (2004). If 
it is care work that is being considered as unpaid work, compulsion to 
care goes against the inherent meaning of the activity. The argument is 
that one cannot force someone to be responsible and attentive in a compe-
tent manner, feeling the emotions that need to accompany the actions for 
caring to take place. The most that is possible is that people are given the 
choice to care and favorable conditions to do so. In this sense, parental 
leave policies such as Daddy Leave are reasonable, because they retain 
the element of choice.9 Although one could argue that women have less 
choice about caring whereas men have more choices not to care, the evi-
dence points to women generally being happy with caring roles and not 
wanting to give them up.10 There may be a stronger case for getting men 
to share ironing and cleaning, because emotions or love are not necessar-
ily required to carry out these tasks to a reasonable standard. In practice, 
however, child care is more rewarding, and where men have increased their 
household contribution, it has been more in child care than in other core 
domestic duties.
In conclusion, there are serious doubts about whether it is possible or 
realistic to expect or hope that policy changes of the sort we have seen to 
date can change the amounts of paid and unpaid work done by men and 
women, or equalize their shares of unpaid work. Policies probably are one 
of the supporting planks that help to maintain the unequal gendered divi-
sion of unpaid work within households, but there appear to be plenty of 
other contributors, all too many in fact to make policy change a driver of 
sizeable changes in these shares.
untried policies
Shares of unpaid work within households are related to the unequal wage 
rates of men and women. As mentioned earlier, state policy attempts to 
change the female-to-male wage ratio to achieve changes in the shares of 
unpaid work are not in evidence. The concept of wages for housework 
has been discussed and suggested, but never implemented (e.g., Young and 
Halsey 1995). In the United States during the 1970s, the possibility of cred-
iting homemakers with social security contributions was discussed, but not 
adopted. Women’s behavior in entering the labor market in large numbers 
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has made redundant any policy interest in such ideas. Cash for parental care 
is a policy that has many examples, including parental leave. More recent 
examples used in Finland and Norway offer parents the choice between cash 
to care for their own children at home or a subsidized place in formal child 
care. Such policies have been popular among lower paid women who are the 
ones who have taken the cash and stayed at home, rather than choosing the 
child care places. These policies are criticized by feminists who think that 
women will only be emancipated through employment. However, none of 
these policies has tried to manipulate women’s wages.
It is not likely to be possible to change suddenly the amounts of human 
capital that are embedded in individuals’ wage rates, such as the differing 
amounts of paid work experience men and women have. But legislating 
for equal pay for equivalent work is a policy that starts to tackle the issue, 
as long as it is actually implemented in workplaces. Similarly, gender pay 
audits and pay reviews, as well as enforced monitoring of pay and equal op-
portunities, can assist in making sure women do not fall behind when they 
are in paid jobs. However, the result of several decades or more of trying 
to achieve gender wage equality is that both raw and adjusted-for-work-
experience female-to-male wage ratios remain resistant to equality in nearly 
all countries.
One approach to increasing the wages of partnered women relative to 
men would be to tax partnered men’s wages sufficiently to give women in 
paid work a sizeable tax credit to boost their hourly wage rate to the same 
level as their partner’s after-tax hourly rate. This policy could, in principle, 
equalize wage rates and eliminate the incentive for the female partner to 
be the person who did more of the paid work. Whether equality in wage 
rates would be sufficient to get the women to do the paid work is not clear, 
because there is still a lot of evidence that women like caring (Houston and 
Marks 2005). This would certainly be a serious test of whether policy could 
effect the degree of change necessary for equal shares in unpaid work.
conclusion
The determinants of both the amounts of unpaid work done by households 
as well as the shares done by men and women are more extensive and more 
complex than is often assumed in social policy discussions about policy le-
vers. After one examines them in detail, it is clear that different factors 
influence households’ decisions, and these vary according to the type of 
unpaid work that is being considered. This chapter emphasized that taking 
a disaggregated look at domestic work is important. Advancing the debates 
and theorizing will only take place through researching domestic work at a 
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disaggregated level and acquiring the necessary data to do that. The extent 
of unpaid work has many of its roots in the values, attitudes, and prefer-
ences of couples, which are probably agreed and accepted at an early stage 
in partnerships, at least in the ones that last. Early arrangements do seem to 
become habituated and hard to break, because a whole lifestyle is often built 
around them. In addition, they are built upon many generations of “doing 
gender” role models. These deep-rooted preferences may be as important in 
underpinning household decision making as relative wage rates are in the 
allocation of who does the paid (and unpaid) work, although clearly prefer-
ences and behavior have been changing, so they are not fixed immutably. 
Changes in circumstances and preferences do occur for some couples at criti-
cal points. There is evidence that transitions in to and out of paid work are 
times when changes occur in domestic hours, which may even lead to com-
plete reversals of traditional roles for some couples. So far, interventions, 
such as Daddy Leave, that attempt to change men’s orientations to home 
work have been limited in their goals, and while having had some success in 
getting men to increase their amounts of unpaid work and care, have left the 
gendered shares of domestic work some way off equality.
However, it is not policies that have produced the most dramatic changes 
we have seen to date. Very large changes have taken place in women’s and 
mothers’ employment behavior, which have led rather than followed changes 
in policy and even changes in public opinion. These behavior changes have 
led to the push to change policies that have been generally in the direction 
of recognizing women as different from men—a position that the major-
ity of women probably support, despite its being likely to reinforce gender 
inequality in the workplace. At the same time, there has been an ongoing 
discourse and demand from feminists for full equality in the workplace as 
well as in the home. However, full equality is probably not what the major-
ity of women want to see. rather, more realistic is a shift toward higher 
relative pay, especially for work of equal value, and maybe a significant, but 
possibly small, increase in men’s contributions to unpaid work in the home. 
This would leave women free to do paid work, be the majority caregiver and 
multitasking manager of unpaid domestic and emotion work at home, but 
not be totally equal in time spent in paid or unpaid work.
In conclusion, there are serious doubts about whether it is possible or 
realistic to expect that policy changes of the sort we have seen to date can 
equalize the shares of women and men’s unpaid work, although policies 
may be able to help achieve smaller changes in the shares. If policies were 
aligned to facilitate such changes at critical points when men are open to 
change, there might be more couples who take them up, but it is unlikely to 
be a majority. Full equality in shares of unpaid work is a much larger and 
more elusive target.
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notes
1. For example, Lewis (2008) cites a finding from Gershuny (2000) as her 
source for claiming that, despite the increase in paid work by women, “women 
have continued to bear the brunt of care work in families in all western countries; 
women have changed their labour market behaviour much faster and to a much 
greater degree than men have changed their participation in domestic work” 
(p. 269).
2. It is, however, the case, in nearly all countries, that at particular life 
course stages, the majority of couples do spend a period or several periods of 
childbirth with one full-time earner, the male partner, while the female partner 
takes time out of employment to have the child and care for it. These periods 
have been getting successively shorter and shorter over the generations of mothers 
(Macran, Joshi, and Dex 1996).
3. Belgium, Italy, Finland, Sweden, and Norway offer some payment while 
parents are on leave.
4. Portugal offers fathers 5 obligatory days of paternity leave plus 15 days 
of fully paid parental leave if taken immediately after maternity leave. Spain and 
Slovenia offer fathers 15 days of paternity leave at full pay. The United Kingdom, 
since 2003, offers fathers 2 weeks of paid paternity leave.
5. Finland offers fathers 18 days paid paternity leave (not well paid) plus 
12 bonus days for fathers who take at least 2 months paternity leave. Germany 
gives a family 2 extra months of paid parental leave if the father takes at least 2 
months’ leave.
6. One month of leave was allocated to the father in Sweden only from Jan-
uary 1, 2002; from January 1, 2005, this period was extended to 2 months.
7. In the United Kingdom and Germany, official definitions draw the bound-
ary between full- and part-time weekly hours at 30 per week, whereas in Sweden 
and Finland, the boundary is drawn at 35 hour per week. In Sweden, there are 
particular employment rights for mothers to work part-time hours that coincide 
with this threshold.
8. The introduction of a minimum wage in the United Kingdom in 1999 did 
improve a large number of low-paid women’s wages, but given the low level at 
which it was introduced, it has not made a large impact on the female-to-male 
wage ratio.
9. Ironically, Denmark abandoned its trial of Daddy Leave in 2002, because 
it was criticized as interfering with men’s freedom to choose. Lewis (2008) thinks 
this is erroneous reasoning and that Daddy Leave—“use it or lose it”—does offer 
men a freedom to choose.
10. There are arguments that women have low expectations, culturally as 
well as economically embedded, that make them loath to express dissatisfaction. 
This is akin to Marx’s concept of alienation. To take such views seriously, we 
must question whether we can ever believe anything anyone ever says. We also 
have to take the strong position of telling people we know what would make them 
happy/satisfied better than they know themselves. These are not positions that I 
would want to support.
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In recent years, scholars have become increasingly interested in the link be-
tween gender equality in the nation and in the household. The motivating 
idea of their research is that household processes such as the division of 
housework can be affected by national characteristics such as the employ-
ment rates of women, their presence in the higher reaches of the government 
and private sector, the prevalence of antidiscrimination laws and policies, 
and other societal markers of the status of women. A number of studies 
have used data from multiple countries to analyze the gender gap in the 
performance of domestic labor. They have established both the universality 
of this gap as well as important cross-national differences in its magnitude 
and correlates. Although it would be too much to say that this research has 
unambiguously demonstrated a relationship between gender inequalities at 
the national and household levels, its findings are at least suggestive of such 
a connection (e.g., Batalova and Cohen 2002, Fuwa 2004).
Here we ask a different question: Are countries with greater economic 
inequality among women characterized by greater disparity in their perfor-
mance of domestic labor? Our analysis addresses a major gap in the existing 
cross-national scholarship on housework. Like the quantitative housework 
literature in general, prior cross-national research has focused on the gender 
gap and has paid relatively little attention to disparities in domestic labor 
among women. Specifically, it has not analyzed gaps in housework among 
women that are related to economic differences among them. Consequently, 
we know how much more time women spend than men on domestic labor in 
many countries, but not how much more or less time women with low earn-
ings spend on this kind of work compared with those with higher earnings. 
And the recent wave of cross-national quantitative studies has not examined 
the possible connections between economic inequality at the national level 
and inequalities in time use among women.
In this chapter we perform the first cross-national investigation to date of 
the relationship between economic inequality among women and disparities 
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in their time spent on domestic labor. Using large, nationally representa-
tive samples of women in heterosexual couple households from Germany, 
Sweden, and the United States, we analyze what we will call the economic 
gap in women’s housework. We focus on the gap related to differences in the 
earnings of married and cohabiting women. For each country, we report the 
observed difference in time spent on housework by women with the lowest 
and highest 10 percent of earnings in that country. Furthermore, we com-
pare this economic disparity in women’s housework time with the gender 
gap in domestic labor within each country. To account for the variation in 
women’s earnings that comes from differences in their employment hours, 
we present our findings separately for women employed full-time.
Our purpose here is twofold. First, we simply want to focus attention 
on the economic gap in women’s domestic labor in each country. Second, we 
would like to suggest that the logic of linking inequality at the national and 
household levels, used in the literature to date with respect to the gender gap 
in housework, may also be applicable to within-gender disparities in domes-
tic labor. Across countries, greater earnings inequality may be associated with 
wider gaps in the burden of domestic labor among women. The three nations 
in our study are ideal for this investigation, because they feature varying lev-
els of economic inequality among women. They also fall at different points 
on the continuum of collective versus market regulation of earnings, provi-
sion of social benefits, and other factors affecting disparities in earnings. Our 
comparison of the economic gap in women’s housework across these three 
countries is suggestive of this broader divergence among them.
background
Housework and Women’s Earnings
Our study brings together two separate lines of inquiry in the scholarship 
on gender relations in heterosexual couple households. The first has docu-
mented the role of women as independent economic actors with respect 
to household finances and expenditures (Bellante and Foster 1984; Cohen 
1998; Ludwig-Mayerhofer, Gartner, and Allmendinger 2006; Soberon-Fer-
rer and Dardis 1991). This research implies the importance of earnings in-
equality among women for outcomes like the division of domestic labor, but 
does not pursue this theme. A second strand of investigation concerns the 
relationship between gender inequality at the country and household levels 
(Blumberg and Coleman 1989; Breen and Cooke 2005; Calasanti and Bailey 
1991; Fuwa 2004; Künzler 1998). This research emphasizes the need to ac-
count for gender disparities in the wider context within which households 
are embedded, but typically does not examine inequalities among women. 
Here we draw on the insights of both of these bodies of literature to frame 
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our comparative investigation of the relationship between disparities in 
women’s housework and earnings.
We consider first the literature on household spending. There is grow-
ing evidence that women in couple households have different priorities from 
their male partners for monetary expenditures, particularly with regard to 
children and substitutes for domestic labor. A pioneering study by Lund-
berg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) showed that government cash payments to 
mothers in the United Kingdom during the late 1970s were associated with 
greater expenditures on women’s and children’s clothing compared with 
expenditures on men’s. Brandon (1999) found that in the United States, 
mothers’ own earnings increased the odds of their choosing market child 
care over parental care; fathers’ incomes affected child care choices only 
if husbands and wives pooled their incomes. Similarly, Phipps and Burton 
(1998) reported that only women’s incomes were associated with child care 
expenditures in Canada, even when both spouses were employed full-time.
More directly to the point of our study, the evidence is accumulating 
that household expenditures on market substitutes for housework are driven 
particularly by women’s earnings. Soberon-Ferrer and Dardis (1991) found 
that women’s wage rates, but not men’s, were positively associated with 
spending on housework substitutes. Oropesa (1993) also reported a link, for 
women employed full-time, between their own incomes and the likelihood 
of paying someone to clean the home. Phipps and Burton (1998) and Co-
hen (1998) found that women’s incomes, more than their husbands’, were 
directly associated with household spending on eating out; Cohen (1998) 
showed that this was also the case for spending on housekeeping services. 
Most recently, Treas and de ruijter (2008) confirm that the association of 
household spending on outsourcing routine housework with women’s earn-
ings is greater than its association with their partners’ earnings.
An important implication of these findings is that women with high earn-
ings may have an advantage, with respect to time spent on domestic labor, 
over their low-earning peers. However, the literature has not examined this 
potential disparity among women in time spent on household labor nearly 
as thoroughly as it has the housework gender gap. The theoretical roots 
of this omission lie in the sustained focus of the quantitative literature on 
the relationship between married women’s housework and their economic 
resources relative to their husbands’ (e.g., Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; 
Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Greenstein 2000). The dominant theoretical 
models in this research, the “economic exchange” and “gender display” 
hypotheses, do not distinguish between women with low and high earnings 
(see Bittman et al. [2003] for a lucid overview of both models). They implic-
itly assume that a married woman with low earnings is equivalent to another 
with high earnings with respect to their time spent on housework, at least 
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if their earnings relative to their husbands’ are the same. This conceptual 
approach has precluded the investigation of a relationship between earnings 
inequality among women and variation in their time spent on housework.
The existence of an economic gap among women in their time spent 
on household labor has been suggested in a recent study by Gupta (2007). 
Using the National Survey of Families and Households from the United 
States, Gupta (2007) found that only their own earnings mattered to wom-
en’s housework time, not their earnings relative to their partners’, and not 
their partners’ earnings. This result implies that inequalities in women’s own 
earnings could be more consequential for differences in their housework 
time than variation in their relative earnings or in total household income. 
Placed in the context of the literature on household spending discussed ear-
lier, it suggests that women deploy their own earnings more than their male 
partners’ for the purposes of reducing time spent on housework.
Furthermore, women with low earnings may experience additional 
housework burdens if they lack labor-saving devices. For example, wash-
ing and drying clothing may take longer if it has to be carried to and from 
laundromats. Shopping could take longer for women who have to use public 
transportation. Women with young children who cannot afford preschool or 
child care may have to spend more time on housework because of the con-
tinuous presence of their children dirtying the home. The volume of house-
work for poor women may also increase if they live in deteriorating housing 
that requires them to clean up after leaking pipes or flaking plaster, as in the 
extreme example documented by Kotlowitz (1991, pp. 27–28). Given the 
same volume of work, such factors may increase the labor intensity of their 
household labor. For all these reasons, an analysis of the consequences of 
economic differences among women for their time spent doing housework 
is overdue.
Housework, Earnings, and Nation
The second set of ideas informing our study concerns the relationship be-
tween gender hierarchies at the macro level and those operating in house-
holds. Some scholars have argued that the division of domestic labor, a mi-
cro- or household-level process, must be understood in the context of gender 
inequality in the larger social settings in which households exist. In this 
view, gender structures at the macro level are not merely the aggregation 
of smaller units such as households, but rather can exert an independent 
influence on them. For example, Blumberg and Coleman (1989) argued that 
gender inequalities at the macro level could “discount” the effect of women’s 
individual assets on household processes such as the division of housework; 
conversely, a greater degree of societal gender equality may enhance the 
effect of those resources. An alternative possibility was suggested by Calas-
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anti and Bailey (1991), who argued that state provision of various services 
in Sweden reduced the relevance of individual resources to time spent on 
housework. By contrast, such resources may be more pertinent in the United 
States, with its comparatively weaker social welfare system and greater reli-
ance on markets.
These competing ideas have received mixed support in the literature. 
Like the single-country research on the relationship between earnings and 
housework, cross-national studies have focused on the relationship between 
women’s housework and their earnings relative to their husbands or part-
ners. Calasanti and Bailey (1991) found that relative income mattered more 
for housework in the United States than it did for Sweden. However, a recent 
analysis of data from 22 nations by Fuwa (2004) provided some corrobo-
ration for the argument of Blumberg and Coleman (1989). Fuwa (2004) 
found a stronger negative association in countries with greater equality be-
tween women’s share of domestic labor on the one hand, and their employ-
ment hours and egalitarian gender ideology on the other. But there were no 
significant differences in the relationship between women’s relative income 
and their share of housework between countries with high and low levels 
of gender equality. An earlier analysis by Baxter (1997) on data from five 
countries, including Sweden and the United States, also did not discover dif-
ferences in the association between relative income and domestic labor.
Two other recent studies have investigated the relationship between 
women’s relative income and their housework time using data from more 
than one country (Bittman et al. 2003; Evertsson and Nermo 2004). The 
first found that the housework time of Australian married women whose 
earnings were less than their husbands’ varied inversely with their relative 
earnings, as predicted by the economic exchange model of the relationship 
between earnings and domestic labor. However, the housework time of 
women whose earnings were more than their husbands’ exceeded that of 
other women. This conforms to the gender display hypothesis, which pre-
dicts that women with unusually high earnings compared with their male 
partners’ will compensate for their gender-atypical earnings by spending 
more time on housework than other women. In contrast to this behavior of 
Australian women, Bittman et al. (2003) found that the housework time of 
U.S. married women fit the exchange model.
Their findings for the United States were contradicted by Evertsson and 
Nermo (2004) who reported that U.S. women’s housework behavior also 
fit the gender display model. However, they found that Swedish women’s 
domestic labor varied inversely with their relative earnings, in keeping with 
the economic exchange hypothesis. Both studies speculated that in countries 
in which high relative earnings for women were more “deviant,” women 
may compensate for their economic deviance by spending more time on 
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housework than women whose relative earnings were more gender typi-
cal. Although these studies did not explicitly draw upon the hypothesis of 
Blumberg and Coleman (1989), it could be argued that the prevalence of 
high relative earnings for women indicates the degree of gender equality at 
the macro level. Thus, high relative earnings for women may be discounted 
in countries like Australia and the United States compared with a nation like 
Sweden, where they are more common.
Nation and Earnings Inequality among Women
Because of its focus on women’s relative earnings, and more generally on 
gender inequality, none of the existing cross-national studies of housework 
has compared the implications of economic inequality among women for dis-
parities in their housework time. Here we compare across three countries the 
disparities in domestic labor based on the inequality in women’s own earn-
ings. In the spirit of the existing cross-national research on domestic labor, we 
describe briefly the different national contexts of economic inequality. We do 
not have the data to test the association formally between macrolevel indica-
tors of inequality among women and differences in their housework time. 
Our more modest aim is, therefore, to suggest the theoretical and practical 
importance of this relationship and to motivate its further investigation.
An important determinant of earnings inequality among women is 
whether they are employed in the first place, and the distribution of part-
time versus full-time employment among those who are. (Except where spe-
cifically noted, the following summary of the literature on inequality in the 
three countries is derived from Orloff [2002].) Among the countries in our 
study, Sweden has the highest rates of labor force participation and full-time 
employment among women, and Germany the lowest. These cross-national 
differences are generally understood in terms of the degree of state support 
for women’s labor force activity. Sweden is a dual-earner society that pro-
vides substantial subsidies for child care and other benefits to maximize the 
rates of women’s employment and full-time work among those employed. 
In contrast, Germany, with its high taxation of second incomes, limited state 
provision of child care, and a strong normative orientation toward in-home 
maternal care for young children, is described in the literature as a “male 
breadwinner regime.” The “market-oriented” approach of the United States, 
which stresses equal opportunity for paid work but lacks state provision of 
care services, has lower rates of women’s labor force participation and full-
time employment than Sweden, but higher rates than Germany.
Earnings inequality among women in the labor force is affected by many 
of the same factors that shape it for male workers. These include the strength 
of labor unions, and the distribution of workers and range of earnings 
across jobs and occupations. Sweden is typically described as being “social–
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democratic” in this regard. Its progressive tax system is designed to reduce 
extreme economic inequality and fund extensive social benefits. A long tradi-
tion of collective bargaining and a relatively high unionization rate may also 
help reduce wage inequality. Furthermore, the earnings gap among Swedish 
women may be dampened by their concentration in the public sector, which, 
on average, pays lower wages than the private sector. Germany’s more “con-
servative” regime also features high levels of taxation, but, in contrast to 
Sweden, the German tax system offers a disincentive to wives’ employment 
by imposing especially severe tax burdens on secondary earners (Laurin 
2006; Sainsbury 1999). As a result, fewer women are in the labor market 
in Germany, and after-tax earnings inequalities among employed women 
are higher than in Sweden. The market-oriented or “liberal” United States, 
with lower levels of taxation and unionization, has the highest variance in 
earnings among the three countries we consider. Swedish women are less 
concentrated than U.S. women in managerial and other highly remunerative 
private sector occupations (Mandel and Semyonov 2006). The greater pres-
ence of women in high-paying private-sector jobs in the United States, and 
the higher wages in such jobs there, may contribute to the higher dispersion 
in their earnings. The ranking of the three countries with respect to disper-
sion in women’s earnings is clearly evident in Table 6.1, which shows mean 
earnings for all women and for those employed full-time.
National Differences in the Relationship between 
Women’s Earnings and Housework
The economic gap in housework time among women in a particular country 
is affected not only by the extent of earnings inequality there, but also by 
the degree to which women’s earnings are associated with their time spent 
on housework. Because our focus here is on earnings inequality, we do not 
estimate the magnitude of this relationship. However, we note that in a 
hypothetical nation in which women’s earnings had no relationship to their 
domestic labor, there would be no economic gap in women’s housework 
(as we have defined it) no matter how extreme the earnings inequality is in 
that country. As discussed earlier, the literature on household spending sug-
gests that the relationship between women’s earnings and their housework 
time reflects, in part, their purchase of market substitutes for domestic la-
bor. If this is indeed the case, then the magnitude of the relationship in a 
given country represents most directly the cost and efficiency of substitutes. 
The cheaper they are, or the more housework they can defray per dollar, 
the larger the association between earnings and housework time. This as-
sociation could further represent the normative acceptability in a particular 
place of using earnings to buy substitutes for housework, the propensity of 
women there to do so, or a combination of all these factors. It may also be 
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affected by the housework burden in a given country. The more time women 
in a particular nation spend on domestic labor, the greater their need or 
scope for substitution using their earnings.
Cross-national differences in the earnings gap in women’s housework 
time could also arise from differences in the prevalence of market substitu-
tion for the most time-consuming household chores such as cooking and 
cleaning. In the United States, 8 percent of married and cohabiting couples 
hire housekeeping services, although much higher proportions consume 
meals not prepared at home (Treas and de ruijter 2008). The proportion 
of German households employing cleaning persons regularly was about 7 
percent in 2005 (author calculations from the 2005 GSOEP), and virtu-
ally no households report doing so in Sweden (author calculations from the 
2000 Swedish Level of Living Survey). Because of relatively high labor costs 
in Germany and Sweden, there is a black market for domestic services, and 
the actual rates of their utilization may be higher than those reported (Focus 
2004, referring to Bundesknappschaft estimates for Germany). In both na-
tions, tax policy changes are either in place or underway to ease the hiring 
of household help. It is also possible that there are national differences in 
the acceptability of employing household help. The negative relationship 
between women’s earnings and housework may also be the result of factors 
other than outsourcing, such as lower standards of cleanliness for women 
with higher earnings. In that case, national differences in the size of the rela-
tionship between women’s earnings and housework may reflect a divergence 
in this class variation in standards.
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SD 18.7 13.9 18.3 5.8 2.6 7.9
SD, standard deviation.
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To summarize, the preceding discussion suggests two principal ways in 
which national or macrolevel factors could affect the earnings-based dis-
parity in women’s housework time. First, the size of this disparity among 
women in a given country is affected directly by the degree of inequality in 
their earnings. It will therefore reflect all the macrolevel factors that increase 
or reduce dispersion in women’s earnings. Second, the disparity in women’s 
housework time based on differences in their earnings is related to the extent 
to which those earnings can be translated into reductions in domestic labor. 
That, in turn, depends on the costs of housework substitution, the avail-
ability of domestic services, and the cultural norms regarding substitutes 
such as food prepared outside the home and the employment of household 
help. This relationship between women’s earnings and domestic labor in a 




We use three large, nationally representative surveys from each country. The 
German data are derived from the 1999 wave of the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (GSOEP), a longitudinal household survey that began in 1984, and, 
since June 1990, has included residents of the former German Democratic 
republic, or East Germany. The data for Sweden come from the Swedish 
Level of Living Survey (LNU) for the year 2000. For our U.S. sample, we 
use the 1999 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a longi-
tudinal survey that began in 1968. From each of these surveys we selected 
samples of women, age 18 to 65, in marital or cohabiting relationships with 
male partners. Sample sizes are 2,271 for Germany, 1,464 for Sweden, and 
1,888 for the United States.
Data: Measures
The primary substantive variables of interest are weekly housework hours 
and annual earnings. Following the existing quantitative literature on do-
mestic labor, we focus on tasks such as cooking and cleaning, which are 
mostly done by women and have to be performed regularly. Our measure of 
housework time in Germany was constructed from responses to questions 
about the number of hours usually spent on washing, cooking, and clean-
ing on a typical weekday and both weekend days. From the Swedish survey 
we created a measure of weekly housework hours from separate questions 
about time spent on shopping, cooking, doing the dishes, and cleaning. In 
contrast to the more detailed information on weekly housework available in 
the surveys from the other two countries, the measure in the United States is 
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obtained from a single survey question about time spent cooking, cleaning, 
and doing other work around the house. We discuss the implications of this 
less comprehensive U.S. measure for our findings in the conclusion.
With respect to annual earnings, our focus is on labor market earnings, 
including those obtained from self-employment. Additionally, the Swedish 
measure includes reimbursement from employment-based insurance such as 
health insurance and parental leave insurance. Unlike the data from the two 
European countries, the U.S. data on employment hours and earnings were 
obtained retrospectively 2 years after the 1999 interview. They may, there-
fore, be subject to greater error as a result of recall issues than the earnings 
data from Germany and Sweden. We discuss in the conclusion the implica-
tions of this possible measurement error for our findings.
Analysis
We define the economic gap in housework time as the observed difference in 
each country between the average hours spent per week on domestic labor 
by women with the lowest and highest 10 percent of annual earnings in that 
country. We exclude women with zero earnings. Because the three countries 
differ in the proportions of women employed and employed full-time, we 
report the gaps separately for all women and for women employed full-time. 
Presenting separate results for women employed full-time also addresses the 
possibility that women with a greater taste for housework than paid work 
have low earnings because of a lower commitment of time to the labor force. 
We also compare the magnitude of this economic disparity with the house-
work gender gap in each country, defined as the average difference between 
the women’s and their male partners’ weekly housework hours.
results
Table 6.1 shows weighted means and standard deviations of the central 
variables for two groups of women: an unrestricted sample and a subset 
of women employed full-time. The mean time spent on housework among 
all women is lowest in Sweden, reflecting, in part, the higher proportion of 
women employed full-time there. The cross-national differences in house-
work hours are smaller among women employed full-time. Note that the 
variance in housework time is consistently highest in the United States. With 
respect to employment, Sweden has the highest mean weekly employment 
hours among all women and, correspondingly, the largest proportion of 
women employed full-time.
Table 6.2 shows the crux of our story—namely, the disparities in house-
work time in each country between women at the low and high ends of the 
earnings distribution. The figures shown are the averages for the lowest and 
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highest 10 percent of earnings (excluding zero earnings). Separate t-tests 
show that these two means are significantly different in all three countries 
for all women and for women employed full-time. We note first that the 
gap is meaningfully large in each of the three countries, particularly among 
all women, and even among women employed full-time. Swedish women 
employed full-time with low earnings spend a half hour more on domestic 
labor daily than their peers at the high end of the distribution. Second, this 
gap is greatest in the United States. Among women employed full-time, the 
women with the lowest 10 percent of earnings spend, on average, a full 
additional hour per day on housework compared with women in the top 
earnings bracket. This gap is substantially larger than the cross-national 
differences in housework time among women employed full-time: On aver-
age, full-time working women in the United States spend less than a quarter 
of an hour more per day on domestic labor than their European peers.
Figure 6.1 compares the economic disparity in housework time among 
women with the gender gap in housework time, here defined as the average 
difference between the women’s hours and their partners’. The striped bars 
represent the gender gap; the solid ones, the disparity based on women’s 
earnings. The black bars are for all women and the gray ones represent 
women employed full-time. We observe that the gender gap is largest in 
Germany and smallest in Sweden for both groups of women. The economic 
ta b l e  6 . 2
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All within-country differences in means are different from zero at a significance level of 0.01 or better.
The n-values are different for the two groups of women as a result of weighting of the earnings per-
centiles. In nearly every case, the weighted 90th percentile is higher than the unweighted one, resulting in 
smaller (unweighted) n-values for women with high earnings. This is most noticeable for Germany.
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disparity in housework time is smallest in Sweden among all women, and 
smallest in Germany among women employed full-time. It is highest in the 
United States among both groups of women. Furthermore, the economic 
disparity in housework time among all U.S. women is actually larger than 
the gender gap. In the other two countries, it is consistently smaller than the 
gender gap, but not trivial by comparison.
discussion
Our objective in this study was to examine economic gaps in women’s 
housework time in their national context. Our findings are summarized in 
Figure 6.1. In all three countries, the size of this housework economic gap 
is appreciable compared with the housework gender gap. The inequality 
among women in their time spent on household labor is substantially larger 
in the United States, the nation with the greatest inequality in earnings, than 
in the other two countries. This is the case among all women and women 
employed full-time; among the latter, it amounts to an additional hour per 
day spent on household labor by women with low earnings compared with 
those with high earnings. As far as the comparison between the United States 
and the two European countries is concerned, our results show that larger 
inequalities in women’s earnings correspond to bigger economic disparities 
in housework time among them.
Furthermore, Table 6.1 shows that the economic gap in women’s house-







Gender gap: all women
Economic gap: all women
Gender gap: full-time
Economic gap: full-time
Figure 6.1. Gender gap in weekly housework hours compared with economic 
disparity among women with the lowest and highest 10 percent of earnings (zero 
earnings excluded) for all women and women employed full-time, by country.
n o t e :  Gender gap equals the difference between mean women’s and partners’ weekly 
housework hours. Economic disparity equals the difference between mean hours of women 
with the lowest and highest 10 percent of earnings (zero earnings excluded).
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with low earnings spend much more time on domestic labor than their Ger-
man and Swedish counterparts. Comparing the two European countries, 
we see that the economic housework gap among all women is larger in 
Germany, which has greater earnings inequality than Sweden. However, it 
is smaller among German women employed full-time. This is because those 
with high earnings spend more time on domestic labor than their neighbors 
across the Baltic, whereas there is not much difference between the mean 
housework hours of women with low earnings in the two countries. The 
general descriptive pattern reported here is confirmed by multivariate mod-
els (not shown) controlling for women’s and partners’ employment hours, 
age, education, occupation, presence of young children, and cohabitation, 
although the economic and gender gaps in housework time adjusted for 
these controls are smaller.
We conclude that there is indeed a connection between economic in-
equality among women in a country and inequality in their time spent on 
domestic labor. Such a link is theoretically contiguous with the recent litera-
ture on the relationship between gender equality at the national and house-
hold levels. We do not formally test the hypothesis that macroeconomic 
inequality among women is associated with disparities in their performance 
of household labor. However, our findings imply the need for an investiga-
tion of the links between economic gaps in women’s housework and na-
tional factors such as taxation levels, subsidized child care, the occupational 
and earnings distribution of women, and social inequality more generally. 
If higher earnings are always associated with less time spent on housework, 
the economic housework gap may increase over time as earnings inequality 
among women increases. In the United States, for example, the ratio of the 
90th and 10th percentiles of earnings increased from 3.4 to 4.6 for women 
working full-time (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2005).
The familiar differences between Swedish social democracy and U.S. 
market-oriented liberalism give us an idea of the factors contributing to 
the economic disparity in women’s housework and what could be done to 
reduce this disparity. Our results suggest that reduced earnings inequal-
ity among women could lessen the economic disparity in their housework 
burden. The disparity could also be made smaller by reducing the costs of 
housework substitution, perhaps through state subsidies. Consider the ex-
treme scenario in which the costs of substitution are completely subsidized. 
In that case, inequalities in women’s earnings would not be associated with 
disparities in their hours of domestic labor. In both Germany and Sweden, 
policies are currently in place or under consideration to subsidize partially, 
through tax breaks, the costs of hiring household help. The consequences of 
these innovations remain to be seen.
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We turn now to some caveats. It is possible the relatively large economic 
disparities we observe in the United States result from the less detailed na-
ture of the housework measure in the American survey compared with the 
ones used in the German and Swedish cases. However, our focus is on the 
housework gap between women at the two ends of the earnings distribution 
rather than the absolute time spent on housework by women with low or 
high earnings. Therefore, unless the U.S. measure is biased differently for 
the two groups of women, the size of the gap should be as credible as in the 
other two countries. For instance, it has been observed that housework time 
data obtained from a single retrospective question, as in the PSID, is likely to 
underestimate time spent compared with information obtained from several 
such questions, as in the German and Swedish cases (Evertsson and Nermo 
2004, p. 1276). Our estimate of the economic gap in U.S. women’s house-
work would be biased if the amount of this measurement error is different 
for women with low earnings compared with those with high earnings. A 
more serious concern is the potential bias in our results for the United States 
resulting from recall error in the PSID earnings data, which was obtained 
2 years after the housework information. Here, also, because our findings 
have to do with differences between women with low and high earnings, the 
bias should matter only if it is systematically different for these two types 
of women.
Substantively, we cannot say exactly how inequality in women’s earnings 
translates into a gap in their housework time. That is a necessary preliminary 
to understanding the national differences in the size of the gap in housework 
time between high- and low-earning women. A reasonable guess, supported 
by studies mentioned earlier, is that women use their earnings to purchase 
substitutes for domestic labor, such as prepared food and cleaning services. 
Because our data do not contain information on household expenses, how-
ever, we cannot be sure of this. It could also be that women with high earn-
ings have different standards for housework performance than those with 
low earnings. It is even possible that the disparity in one country is the result 
of different phenomena from the gap in another. To address these issues, we 
would require data from each country with information on earnings, house-
work, expenses, and norms regarding domestic labor. We note also that the 
direction of causality in the relationship between earnings and time spent on 
housework cannot be established unambiguously with our cross-sectional 
data, and that other researchers have claimed that it operates in the oppo-
site direction from the one we suggest here—that is, with housework time 
affecting earnings rather than vice versa (e.g., Hersch and Stratton 2002; 
Noonan 2001).
A second unresolved substantive question is exactly what constitutes 
inequality in earnings among women with male partners. Our focus here 
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has been entirely on the inequality in women’s own earnings. This is be-
cause multivariate models (not shown) for women’s housework in all three 
countries demonstrate that their partners’ earnings have no relationship to 
women’s housework. However, economic inequality among married and 
cohabiting women also depends on disparities in their male partners’ re-
sources. Particularly in strong male breadwinner countries like Germany, 
women married to men with high earnings may have zero or low earnings 
themselves, but still avail themselves of market substitutes for housework. 
The scholarly debate regarding the connection between married and co-
habiting women’s economic, or class positions and their male partners’ is 
complex and ongoing (see Sorensen [1994] for a review). We acknowledge 
this larger controversy without addressing it directly. With respect to their 
time spent on housework, women’s own earnings appear to be far more 
important than their male partners’ in all three countries. As noted in our 
review of the research literature, at least for the United States, women’s own 
earnings also matter more for the outsourcing of domestic work.
Finally, we note that the other determinant of the economic gap in women’s 
housework is the extent to which women’s earnings translate into reductions 
in their time spent on it, as captured by the size of the association between 
the two. We do not estimate these associations here, but note that a number 
of factors can affect the magnitude of the relationship between women’s earn-
ings and housework. These include matters of culture, norms, or preference, 
such as women’s desire to use their earnings to cut down on housework, the 
acceptability of doing so in their milieu, and class-specific standards regarding 
domestic labor. The cost and availability of substitutes are also likely compo-
nents of the association between earnings and housework. regardless of its 
exact origins, the larger this association—that is, the more earnings are used 
to defray housework time—the bigger the economic gap in housework among 
women. Thus, the larger economic gap in U.S. women’s housework time may 
result, in part, from a greater ability or propensity among U.S. women to use 
their earnings to reduce their domestic labor.
conclusion
Long the main object of inquiry in single-country studies of domestic labor, 
the housework gender gap has also been the central concern of the growing 
body of cross-national research. Our objective in this study is to add the 
economic gap in housework among women to the research agenda. That 
is, we wish to emphasize differences among women in their performance of 
housework associated with disparities in their earnings. In all three coun-
tries, women with the lowest earnings spend substantially more time doing 
routine household chores than those with the highest earnings. Moreover, 
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the magnitude of this disparity appears to be higher in countries with greater 
economic inequality among women. To put it differently, women with low 
earnings are at a more severe disadvantage in terms of reconciling their 
work–family conflicts compared with those with high earnings, in countries 
with greater variation in women’s earnings.
Future studies with data from more countries would be helpful in estab-
lishing the magnitude of this association and the cross-national variation in 
it. We expect the economic disparity in women’s household labor to increase 
over time. This is both because earnings inequality in all three countries 
is increasing (The Economist 2007) and because market substitution for 
housework is likely to become more commonplace. It is conceivable that, 
over time, this disparity among women will become comparable in size with 
the gender gap in household labor, as appears to be the case already in the 
United States. To contemplate this possibility is not to diminish the theo-
retical or practical significance of the gender gap, which is likely to persist 
and remain universal for at least the near future. rather, comparing the 
economic disparities in housework among women across countries gives us 
another angle on the consequences of different national approaches to the 
regulation of economic inequality. It also serves as a reminder of the fault 
lines of class among women, even in countries like Sweden.
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Together with the increase in labor force participation rates of women, the 
structures of work in the family household have also changed. Household 
labor is composed of different types of work, which include housework, 
such as cooking, cleaning, and ironing, on the one hand; and care work, 
such as child care and care of the elderly, on the other. Housework and care 
work are connected in specific ways with the overall system of work organi-
zation in society and can be organized in different forms within and outside 
the family household. However, there are substantial differences between 
societies with respect to the ways in which household work is organized. The 
central question of this chapter is: Which theoretical framework is adequate 
for explaining cross-national differences in the ways in which housework 
and care work are organized in a society?
It has frequently been argued that the degree to which family policies 
support the public provision of child care constitutes the main explanation 
for cross-national differences in the ways in which household work is orga-
nized. There is no doubt that family policies contribute substantially to the 
explanation. However, as it is argued in this chapter, such an explanation 
is too restricted, because the organization of housework and care work in 
society is also influenced by cultural values and models that relate to the 
role of the family in society, the gender division of labor within the family, 
the participation of women and men in waged work, and the societal sphere 
in which care work takes place. Consequently, societies also differ in terms 
of the degree to which women wish to be “freed” from care responsibili-
ties, as well as in the degree to which a model of the “caring father” exists. 
Both welfare state policies and individuals refer to such values and models 
to guide and evaluate actions. However, there is a complex relationship be-
tween the values to which welfare state policies are oriented and the values 
to which individuals and social groups relate in terms of their behavior. This 
complex relationship can best be characterized by time lags or by various 
contradictions. Therefore, a broader approach to explaining cross-national 
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differences in the ways in which housework and care work are organized is 
required. In addition to considering the welfare state and other institutions, 
this approach also takes into account the contribution that cultural differ-
ences make to explaining cross-national differences. In this chapter, such 
an approach is introduced in relation to child care. In addition, the ways in 
which housework might be integrated is reflected upon. As a basic part of 
household work, child care is especially interesting, because it is particularly 
decisive in terms of the influence that it exerts on the degree that women 
participate in the labor force and the forms that their participation takes.
The first part of this chapter will outline briefly the ways in which 
child care is organized in European societies by identifying three distinctive 
patterns. In the second part, an explanatory framework for cross-national 
differences will be introduced—namely, the theoretical approach of the 
“arrangement of work and family” based on different cultural models of 
breadwinning and caregiving. This approach emphasizes the mutual, and in 
part contradictory, interrelations and dynamics among culture, institutions, 
social structures, and action, which form the societal context for the struc-
tures of care work in a society. The third part will outline how the differ-
ences in the cultural context and welfare state policies in different European 
societies, and the ways in which they interact make a particular contribu-
tion to explaining differences in the degree to which child care is organized 
in society and in the gender division of labor within the family. This analysis 
demonstrates that the broad typology of welfare regimes maps only imper-
fectly to the patterns for organizing child care, and that considering cultural 
models and welfare regimes together leads to a more satisfactory explana-
tion of the societal organization of child care. The chapter will finish with 
some reflections on the possibility of including housework in this explana-
tory framework.
Given the focus on the care of children, I define family here as a so-
cial unit that is based on the relationship between at least two generations, 
which are defined in a society as parents and their children. The article is re-
stricted to families in which one parent or two parents are living in the same 
household together with their dependent children who are in need of care.1
different patterns of the organization 
of child care in european societies
In western European industrial society in the middle of the 20th century, 
child care was organized in many countries in the context of the male bread-
winner marriage.2 Its nature involved an informal, unpaid, and hidden type 
of work. Child care was seen as the main task of married women to be 
provided in the private family household, and this responsibility restricted 
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women from participating in formal employment to the same degree as 
men. Therefore, in modern industrial society, the gender division of labor 
excluded women, or at least marginalized them, in relation to the central 
sphere for social integration, income, and social security. During the transi-
tion to postindustrial society during the last two decades of the 20th century, 
substantial changes took place in European societies, as van der Lippe de-
scribes in this volume. The labor force participation of women increased in 
all areas in which it was previously low. Furthermore, the structures of care 
work also changed substantially.
Some changes also occurred in the gender division of work in the private 
household; these changes are the subject of several chapters in this book, 
particularly Sayer’s (Chapter 2). The responsibilities for care work in the 
family household have, to some extent, been redistributed between men and 
women, meaning that degendering of care work has taken place to at least 
some limited degree. The extent of male participation in this work varies 
extensively in international comparisons and is highest in the Scandinavian 
countries (Blossfeld and Drobnicˇ 2001; Döge and Volz 2004; Eydal 2005).
A massive shift of child care away from being strictly the parents’ re-
sponsibility took place in many western European welfare states as well. 
Care was taken over by various types of organizations, based in the state 
or municipal sphere, in the nonprofit sector, or in the market. The public 
sector and, as in the case of Germany, the nonprofit sector, were extremely 
important to the expansion of social services (Anttonen and Sipilä 2005; 
Geissler 2002; Theobald 2005). Indeed, with the exception of the United 
Kingdom, market-based provisions play a far smaller role than the other 
sectors for western European countries (Meyer et al. 2008). Like informal 
care work, care work that is organized as gainful employment is generally 
thought of as “women’s work.” Thus, the increase in formal child care was 
accompanied by a considerable increase in the number of jobs for women, 
particularly in the area of social services, and consequently by an increase in 
the number of women in gainful employment (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development [OECD] 2002). As an area of employment, 
the social service sector is primarily female and one of the most prosperous 
areas in Europe (OECD 2002).3 In eastern European societies, in contrast, 
the current structure of child care is partly the result of converse processes. 
The tendencies of returning care from public arrangements to the private 
family household have at times been a component of the postsocialist trans-
formation process (Michon 2006; Surdej and Slezak 2009).
Based on data from the European Social Survey and OECD for eight 
European societies, Table 7.1 shows differences in the patterns relating to 
the extent to which families use formal child care. Table 7.1 also highlights 
differences in the degree to which mothers participate in the labor force and 
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in the share of their part-time work. Three particularly distinctive patterns 
emerge among the eight countries.
Pattern A: Employment-Oriented Pattern on 
the Basis of Formal Child Care
This pattern is characterized by the strong role of the employment of par-
ents on the basis of external, formalized child care. It is typical for France, 
East Germany, and, to a lesser extent, Finland as well. In these countries, 
the share of parents who are using formal child care is relatively high. The 
employment rate of mothers with young children is high and the share of 
mothers with one child who work part-time is relatively low. It is common 
in Finland, France, and East Germany.
ta b l e  7 . 1
Main patterns of combination of child care and employment by mothers with 
children age 0 to 6 years in selected European countries
Country
Use of Formal 
Child Carea
employment patterns of mothers
 
Employment Rates  
of Mothers  
with Children  
<3 Yearsb
Percentage of Part-time 
Employed Women with 
One Child in Total 
Employment of Women 
with One Childc
Pattern A: Employment-oriented pattern on the basis of formal child care
Finland 42.9 52.1  8.6
France 67.8 49.2 23.7
East Germany 71.0 45.1 14.3
Pattern B: Dual pattern on the basis of a combination of employment and  
family child care on part-time basis
Norway 45.3 18.0 33.5
West Germany 31.0 21.7 43.2
United Kingdom 23.2 49.2 46.6
Pattern C: Employment-related pattern on the basis of informal care
Spain 17.4 52.6 17.4
Poland 13.5 45.0 15.1
aPercentage of mothers with children younger than 6 years using formal child care in relation to all 
mothers with children younger than 6 years in the respective country. “Formal” means according to the 
European Social Survey: “paid child care, looked after at caregiver’s or own home; free nursery or child 
care, looked after somewhere other than home,” data for 2005.
bData for 2005.
cData for 2000; more recent comparative data are not available. Data for West Germany and East Ger-
many show the percentage of all women in part-time employment with at least one child age 0 to 6 years 
versus all employed women, and data for Poland show percentage of all women in part-time employment 
versus all employed women, because of a lack of more specific data.
s o u rc e :  Use of formal childcare—European Social Survey 2005; for West and East Germany: 
Kinder und Jugendhilfestatistik, Statistisches Bundesamt 2004; Employment data (for 2003) - OECD 2007: 
Tables 1.1., 3.2.; for East and West Germany: Engelbrech and Jungkunst 2001: 1-3.; part-time data: OECD 
2002: 78.
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Pattern B: Dual Pattern on the Basis of a Combination of 
Employment and Family Child Care on a Part-time Basis
This pattern is based on a combination of external formal child care with 
parental child care in the family household, on the basis of part-time employ-
ment of mothers as the dominant form. It can appear in two somewhat dif-
ferent forms: (1) mothers of small children stay for a longer time outside the 
labor force on the basis of parental leave and work part-time afterward (as 
in West Germany and Norway) or (2) a short period of parental leave is fol-
lowed by a period of part-time employment (as in the United Kingdom). This 
is a main reason why the employment rates of mothers with young children 
differ considerably between West Germany and Norway (between 18.0% 
and 21.7%) on one hand and the United Kingdom on the other (49.2%).
Pattern C: Employment-Related Pattern on the Basis of Informal Care
This pattern is based on a relatively high employment rate of mothers with 
small children and a low proportion of mothers working part-time. Dif-
ferent from pattern A, however, child care is mainly provided in informal 
forms. This pattern is common in Poland and Spain. In the following sec-
tions, cultural values and the policies of welfare regime types are evaluated 
as explanations for the three patterns of the organization of child care.
explanation of differences in the organization 
of child care in european societies in the 
context of culture and welfare state policies
The Approach of the “Arrangement of Work and Family”
The ways in which family and care are interrelated have been subject to 
historical change and, from a comparative perspective, differ substantially 
between national societies and at the regional level (Anttonen and Sipilä 
2005; Kröger 2001; Siim 2000). In this section I introduce a theoretical 
framework for explaining why the organization of child care differs for dif-
ferent societies and in terms of historical change in postindustrial societies. 
This approach is the arrangement of work and family in society.4
By arrangement I mean a configuration, which can be more or less co-
herent or contradictory in itself, in the relationship between institutions and 
cultural concepts, as well as in the relationship of social groups of actors. It 
can be contested and subject to conflict and negotiation by actors with dif-
ferent levels of power, and it can change under specific circumstances. The 
particular arrangement of work and family in a society comprises the spe-
cific configuration of institutions, social structures, socioeconomic factors, 
and constellations of actors that refer to the relationship of family and work. 
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Values and cultural models (Leitbilder) regarding the relationship of family 
and work contribute to explaining the context-specific development of both 
the structural relationship of family and work, and the actual practices of 
social actors and their gendered nature. With their ideas and interests, the 
individuals refer, on the one hand, to cultural values and models and, on 
the other hand, to the institutional and social–structural framework. As is 
particularly emphasized in this approach, the interaction of different factors 
in the specific societal context should be taken into account to achieve an 
adequate explanation (Pfau-Effinger 2009a).
Using such an approach, the comparative analysis of arrangements of 
work and family is extended by an actor-centered perspective, and by a sys-
tematic analysis of the influence of cultural factors and the ways in which 
these interrelate with other factors. Culture is defined here as the system of 
collective constructions of meaning by which human beings define reality. 
It includes stocks of knowledge, values and ideals—in sum, ideas. As has 
also been argued by Lepsius (1990, p. 31), cultural values can be seen as 
“switches” on the pathways along which interests influence actions to be 
taken. These theoretical assumptions refer to the theories of Max Weber 
(1971), David Lockwood (1964), and Margaret Archer (1995). The ap-
proach is not normative, because it leaves space for cross-national variations 
in the ways in which such arrangements are shaped, and some combination 
of care responsibility and employment for mothers/parents is achieved.
In the following sections I will outline the way in which cultural values, 
welfare state policies, and their interaction can exert an influence on how 
child care is organized in a society. The focus of this chapter is limited to 
these explanatory factors as a result of limited space and because they can 
be seen as most relevant for the explanation of cross-national differences. 
However, the role of other institutions like the employment system and the 
labor market, as well as the role of actors’ constellations, should also be 
considered.5
Cultural Family Models upon Which Arrangements 
of Work and Family Are Based
It is my argument that arrangements of family and work can be compara-
tively analyzed and classified by the dominant family models upon which 
they are based. Such cultural models of the family include cultural values 
regarding different elements of the family structure. These relate to (1) the 
relationship of family members with the employment system, (2) the appro-
priate spheres for the upbringing of children, and (3) the adequate gender 
division of labor within the family. It is possible that one specific family 
model is dominant in a society or that different family models coexist or 
compete. Family models can be contested between different actors and are 
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subject to change. According to a classification model that I developed, at 
least four family models can be distinguished in postindustrial European 
societies (Pfau-Effinger 2004a, p. 6; 2009a)6:
1. The male breadwinner/female part-time care provider model. This 
model rests essentially on the vision of full integration of women and men into 
paid economic activity. However, this model assumes that women, as mothers, 
may interrupt their gainful activity for a few years, after which they combine 
employment and responsibility for child care through part-time work, until 
their children are no longer considered to require particular care.
2. The dual (part-time) breadwinner/dual (part-time) care provider model. 
In this model, it is considered desirable that both parents be employed part-
time and share a part of the child care with one another, while entrusting the 
other part of child care to an institution outside the family.
3. The dual breadwinner/external care model. This model posits, in prin-
ciple, that all women as well as men can be employed full-time, and that child 
care is essentially the responsibility of institutions outside of the family. In the 
majority of these countries, the state is seen as primarily responsible for orga-
nizing access to these services.
4. The dual breadwinner/extended family care model. Here, extended 
family networks are mainly seen as responsible for family care. This notion is 
related to the family form of the “complex family household” (Flaquer and 
Escobedo 2009), in which other adult relatives besides the children’s parents 
are supposed to contribute to child care. Accordingly, it is not expected that 
the welfare state provide child care to any considerable extent.
It is argued here that differences between the dominant family models 
contribute to a substantial degree in explaining cross-national differences 
in the ways in which child care is organized. Within a societal arrangement 
of work and family, different family models can be particularly relevant. In 
West Germany and East Germany, for example, two distinctly different fam-
ily models remain dominant up to the present day. This is mainly the result 
of the different developmental paths in the two countries after World War II 
(Pfau-Effinger and Geissler 2002). It is important not to regard the classifica-
tion as static, but rather to consider the processes for change within such an 
arrangement. The ways in which new cultural models are addressed, having 
developed at a given time in the population, is strongly influenced by the 
conflict and negotiation processes taking place in between the social actors.
Welfare State Policies That Influence the Organization 
of Housework and Care Work in Society
Welfare state policies constitute another relevant element explaining how 
child care is organized in a society. In interaction with the cultural family 
models described earlier, welfare states influence the degree to which care 
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work is provided within and outside of the family. A particularly important 
question is the extent to which the welfare state assumes the social tasks of 
child care and to what degree and at what quality it supplies these services 
(see also Esping-Andersen 1999; Evers and Olk 2006). Furthermore, if child 
care takes place outside the family, welfare state policies are relevant in 
determining the main sphere in which child care is provided, whether it is 
in the nonprofit sector or the market. Also differing between welfare states 
is the degree to which social rights are connected to care—that is, rights 
to receive care and rights to give care (Knijn and Kremer 1997). Through 
particular schemes for paternity leave, the welfare state can also influence 
the degree to which fathers participate in family child care. The state is also 
an employer and in this role can influence the labor force participation of 
mothers and fathers. The welfare state therefore represents an important 
arena for social conflicts and negotiation processes with respect to the ar-
rangement of work and family (see also Mósesdóttir 2001).
It should be noted that the ways in which welfare states and other in-
stitutions refer to such cultural models can differ in the context of time and 
space. The relationship can be orderly or can display discrepancies and lags. 
It is possible for discrepancies to exist between the provision of child care 
by the welfare state and the actual demand for child care. For example, in 
West Germany, this arises when the state is still oriented toward a more tra-
ditional family model and state policies do not sufficiently take into account 
the change in the cultural orientation of the majority of the population. 
The opposite is also possible: State policies can, for example, offer generous 
schemes for parental leave with relatively high child care allowances, but the 
take-up rates may be relatively low, because the schemes do not match with 
the cultural orientations toward child care (e.g., Haataja 2005).
According to the “welfare regime” approach of Esping-Andersen (1990, 
1999), which is particularly popular in comparative social policy research, 
welfare state policies toward child care differ in the context of different 
state welfare regimes.7 The general features of the different regime types are 
described as follows: In the social–democratic welfare regime, social rights, 
based on cultural principles of egalitarianism and solidarity, are universally 
available and of high quality. Policies aim to achieve the leveling of social 
hierarchies. The liberal welfare regime, by contrast, is based on neoliberal 
ideas about individual responsibility and a largely laissez-faire state policy 
toward markets; consequently, social rights are typically means tested and 
are of comparatively low quality. This tends to cause social–structural polar-
ization between groups of the employed. Finally, with its policies, the con-
servative welfare regime tries to reproduce the existing hierarchical structure 
of social inequality among groups of the employed. Social rights are of me-
dium quality and are essentially limited to employed people.
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These differences, Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) argues, go hand in 
hand with specific differences in the way in which the state intervenes in the 
labor market and in the family, particularly with respect to the extent that 
it promotes the formalization of care. Thus, in the social–democratic wel-
fare regime, women tend to be fully integrated into employment on the 
basis of a strongly developed state social service sector and a comprehensive 
formalization of informal care. Instead of promoting the participation of 
women in employment, conservative welfare regimes use financial transfers 
to promote their participation in unpaid informal care in the family. Liberal 
welfare states tend to produce high levels of women’s employment, made 
possible by child care services offered by the market, but accessible largely 
to the middle classes. In addition to Esping-Andersen’s approach, two more 
welfare regime types have been introduced: the postsocialist welfare regime, 
which is often based on a contradictory mix of neoliberal and traditional 
welfare values, and the Mediterranean welfare regime, in which the family is 
assigned priority for the provision of social security and social services (see 
Arts and Gelissen 2002).
The welfare regime approach, however, is not sufficient to explain cross-
national variations. This inadequacy relates to the A, B, and C patterns for 
the organization of child care that I outlined earlier. According to Esping-
Andersen, we would expect pattern A (employment-oriented pattern on the 
basis of formal employment) to be characteristic for the social–democratic 
welfare states, which are represented among our eight countries by Den-
mark, Finland, and Norway. In fact, these countries have established com-
prehensive social rights to full-time public care provisions for children of all 
age groups. Furthermore, the quality of public care provisions in these coun-
tries is the highest in Europe (Anttonen and Sipilä 2005; Daune-richard 
2005; Fagnani and Letablier 2005). This would give mothers the option 
of complete and full-time participation in formal employment. We would 
expect pattern B (dual pattern on the basis of a combination of employment 
and family child care on part-time basis) to be typical for the conservative 
welfare regimes of France, and West and East Germany.
In the social–democratic states of Finland and Norway, however, a clear 
pattern A is only evident for Finland. And, in contrast to expectations, pat-
tern A is also dominant in two conservative welfare regimes—namely, in 
France and, even more strongly, in East Germany. The organization of child 
care in the social–democratic welfare state of Norway, by contrast, bears a 
closer resemblance to pattern B (which is also characteristic for West Ger-
many and to some degree for the United Kingdom), but with considerably 
lower formal child care usage. This means that the differences in the welfare 
regimes alone cannot explain the differences in the patterns of the societal 
organization of child care. Nonetheless, pattern C, the employment-related 
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pattern on the basis of informal care, does aptly characterize the organiza-
tion of child care in the Mediterranean and the postsocialist welfare regimes 
of Spain and Poland.
According to the “arrangement of work of family” approach that is 
introduced here, how a specific cultural family model interacts with a spe-
cific welfare regime merits particular attention in the explanation. Together, 
these form a main part of the explanatory framework for understanding in-
dividual behavior. According to Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), each type of 
welfare regime is based on a specific set of cultural values about the general 
role of the welfare state in society, about its relationship with its citizens, 
and about redistribution and what is “just.” Therefore, the quality of social 
rights—that is, the generosity and the strength of welfare state provisions—
differs between welfare regimes. Each family model, on the other hand, is 
based on values that relate to the societal organization of child care, as out-
lined earlier. Both value systems interact, but they can also vary relatively 
autonomously in relation to each other (Pfau-Effinger 2005b).
Integrating Cultural Family Models and Welfare Regime 
Policies to Explain Patterns of Child Care Organization
Pattern A: Employment-Oriented Pattern on the Basis of Formal 
Child Care (France, East Germany, Finland) In France, East Germany, and 
Finland, the dominant cultural model of the family is a dual breadwinner/
external care provider model with a high appreciation of the idea of gender 
equality. This means that both women and men, aside from a certain period 
of maternity leave and parental leave, orient themselves toward full-time em-
ployment during active parenthood. In the social–democratic welfare state 
of Finland, the basis of the model is the comprehensive and high-quality 
public care provisions (Anttonen 1997; Julkunen 1999; Julkunen and Nätti 
1999; Pfau-Effinger 2004a). This model is also dominant in the conservative 
welfare regime of France, albeit with a less egalitarian basis (Daune-richard 
2005; Martin, Math, and renaudat 1998; Veil 1997). France has a long 
tradition of appreciating public child care as well as having high women’s la-
bor force participation (Daune-richard 2005; Fagnani and Letablier 2005). 
Traditionally, these countries already had above-average full-time employ-
ment levels for women (OECD 2000). The number of women who work 
only part-time for family reasons today is generally low (7% in France at 
the end of the 1990s) (European Commission 1998, p. 12). In Finland and 
France, an even higher share of couples would prefer to organize their care 
work–employment relationship on the basis of the dual full-time breadwin-
ner model. In Finland, both parents are working full-time in 49.3% of the 
couples with children younger than 6 years, but 80.3% of couples would 
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prefer to work in this form (OECD 2001, p. 136). In France, the model of 
both parents of children younger than 6 years working full-time is practiced 
by 38.8% of the couples but preferred by 52.4% (OECD 2001, p. 28).
As a carryover from socialist times, a dual breadwinner/state care model 
still prevails in East Germany, too. Mothers in East Germany behave ac-
cording to this cultural model, even if this contradicts the aims of German 
family policies, which were based on the traditional family model of West 
Germany (Pfau-Effinger and Geissler 2002). However, through their strong 
action in collective associations, citizens in East Germany have managed, 
during the transformation, to retain high public child care provisions for 
children younger than the age of 3 years in East German federal states and 
municipalities, meaning that the public child care provision is considerably 
higher there than in West Germany. Fully 16% of children younger than 3 
years participated in public child care in East Germany, but only 3% in the 
West; among children age 3 to 6 years, 87% in East Germany, but only 60% 
in West Germany, received public child care (data from Institut für Arbe-
itsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit [IAB] project 
3-523, 2000 [after Engelbrech and Jungkunst 2001]).
Pattern B: Dual Pattern on the Basis of a Combination of Employ-
ment and Family Child Care on Part-time Basis (West Germany, Norway) 
The male breadwinner/female part-time care model is the dominant cultural 
model in the countries where child care is organized on the basis of pat-
tern B, and the model contributes substantially to explaining this pattern. 
This is true for women in West Germany, which has a conservative welfare 
regime; as well as for women in Norway, with a social–democratic welfare 
regime; and Great Britain, with a liberal welfare regime (Dale and Holds-
worth 1997; Meyer and Pfau-Effinger 2006). In West Germany and Nor-
way, full-time parental leave for longer than 1 year, and part-time work by 
mothers thereafter, is seen as the best way to combine the values of a “good 
childhood” with mothers’ labor force participation (Ellingsæter 1999; Pfau-
Effinger 2004a). As is shown by findings of a representative attitude survey 
that was conducted by the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 
2001 at the beginning of the 21st century, the most popular cultural model 
of the family in West Germany is based on the marriage of a male breadwin-
ner and a female part-time caregiver. About two thirds of all respondents 
opted for this model (Engelbrech and Jungkunst 2001). Although a high 
share would prefer that the man work full-time and the wife work part-time 
(41.8%), only 31.9% are actually working this form.
Which societal sphere is seen as responsible for the provision of child 
care differs with the type of welfare regime. In Germany, child care is mainly 
provided by professional staff in organizations of the nonprofit sector, but 
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it is mainly financed by the state. Norway, with its social–democratic wel-
fare regime, also matches this pattern of child care organization. This can 
be explained by the specific combination of the cultural model of the dual 
(part-time) breadwinner/dual (part-time) caregiver model, which is based 
more on egalitarian principles than the male breadwinner/female part-time 
caregiver model (Ellingsaeter 1999). In reality, it is mostly women who work 
part-time. Different from the other countries, however, Norwegian mothers 
on part-time leave are not financially dependent on a male breadwinner. 
Instead, the generous parental leave scheme provides them with an earnings 
replacement that gives them financial autonomy.
Pattern C: Employment-Related Pattern on the Basis of Informal Care 
(Spain, Poland) The cultural model of the family that is dominant in Spain 
resembles the dual breadwinner/extended family care model. As Lluis Fla-
quer and Anna Escobedo (2009) outlined for Spain, this model is based on 
the notion that both parents are employed full-time while other adults, who 
live in the same household in the context of the “complex family,” care 
for the children. Part-time work plays a rather marginal role in this model. 
This is reflected in the working time preferences of couples. In 25.6% of the 
couples with children younger than 6 years, both parents are working full-
time. However, 59.7% of couples would prefer to work in this form. In only 
6.3% of couples with children younger than 6 years is the father employed 
full-time and the mother part-time. The share of those who would prefer this 
form is not much higher (11.6%) (OECD 2001, p. 136). With respect to this 
dominant family model, Poland is a similar case (Surdej and Slezak 2009). 
However, the realization of this model is only possible as long as there are 
adults in the family who are not employed. With the increase in the labor 
force participation rates of women, including older women, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult in both countries to maintain this model. In Spain, as 
a consequence, there is a strong trend to substitute informal child care by 
caring relatives with undeclared child care by immigrant women within the 
private household (Flaquer and Escobedo 2009).
The Role of Undeclared Work as a Precarious 
Element in the Organization of Child Care
If the availability of family caregivers represents a threat to pattern C, a 
lack of formal child care may also be perceived as a problem. Even in those 
countries where pattern B is dominant and parents do not orient themselves 
toward comprehensive, full-time, formal child care provisions, the existing 
supply of public child care is often seen as insufficient. This is especially 
true for countries with pattern C, where the increase in women’s labor force 
 Cultural and Institutional Contexts 137
participation has contributed to a reduction in potential family caregivers, 
but public child care provision is nearly completely lacking.
Therefore, in the countries outside the social–democratic welfare regime, 
the employment of nannies in the private household, often on the basis of 
undeclared work by immigrants, helps to bridge the discrepancies between 
the time demands of the employment system on the one hand, and the time 
structures of public child care on the other (Hillmann 2005; Pfau-Effinger 
et al. 2009b). This caregiver employment takes place predominantly on the 
basis of market-based wages in dependent, undeclared employment. Unde-
clared employment includes any employment that is paid but not formally 
declared as gainful to the authorities and is, therefore, carried out illegally.8 
Insofar as fairly reliable data on this are available, the proportion of un-
declared work for child care in private households is especially high in the 
southern and eastern European countries, moderately high in the continen-
tal European countries (where it is more often used for cleaning than for 
child care), and very low in the Scandinavian countries.
In the Scandinavian countries, a “service culture” is not strongly an-
chored in cultural terms because of the pronounced egalitarian ideals. In 
the other countries except for Poland, cultural support for casual domestic 
employment has historical roots. In Poland, the “service culture” was able 
to establish itself relatively easily in the cultural vacuum created by the in-
troduction of the market economy (Pfau-Effinger 2009b).9 In short, reliance 
on the market to overcome the limitations of family and public child care 
assumes a broader culture that is receptive to this solution.
reflections on the possibility of applying 
the explanatory framework to housework
Similarities and Differences between Care Work and Housework
The similarities and differences between care work and housework should 
be reflected upon. Care work differs substantially from housework in its 
particular features. As was emphasized by feminist thinkers, care work is 
deeply embedded into a social relationship. The main features of care work 
are influenced by this context. The time structure of care work is substan-
tially based on the need, which includes the emotional and physical needs 
of those who are cared for. Therefore, the time demand for care work is 
comprehensive and requires the caregiver’s continuous attention to the per-
son for whom she or he is caring (England 2005, Himmelweit 2002). Care 
work can be outsourced to other spheres of society. However, it may be the 
case that the recipient of care, such as a child, participates in negotiation 
processes and tries to incorporate his or her own wishes regarding the choice 
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of caregiver on the basis of personal emotional and physical experiences and 
preferences. The degree to which the wishes of the care recipient are taken 
into consideration, and the degree of dependency of the person in need of 
care, vary among different societies (Anttonen and Sipilä 2005).
In some ways, housework is more restricted to the sphere of the fam-
ily household than is care work. This is mainly true for the cleaning of the 
house or the apartment. Other work, such as cooking, can be outsourced 
by employing staff, by consuming ready-made dishes that are offered by 
market enterprises, or by eating out in restaurants. In addition, chores like 
washing or ironing can, in principle, be performed by hired staff within the 
household or by market-based enterprises offsite.
The outsourcing possibilities for housework may suggest that house-
keeping tasks are endowed with less personal meaning and social resonance 
than care work, but one should not put too fine a point on it. As some 
research reports, doing housework can be interpreted by the household’s 
members as caring activity (DeVault 1991). Also, it should be mentioned 
that the boundary between housework, child care, and “leisure” is not al-
ways clear. Both types of work may also include elements of pleasurable 
leisure. For example, playing with children or cooking a special meal for 
a group of friends has pleasurable dimensions. In addition, the boundary 
between child care and housework is not always clearly defined. Housework 
can be an element of care work: Cooking a meal for a baby, for example, is 
an element of care work as well as of housework. Furthermore, housework 
and child care are sometimes carried out simultaneously. Laundry may get 
folded while the children’s homework is supervised. Bearing in mind the 
distinctions and similarities in care work and housework, it is worth consid-
ering whether an explanatory approach that illuminates the former can be 
profitably applied to the latter.
Integration of Housework into the Explanatory Framework
The question here is whether the explanatory framework of the “arrange-
ment of work and family” is adequate for explaining cross-national differ-
ences in the organization of housework. There are substantial similarities. 
As far as it is provided within the family context, housework is often in-
tegrated into the same complex of cultural values as child care in terms of 
ideas about the role of the private household members to provide the work 
and the way in which child care is allocated according to the gender division 
of labor within the family household. To take an example from family mod-
els, it can be assumed that when family models are based more on a male 
breadwinner model, housework, like child care, will be allocated primarily 
to women. In contrast, it can be assumed that when family models are based 
on a more egalitarian dual-breadwinner model and are linked to cultural 
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values of gender equality, both men and women are seen as responsible for 
the provision of housework as well as child care. However, as this chapter 
emphasizes, such family models are still far from realized as social practices 
in the family, and women are still the main providers of informal or semi-
formal child care within the family.
Welfare state policies are primarily directed toward the organization of 
care work and less toward the organization of housework. Therefore, their 
effect on housework is often only indirect and caused by the relatively close 
connection of care work and housework for parents of young children. Be-
cause the responsibility for child care and the responsibility for housework 
in families with dependent children are often closely connected, it can, how-
ever, be assumed that parental leave, which includes specific incentives for 
paternal leave, not only contributes substantially to increasing fathers’ share 
in family child care, but also their share in housework.
The differences that exist in some main features of child care and house-
work should also be regarded in the explanatory framework for cross-na-
tional differences. I will discuss this in relation to two cultural dimensions of 
the societal organization of housework: the degree and forms of outsourcing 
and the gender division of labor.
The Degree and Forms of Outsourcing
As it was argued, child care is embedded in a social relationship and is often 
organized on the basis of cultural notions about what constitutes a “good 
childhood” and “good parents.” These values that are not particularly re-
lated to housework—particularly tasks such as cleaning, washing, and iron-
ing—or they are typically less well defined. Thus, ideas about rational and 
efficient household organization have a stronger role in the organization of 
housework than child care. This is one reason why undeclared work of em-
ployees in the family household, particularly by immigrants, is substantially 
more important in housework than in child care in those European countries 
where it is used (Pfau-Effinger, Flaquer, and Jensen 2009).
In housework, compared with child care, other sets of values may play a 
role. Today, in countries where traditions of a “servant culture” exist on the 
basis of social inequality, the use of employees, often in undeclared work, 
for cleaning and other household tasks is often highly accepted. This is the 
case, for example, in the Mediterranean countries and in continental Euro-
pean countries like Germany, France, and Great Britain. This is clearly dif-
ferent in the Nordic countries. Here, it contradicts the moral values of the 
middle classes to act as employers of household workers in one’s own family 
household (Jensen and rathlev 2009; Jolkkonen, Kovalainen, and Koistinen 
2009). Mainly, household workers are only accepted in those cases in which 
employees of the municipality provide housework in the private household, 
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which is a common service for elderly people in Denmark and Sweden (Sze-
behely 1998).
The Gender Division of Labor in Housework
It seems that housework has remained more gender segregated than child 
care. In some respects, this can be explained by the fact that child care, 
and the need for the “active father,” has been the subject of public debate 
and reflection in many European countries since the 1990s (Eydal 2005). 
In contrast, the gender division of labor with respect to housework has re-
ceived less attention as an issue in public debate. This gender segregation 
in housework reflects, to a substantial degree, the gender segregation in the 
occupational system in employment. It also is based on deep cultural values 
relating to the definition of activities as “male” or “female,” which may 
differ cross-nationally. However, change may lead to the redefinition of ac-
tivities with respect to their gendered nature. I take the example of Finland, 
which is a relatively egalitarian society. Women are more active in cooking 
and cleaning. In contrast, a higher share of men do the building and repair 
work, accompany children to leisure activities, and take care of the family 
pet. Shopping seems to be a gender-neutral activity: The share of men that 
do the shopping is nearly as high as the share of women (Melkas 2002; 
Niemi and Pääkkönen 2001). Therefore, in analyses of household work, 
cultural constructions of “female” and “male” tasks should be considered 
in the explanatory framework.
conclusion
There are clearly cross-national differences in European societies in the ways 
in which household and care work is organized. In this chapter, a theoretical 
framework for the explanation of such differences was introduced. It is based 
on the assumption that the specific ways in which cultural, institutional, and 
socioeconomic factors interact in the specific “arrangement of work and 
family” in a society are crucial for the explanation of cross-national differ-
ences. The three patterns for the organization of child care in European soci-
eties was used as an example. As was shown, the ways in which welfare state 
policies on the one hand, and cultural models of the family on the other, 
interact can contribute to explaining the differences between these patterns 
of organizing child care. Having introduced the explanatory framework for 
understanding cross-national differences in child care, its possible utility for 
explaining country differences in the organization of housework was next 
considered. Because there is some relationship between the division of child 
care and the division of housework, state policies that affect child care may 
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have some indirect effect on housework, too. To analyze housework fully, 
however, additional sets of cultural values should be taken into account. 
These factors include the degree to which a tradition of a “servant culture” 
exists within a country, as well as the degree to which specific household 
tasks are defined as “female” or “male” and the extent to which change is 
underway.
notes
1. It should be taken into account that the age at which children are seen as 
“dependent” and “in need of care” can differ between countries, even in legisla-
tion (Pfau-Effinger 2004a).
2. Contradicting assumptions of modernization theory and many feminist 
theories, the male breadwinner family model played a role in modern industrial 
society only in a part of western European societies. For a historical explana-
tory model for such differences, see my article in the British Journal of Sociology 
(Pfau-Effinger 2004b).
3. Part-time employment plays an important role in the integration of moth-
ers into the phase of active mothering in those countries in which the participa-
tion of women in gainful employment was below average for a long time (Geissler 
and Pfau-Effinger 2005; Kremer and Schiffbänker 2005).
4. This is another variant of a societal “arrangement” that I have developed 
as a theoretical approach for analyses of historical change and cross-national 
analyses in relation to “gender arrangements,” “care arrangements,” and “ar-
rangements of work and welfare” (Pfau-Effinger 1998; 2004a; 2005a, b; 2009a).
5. My book Culture, Welfare State and Women’s Employment in European 
Societies (Pfau-Effinger 2004a) includes a comparative historical analysis of the 
interrelations of the development of culture, welfare state policies, labor market 
structures, family structures, and the role of different types of social actors in 
explaining cross-national differences in labor force participation in Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Finland.
6. In some parts, two “traditional” models continue to exist, even if they 
are no longer dominant in any of these societies (Pfau-Effinger 2004a, b). These 
include a family model, which I define as the family economy model. Accord-
ing to the ideas characterizing the family economy model, men and women work 
together in their agricultural or craft business, and both men and women play an 
important role for the survival of the family economy. Children are regarded as 
elements of the family economy and therefore are expected to work in the fam-
ily business as soon as they are physically able to do so. The housewife model of 
the (male) breadwinner family is another traditional model. It is based on the as-
sumption of a general separation of “public sphere” and “private sphere,” and on 
complementary fields of work and action for both genders: The man is primarily 
responsible for work in the public sphere, where he provides for his family through 
gainful employment; the woman is primarily responsible for the private household, 
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including housework and child care, and she is financially dependent on her hus-
band. This arrangement is based on a cultural construct of “childhood” according 
to which children require special care and extensive individual support. Care and 
support are first and foremost regarded as the responsibility of private households. 
Complementary to this concept, there is the cultural construct of “motherhood,” 
according to which it is mainly the task of the mother to raise her children and 
care for them in the private household.
7. The concept of “social rights” comes from the theory by Marshall (1964) 
about the historical development of citizenship. In this theory, the history of mod-
ern societies is seen as a process, during the course of which people were able to 
extend their basic rights. Feminist researchers used Marshall’s theory in part as a 
foil to articulate inequalities and injustices in the rights of women and men that 
result from the special situation of women in many countries (e.g., that women 
are mainly responsible for caring tasks) (see also Lister 2003, Siim 2000).
8. Whether this is legally viewed as “undeclared work” depends on specific 
features of nonregistered employment (e.g., length of time, amount of earnings); 
the laws on this vary considerably across Europe (see Pfau-Effinger, Flaquer, and 
Jensen 2009).
9. This is the result of collaborative research in a research project in the Fifth 
EU Framework Programme that I directed titled Formal and Informal Work in 
Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Their Changing relationship and Their Con-
tribution to Social Integration. The chairs of the country team were Per Jensen 
and Jens Lind, Aalborg University (Denmark); Pertti Koistinen, University of 
Tampere (Finland); Birgit Pfau-Effinger, University of Hamburg (Germany); Tra-
ute Meyer, Southampton University (Great Britain); Alexander Surdej, Economic 
University of Warczow (Poland); and Lluis Flaquer, Autonomous University of 
Barcelona (Spain). The research to which I refer here was based, among other 
things, on 215 semistructured guided interviews in middle-class households with 
children younger than 6 years in cities and their suburbs in Finland, Denmark, 
Great Britain, Germany, Poland, and Spain.
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Beliefs about the needs of children and about appropriate modes of mother-
ing exert a powerful moral force in American society, influencing parents’ 
perceived options, their feelings of self worth, and ultimately their deci-
sions about how to organize work and family lives. The dominant Ameri-
can ideal, recently dubbed “intensive motherhood” (Hays 1996), represents 
children as vulnerable and precious beings whose proper care demands an 
extraordinary commitment of time, emotion, and nurturance by one primary 
caregiver, preferably their own mother (Phoenix, Woollett, and Lloyd 1991; 
Zelizer 1985). Like other cultural ideologies, intensive motherhood derives 
much of its power from its naturalized, taken-for-granted quality.
Although social expectations and personal feelings of extreme maternal 
devotion are pervasive, the appropriate enactment of this devotion remains 
the subject of much emotionally charged controversy in the contemporary 
United States. One particularly intensive variety of motherhood requires that 
women forgo paid employment and dedicate themselves exclusively to their 
maternal roles. From this perspective, women’s interest in paid employment 
conflicts with children’s need for around-the-clock mothering. This model of 
full-time maternal care is rejected on principle by many women, especially 
the young, the highly educated, and the nonreligious, and it is unfeasible 
for the many others who lack the requisite financial or personal resources. 
However, even those American women who do not actively embrace ideals 
of full-time mothering are cognizant of this cultural schema and know that 
others may hold them morally accountable to it (Blair-Loy 2004; Hochschild 
2003; Lareau 2003; Taylor 1996). It is in fact not uncommon for social 
movement activists, policy makers, religious leaders, and public intellectu-
als to represent this as the only ethical or socially viable form of mothering.
But although specific practices may be naturalized within local contexts, 
previous research shows that norms about maternal care, familial gender roles, 
and child-rearing styles vary a great deal across time, space, and demographic 
groups (Ariès 1965; Evans and Kelley 2001; Kremer 2006; Fuller 2007; 
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Gottlieb 1993; Lareau 2003). Comparativist scholars have suggested that 
ideals of motherhood are influenced by national institutional structures and 
social policy arrangements that legitimize certain family forms and make cer-
tain child care arrangements more or less viable.1 Exploring such variability 
can help contextualize dominant cultural ideals and practices, and provide 
insights regarding the individual and structural factors that are associated 
with alternative conceptualizations of motherhood. Normative understand-
ings of motherhood are important because they help shape women’s public 
sphere roles and children’s early life experiences, which in turn influence 
other divisions of domestic labor.2
The primary goal of the current analysis is to provide a detailed descrip-
tion of variability in women’s attitudes toward maternal employment across 
32 industrial, transitional, and developing countries and territories. We focus 
on women’s views because we believe that they provide an especially good 
measure of the normative penetration of ideals of full-time maternal care. 
Application of multivariate logistic regression models allows us to examine 
international differences after controlling for demographic factors that are 
known to be correlated with gender role attitudes (i.e., women’s educational 
attainment, employment status, religiosity, age), and to determine the extent 
to which observed patterns of cross-national variation map on to standard 
classifications of welfare state regimes.
Although we do not have the comparative data necessary to assess ar-
guments about attitudinal effects of specific policy measures or social ex-
penditures formally, we do draw some preliminary conclusions about these 
relationships based on information drawn from secondary sources. results 
are consistent with arguments suggesting that institutional and social policy 
structures help shape cultural understandings of motherhood and child-
hood, and that these understandings in turn help sustain path-dependent 
trajectories of policy development (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Mahon 
2002a; Morgan 2006; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1999b). We consider implica-
tions for mainstream and feminist theories of the welfare state.
data, methods, and descriptive statistics
Data are from the 2002 Family and Gender roles III module of the Interna-
tional Social Survey Programme (ISSP). National surveys were administered 
between 2001 and 2004. Three countries (Bulgaria, russia, and Taiwan) were 
omitted because of missing information on religiosity, an important demo-
graphic variable. Countries considered are predominantly advanced indus-
trial market economies, but our sample also includes seven formerly socialist 
countries of eastern and central Europe, and four middle-income developing 
countries. results presented here are based on unweighted samples.3
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We consider cross-national variability in support for full-time mother-
ing based on two indicators: (1) respondents’ beliefs that mothers should not 
be employed “when there is a child under school age” and (2) respondents’ 
beliefs that mothers should not be employed “after the youngest child starts 
school.”4 These are the most direct and unambiguous available indicators 
of belief in the desirability of full-time motherhood, an economically costly 
form of child rearing that depends upon a full-time breadwinner.5
Table 8.1 shows country scores on indicators of support for full-time 
maternal care. Values give the proportion of a country’s respondents who 
agree with the given statement. Much cross-national variability is evident. 
With respect to mothers of preschool children, Israel and New Zealand oc-
cupy extreme ends of the distribution: 10% of women in Israel agree that 
mothers with very young children should stay home, compared with a full 
63% of women in New Zealand. In all countries there was more support 
for full-time mothering of younger than older children, and the view that 
women with school-age children should stay home was held by only a mi-
nority of women (15% on average compared with an international average 
of 38% with respect to preschoolers). Nonetheless, we also find large cross-
national differences regarding care of older children, with values ranging 
from 2% in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden to 32% in the Philip-
pines. In the United States, support for full-time maternal care is slightly 
above the international mean with respect to preschool children (42%), but 
below the mean with respect to school-age children (5%).
The low values shown in Table 8.1 for Sweden and Denmark are un-
surprising in light of the reputably gender-egalitarian cultures characterizing 
Scandinavian welfare states. Other values, particularly the high percentages 
of women advocating stay-at-home mothering of preschoolers in many Eng-
lish-speaking countries, were unexpected. Similar patterns of cross-national 
variability were found for a sample that included male respondents.6
Before further consideration of these international differences, it is use-
ful to determine whether they can be attributed to differences in the sociode-
mographic composition of the respective national populations. Past research 
suggests that support for gender-differentiated family roles is greater among 
older persons, highly religious persons, and those without college degrees 
(Knudsen and Wærness 2001; Morgan 2006; Sundstöm 1999). The stronger 
support for maternal employment in Nordic countries, for example, may be 
partly attributable to low levels of religiosity or high levels of educational 
attainment in those societies.
To understand better the nature of observed cross-national differences, we 
compute a set of multivariate logistic regression models. This allows us to cal-
culate, for each country, the predicted probability of espousing full-time ma-
ternal care while holding constant the relevant individual-level attributes.7
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The explanatory variables included in our regression models were se-
lected based on results of previous attitudinal research on motherhood and 
gender roles. Age is measured in years, and all other covariates are “dummy 
coded,” with the value 1 indicating presence of the corresponding attribute 
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Means on attitudinal variables: Women, 2002
Country [Regime]
Mothers of Preschoolers 
Should Stay Home
Mothers of School Children 
Should Stay Home
Australia [L] 0.55 0.05
Austria [C] 0.45 0.16
Belgium (Flanders) [C] 0.26 0.05
Brazil [D] 0.34 0.19
Chile [D] 0.44 0.18
Cyprus [C] 0.18 0.10
Czech republic [S] 0.35 0.16
Denmark [SD] 0.21 0.02
Finland [SD] 0.38 0.07
France [C] 0.37 0.05
Germany, East [S] 0.12 0.04
Germany, West [C] 0.44 0.13
Great Britain [L] 0.55 0.06
Hungary [S] 0.43 0.14
Ireland [L] 0.35 0.08
Israel [L] 0.10 0.07
Japan [C] 0.52 0.14
Latvia [S] 0.39 0.13
Mexico [D] 0.39 0.31
Netherlands [C] 0.27 0.02
New Zealand [L] 0.63 0.05
Northern Ireland [L] 0.51 0.22
Norway [SD] 0.28 0.05
Philippines [D] 0.48 0.32
Poland [S] 0.54 0.22
Portugal [C] 0.38 0.12
Slovak republic [S] 0.49 0.19
Slovenia [S] 0.25 0.10
Spain [C] 0.35 0.14
Sweden [SD] 0.18 0.02
Switzerland [C] 0.40 0.30




Formerly socialist 0.39 0.15
Developing 0.39 0.27
All 0.38 0.13
Data are taken from the 2002 wave of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP).
Means can be interpreted as the proportion of women agreeing with the corresponding statement.
C, conservative regime; D, developing regime; L, liberal regime; S, formerly socialist regime; SD, social–
democratic regime.
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and the value 0 indicating its absence. Highly religious persons are defined as 
those attending religious services at least once a week. Those coded 1 on the 
“university degree” and “employed” variables reported having completed 
a university degree and having a paid job, respectively.8 respondents coded 
1 on the “married” variable reported being married or “living as married.” 
The presence of one or more children at home is coded from information on 
household composition.9 To determine whether employment differentially 
affected attitudes for women with and without children at home, we include 
an interaction term, “child ¥ employed,” in our models. Information on the 
employment histories of respondents’ own mothers was used to construct an 
additional dummy indicator: Did your mother ever work for pay for as long 
as 1 year, after you were born and before you were 14?10
Means for all covariates, pooled and by country and regime, are shown 
in Table 8.2. For all variables but age (measured in years), means can be 
interpreted as the proportion of respondents with the respective attribute 
(i.e., the proportion coded 1). On the religiosity variable, for example, the 
pooled mean of 0.24 indicates that 24% of all respondents attend services 
once a week or more. In Denmark, the corresponding value is only 2%; in 
Mexico and Ireland, it is 65%.
what predicts support for 
full-time maternal care?
Table 8.3 shows results from a series of multivariate logistic regression mod-
els where the dependent variables are the two attitudinal measures described 
earlier. Values give covariate effects on the logged odds of holding the belief 
in question; the exponent of these values give the multiplicative change in 
the odds corresponding to a 1-unit increase in the covariate.11 For example, 
according to the “age” coefficient in the first column, the log-odds of advo-
cating full-time maternal care of preschoolers increases by 0.015 point as re-
spondents’ ages increase by 1 year. The exponent of this value (exp(0.015) = 
1.015) tells us that the odds of holding this belief grows by 1.5% with each 
year of age.
Three models are presented for each attitudinal indicator. The first 
(model a) includes individual-level sociodemographic covariates only, the 
second (model b) adds variables identifying country of residence (with the 
United States the omitted reference category), and the third (model c) in-
cludes individual effects and variables representing five “welfare regime” 
types (liberal, conservative, social–democratic, formerly socialist, and de-
veloping, with liberal the omitted reference category). Our classification of 
welfare regimes, shown in Table 8.3, is discussed later.
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Effects of Individual-Level Attributes
We turn first to the specifications that include sociodemographic variables 
only (models Ia and IIa). Higher education greatly reduces women’s support 
for full-time maternal care, whereas personal religiosity increases support. 
Having a university degree, for instance, more than doubles the odds that a 
woman will find it acceptable for mothers with school-age children to work 
for pay.12 High religiosity—specifically, attending religious services at least 
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Australia [L] 0.24 0.20 0.52 0.41 0.23 0.66 46.77 0.42
Austria [C] 0.08 0.24 0.46 0.38 0.23 0.48 46.27 0.51
Belgium (Flanders) [C] 0.06 0.13 0.48 0.33 0.24 0.62 48.86 0.35
Brazil [D] 0.06 0.49 0.37 0.69 0.25 0.43 39.27 0.52
Chile [D] 0.10 0.11 0.59 0.33 0.20 0.45 49.14 0.45
Cyprus [C] 0.17 0.14 0.62 0.48 0.37 0.68 40.55 0.52
Czech republic [S] 0.07 0.07 0.58 0.40 0.24 0.59 43.15 0.89
Denmark [SD] 0.09 0.02 0.61 0.36 0.30 0.55 45.66 0.58
Finland [SD] 0.14 0.05 0.58 0.38 0.23 0.67 44.18 0.58
France [C] 0.27 0.07 0.64 0.51 0.36 0.55 41.86 0.57
Germany, East [S] 0.11 0.05 0.42 0.30 0.19 0.64 49.67 0.85
Germany, West [C] 0.10 0.12 0.42 0.32 0.15 0.60 46.74 0.50
Great Britain [L] 0.14 0.14 0.54 0.33 0.23 0.53 48.69 0.58
Hungary [S] 0.04 0.14 0.35 0.29 0.16 0.49 51.42 0.61
Ireland [L] 0.13 0.65 0.46 0.45 0.25 0.57 44.26 0.25
Israel [L] 0.26 0.17 0.56 0.55 0.33 0.67 42.08 0.56
Japan [C] 0.07 0.06 0.41 0.42 0.17 0.70 49.33 0.58
Latvia [S] 0.19 0.04 0.57 0.48 0.31 0.47 43.80 0.89
Mexico [D] 0.12 0.65 0.44 0.62 0.29 0.58 40.83 0.29
Netherlands [C] 0.27 0.09 0.57 0.37 0.26 0.51 43.90 0.34
New Zealand [L] 0.16 0.16 0.62 0.39 0.27 0.61 48.64 0.44
Northern Ireland [L] 0.14 0.47 0.42 0.38 0.20 0.44 49.43 0.34
Norway [SD] 0.26 0.03 0.58 0.42 0.27 0.56 44.57 0.54
Philippines [D] 0.01 0.58 0.37 0.81 0.32 0.76 38.50 0.42
Poland [S] 0.11 0.59 0.39 0.48 0.23 0.56 48.65 0.57
Portugal [C] 0.11 0.38 0.46 0.35 0.22 0.56 48.97 0.45
Slovak republic [S] 0.07 0.45 0.55 0.42 0.30 0.61 43.63 0.71
Slovenia [S] 0.08 0.21 0.42 0.37 0.22 0.57 47.78 0.51
Spain [C] 0.07 0.26 0.38 0.34 0.16 0.56 46.92 0.31
Sweden [SD] 0.27 0.03 0.64 0.36 0.28 0.51 46.78 0.55
Switzerland [C] 0.06 0.26 0.36 0.66 0.26 0.49 44.23 0.43
United States [L] 0.22 0.37 0.59 0.36 0.22 0.48 45.51 0.63
Liberal 0.18 0.30 0.53 0.40 0.24 0.56 46.59 0.47
Conservative 0.13 0.17 0.50 0.39 0.24 0.56 46.02 0.46
Social–democratic 0.19 0.03 0.60 0.38 0.27 0.58 45.20 0.56
Formerly socialist 0.09 0.24 0.48 0.40 0.24 0.56 46.49 0.71
Developing 0.07 0.49 0.38 0.69 0.28 0.55 40.79 0.42
All 0.13 0.24 0.50 0.44 0.25 0.56 45.37 0.51
Data are taken from the 2002 wave of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). For all variables but age, means 
can be interpreted as the proportion of women with the corresponding attribute. 
C, conservative regime; D, developing regime; L, liberal regime; S, formerly socialist regime; SD, social–democratic 
regime.
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Espousal of full-time maternal care among women in 32 countries
Variable
Mothers of Preschoolers 
Should Stay homec
Mothers of School Children 
Should Stay homed
Sociodemographic Model Ia Model Ib Model Ic Model IIa Model IIb Model IIc
 University degree –0.601*** –0.608*** –0.616*** –0.878*** –0.660*** –0.722***
 Highly religious 0.327*** 0.258*** 0.263*** 0.541*** 0.160** 0.284***
 Employed –0.291*** –0.392*** –0.295*** –0.664*** –0.612*** –0.584***
 Child in household 0.297*** 0.252*** 0.299*** 0.412*** 0.081 0.130
 Child × employed –0.365*** –0.290*** –0.364*** –0.286** –0.154 –0.179
 Married 0.039 0.061 0.048 0.058 0.145** 0.122*
 Age (y) 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.018***
 Mother had job –0.133*** –0.210*** –0.140*** –0.232*** –0.272*** –0.249***
Countrya
 Australia 0.478** 0.173
 Austria –0.035 1.212***
 Belgium (Flanders) –0.949*** –0.264
 Brazil –0.615*** 1.415***
 Chile –0.380** 2.027***
 Cyprus –1.173*** 0.857**
 Czech republic –0.292* 1.444***
 Denmark –1.070*** –1.194**
 Finland –0.311* 0.236
 France –0.062 0.338
 Germany, East –1.834*** –0.667
 Germany, West –0.096 0.896***
 Great Britain 0.500*** 0.104
 Hungary –0.248* 0.842***
 Ireland –0.627*** 0.319
 Israel –1.853*** 0.507
 Japan 0.285* 0.945***
 Latvia 0.019 1.289***
 Mexico –0.385** 2.136***
 Netherlands –0.691*** –1.372**
 New Zealand 0.827*** –0.066
 Northern Ireland 0.039 1.529***
 Norway –0.595*** –0.114
 Philippines –0.056 2.169***
 Poland 0.225 1.536***
 Portugal –0.336** 0.897***
 Slovak republic 0.215 1.540***
 Slovenia –1.057*** 0.556*
 Spain –0.557*** 0.924***
 Sweden –1.219*** –1.070*
 Switzerland –0.095 1.375***
regimeb
 Conservative –0.299*** 0.343***
 Social–democratic –0.731*** –0.778***
 Formerly socialist –0.214*** 0.716***
 Developing –0.348*** 1.412***
Constant –1.072*** –0.585*** –0.770*** –2.535*** –3.518*** –3.093***
G2 (df) 1078.64 (8) 2139.41 (39) 1232.07 (12) 977.51(8) 1924.29(39) 1529.47 (12)
BIC –1000.03 –1756.20 –1114.16 –898.89 1541.03 –1411.54
aUnited States is the reference category for models Ib and IIb.
bLiberal regime is the reference category for models Ic and IIc.
cN = 18,506
dN = 18,530
Values are additive coefficients from logistic regression models. G2 gives the difference in –2LL between the respective 
model and the constant-only model. Except for age, all covariates are dummy coded, with 1 indicating presence of the 
respective attribute and 0 indicating its absence.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
BIC = –G2 + df(ln(N)).
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once a week—works in the opposite direction, significantly increasing belief 
in full-time maternal care for both preschoolers and school-age children. This 
may mean that different understandings of childhood and/or motherhood 
are inculcated within university and religious institutions, that educational 
and religious institutions attract persons holding different ideological beliefs 
concerning the role of women in society, or both. These findings are consis-
tent with those from previous American and international research on gender 
role ideologies (Evans and Kelley 2002; Knudsen and Wærness 2001).
As expected, effects of motherhood on attitudes depend upon current 
employment status. For example, the odds of advocating stay-at-home 
mothering of preschoolers are nearly twice as high among nonemployed 
mothers as among employed mothers.13 Although these cross-sectional data 
do not allow us to assess the causal mechanisms underlying this relationship, 
we presume that it is bidirectional (i.e., that women’s attitudes about appro-
priate maternal practices influence their propensity to combine motherhood 
with paid employment, and that women’s experiences as either employed 
or stay-at-home mothers influence their attitudes about maternal employ-
ment). Among childless women, employment reduces the odds of espousing 
full-time maternal care. Being married seems to make little difference to 
women’s beliefs about appropriate child-rearing practices.14
Also consistent with past research, we find that younger women and 
women whose own mothers were employed are generally more supportive 
of combining market work with motherhood (Brayfield, Jones, and Alder 
2001; Knudsen and Wærness 2001).
To assess possible differences by country in the predictors of beliefs 
about appropriate mothering, we also ran a set of 32 single-country models 
for each dependent variable. These models (not shown) yield slope coef-
ficients that are either consistent in direction to those displayed in Table 
8.3 or statistically nonsignificant. We thus find little evidence of important 
cross-national differences in these individual-level relationships.
We now return to our earlier question concerning the compositional 
dependence of cross-national differences in normative understandings of 
motherhood. In particular, we wish to know whether the differences re-
vealed in Table 8.1 persist after we have taken into account international 
differences in the sociodemographic variables discussed earlier. For example, 
are women with similar values on age, education, religiosity, employment 
status, and other relevant attributes more likely to support full-time mater-
nal care if they live in New Zealand than if they live in Israel?
How Do Norms of Motherhood Differ by Country?
Models Ib and IIb in Table 8.3 allow us to examine cross-national differ-
ences while holding sociodemographic attributes constant. This information 
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can be garnered from the strength and direction of the 31 dummy “country” 
indicators. Because the omitted reference category is the United States, a 
positive value on a particular country term indicates a stronger propensity 
for women to hold this belief in the respective country than in the United 
States; a negative value indicates a weaker propensity.
Country effects shown in Table 8.3 reveal rank orderings that are 
roughly consistent with those for the unadjusted percentages displayed in 
Table 8.1. We find, for instance, the same set of highest and lowest scoring 
countries on both dependent variables. This result tells us that the interna-
tional differences described earlier are not simple artifacts of differences in 
respondents’ demographic attributes, but hold even net of such composi-
tional differences. Cross-national variability is substantial even if we con-
sider only advanced industrial countries. The odds of supporting full-time 
mothering of preschoolers are, for instance, more than three times higher 
among U.S. women than among their demographically comparable coun-
terparts in Sweden.15
How can we explain these considerable attitudinal differences even 
among countries with similar traditions of feminist mobilization and compa-
rable levels of postindustrial development and affluence? Scholars of welfare 
state and gender regimes have suggested that ideals of good motherhood and 
beliefs about children’s needs are influenced by prevailing institutional and 
policy arrangements that set the context for family decisions and make certain 
child care arrangements more or less viable (Esping-Andersen 1999; Kremer 
2006; Mahon 2002a, b; Pfau-Effinger 2000, 2004; Sainsbury 1999b). When 
consolidated, public policy regimes gain constituencies and may become in-
scribed in national culture. Existing family arrangements and systems of pub-
lic provision thereby come to be taken for granted as natural and desirable. In 
the following section we consider the extent to which ideals of maternal care 
cohere within categories of standard welfare state classification.
Exploring Regime Effects
Welfare state regimes refer to the different ways in which welfare produc-
tion is allocated between the state, the market, and the family. The most 
influential typology, which distinguishes three basic regime types (liberal, 
social–democratic, and conservative), was put forward by Danish sociolo-
gist Gøsta Esping-Andersen in his 1990 classic, The Three Worlds of Wel-
fare Capitalism. Policy logic in liberal regimes gives primacy to the market, 
with individuals and families expected to care for themselves or purchase 
services. Benefits are modest, means tested, and aimed at a small group of 
welfare recipients.16 Nonparental child care is provided mostly by low-wage 
workers employed in private-sector markets. The liberal cluster is primarily 
comprised of Anglo-Saxon countries, with the United States representing 
156 The Cultural Influences on Housework
the ideal/typical case. In social–democratic regimes, found in Sweden and 
other Scandinavian countries, taxes are high, benefits are universal and are 
paid to individuals, and state policies aim to promote equality at a rela-
tively high material level (as opposed to covering minimal needs). Policies 
are based on “universal earner” principles, with the aim of promoting full 
employment of women and men in part through heavy state investment in 
child care services and parental leave allowances. Conservative regimes are 
mostly continental European countries, with (West) Germany as the ideal/
typical case. Labor force participation is an important source of entitlement 
in conservative regimes because benefits are generally conferred on heads of 
households and are often linked to occupational status and earnings. Poli-
cies aim to temper negative effects of unfettered market competition through 
transfers to families. High male wages, employment-based pension funds, 
and progressive joint taxation promote family divisions of labor between a 
full-time domestic caregiver and a full-time breadwinner.
Although Esping-Anderson’s (1990) analysis focused on advanced capi-
talist societies, the data collected for the ISSP allow us to examine norms 
of motherhood in formerly socialist and developing economies as well. We 
therefore add two categories to Esping-Andersen’s original three. Our fourth 
“regime” is comprised of seven eastern and central European countries that 
share a communist past and a recent postsocialist market transition. Marxist 
doctrine, with its avowed allegiance to principles of gender equality and even 
the “withering away” of the family, provided a strong ideological basis for 
state efforts to facilitate female employment through provision of child care 
and other services. However, resource shortfalls and precommunist legacies 
of care often meant considerable gaps between ideological commitment and 
actual services (Michel 2006).
The fifth regime type considered here is comprised of four developing 
countries (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and the Philippines). Because this group is 
restricted to middle-income, largely roman Catholic societies—three Latin 
American and one East Asian—it can by no means be regarded as represen-
tative of all developing countries. However, these four do share with other 
developing countries a relatively small tax base and a limited state capacity 
to buffer risk and provide social welfare services to individuals and families. 
Moreover, all of these countries have been exposed, since at least the 1980s, 
to pressures from international financial institutions (e.g., The World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund ) for neoliberal restructuring of their econo-
mies and a reduced state role in welfare provision. Child care policies in 
developing countries are also influenced by concepts of early care and edu-
cation propagated by such multilateral organizations as the United Nations’ 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (or UNESCO).17
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Since publication of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) Three Worlds, numer-
ous alternative classification systems have been proposed by welfare state 
scholars and feminist theorists. Although compelling arguments have been 
advanced that France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Mediterranean region, 
the Antipodes, and/or Japan constitute distinct national types (Blossfeld 
and Drobnicˇ 2001; Castles 1996; Huber and Stephens 2001; Jones 1993; 
Leibfried 1992; Miyamoto 2003; O’Connor 1999), we provisionally follow 
Esping-Andersen (1997, 1999) in assigning all of these to the conservative 
category.18 Israel has been described as a hybrid of liberal and social–demo-
cratic regime types (Sabbagh, Powell, and Vanhuysse 2007). We classify it as 
“liberal” based on observations by Ben-Arieh, Boyer, and Gajst (2004). We 
will assess arguments about the cultural distinctiveness of these and other 
national societies by examining within-regime variability in beliefs about 
maternal employment. Our operational classification of countries by regime 
type can be seen in Tables 8.1 and 8.2.
Models Ic and IIc in Table 8.3 allow us to ascertain the extent to which 
patterns of cross-national variability in support for full-time maternal care 
map on to our classification of regime types. Effects are measured relative 
to the liberal category. For example, the value 0.343 in the last column tells 
us that the odds that women will advocate full-time maternal care of school-
age children are about 41 percent greater in conservative than in liberal 
regimes (exp(0.343) = 1.409), holding constant other variables. All regime 
effects are statistically significant at the 0.001 level.
Consistent with the predictions of standard welfare state regime theo-
ries, results show that women in social–democratic countries are least likely 
to advocate full-time maternal care of children in either age group. We sus-
pect that a strong state role in harmonizing family and work obligations, 
subsidizing costs of quality child care, and disseminating alternative nor-
mative conceptualizations of childhood and motherhood contributes to an 
erosion of support for full-time mothering of preschoolers in social–demo-
cratic regimes. In other words, state policies have helped propagate a nor-
mative “universal worker” ideal and a less mother-centered understanding 
of childhood.
In liberal welfare states, normative models of motherhood appear to 
depend strongly on children’s ages. Employment of mothers with school-age 
children is deemed relatively unproblematic in liberal regimes, with only 
social–democratic regimes showing weaker support for full-time mothering 
in that age group. However, we were surprised to find that it is in the liberal, 
not conservative, regimes where women are most likely to believe that moth-
ers with preschool children should “stay home.” Cultural tendencies for 
individualistic attribution of preferences and outcomes in liberal countries, 
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combined with a weak state role in facilitating (and legitimizing) female 
employment, may mean that maternal labor force participation is widely 
understood as a “choice”—and perhaps one that places a mother’s personal 
interests ahead of her children’s. Market- and school-based care provisions 
for older children are reasonably compatible with at least part-time mater-
nal employment in liberal regimes. In contrast, irregular (and in some cases 
even half-day) school schedules greatly increase structural and normative 
pressures for stay-at-home mothering of school-age children in such conser-
vative-group countries as West Germany, Austria, and Switzerland (Bird and 
Gottschall 2004; Buchmann and Charles 1995; Hagemann 2006).
regression coefficients for models Ic and IIc provide no evidence that 
the Marxist critique of bourgeois family norms has resulted in an across-the-
board weakening of women’s support for full-time mothering in the formerly 
communist countries of eastern and central Europe. Women’s attitudes to-
ward child rearing in fact differ little in the aggregate from those in conser-
vative state regimes. This suggests that state-imposed norms of maternal 
employment are not automatically internalized. We may also be witnessing 
an ideological backlash. Given frequent shortages of goods and services, and 
the absence of serious state efforts to increase men’s participation in domes-
tic work, mothers’ “double shift” was often onerous during the communist 
era (Bicskei 2006; Heinen 2002; Michel 2006). As a result, some eastern 
and central European women may now view the male breadwinner family 
as relatively emancipatory, especially where public investment in child care 
was inadequate to support the state-prescribed dual-earner families. The 
relative weakness of the feminist movement and the symbolic association of 
“gender equality” with the communist state may also increase support for 
western-style male breadwinner family models in these contexts.19
In developing regimes, women’s attitudes are quite distinctive with re-
gard to school-age (but not preschool-age) children. The odds of support-
ing full-time maternal care of children in the older age group are in fact 
nearly nine times higher in developing than in social–democratic societies,20 
although still only a minority of women in developing countries advocate 
stay-at-home mothering of these children. The difference between more 
and less affluent societies in this regard may be attributable to the poor 
conditions facing many workers in developing countries (Heymann 2006). 
Women are strongly overrepresented in the unregulated and poorly paid 
informal sector of less developed economies, especially in Latin America. 
When their parents work long and unpredictable hours, children are often 
left unsupervised after school.
To determine whether effects of individual-level covariates vary across 
regime types, we have run a series of regime-specific models (not shown). In 
only one case did a statistically significant coefficient deviate in sign from 
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those shown for models Ia and IIa. The exception concerns the interaction 
of motherhood and employment. Being an employed mother in a developing 
country makes women more, not less, likely to advocate full-time maternal 
care of preschoolers. This may again reflect differences in the nature and 
meaning of female labor force participation in more and less economically 
developed countries. Mothers who believe that full-time maternal care is 
advantageous can more often afford to stay at home with their preschool 
children in affluent than in developing societies.21
The relative predictive power of models displayed in Table 8.3 can be 
assessed by comparing the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) statistics 
across specifications.22 The preferred model is that with the smallest (i.e., 
the most negative) BIC score. Not surprisingly, the best fit is obtained when 
attitudes are allowed to vary freely by country (i.e., in models Ib and IIb). 
Nonetheless, regime distinctions do substantially improve prediction rela-
tive to the individual-effects models, especially with regard to beliefs about 
mothering of older (i.e., school-age) children. Comparing BIC scores be-
tween the regime- and the country-effects models suggests greater within-
regime cohesion of attitudes concerning school-age than preschool-age chil-
dren. As discussed later, state and private provisions for the care of very 
young children (e.g., early education and child care services, maternal and 
paternal leave policies) vary a great deal even within regime types.
Within-regime variability in attitudes toward maternal employment is 
evident in Figure 8.1, which displays adjusted country effects garnered from 
models Ib and IIb, grouped by regime. Bars represent, for each country, the 
predicted probabilities of espousing full-time maternal care, holding con-
stant individual-level factors (see equation in note 5). Specifically, values give 
probabilities for a hypothetical 30-year-old employed woman who is single, 
has no children at home, has no university degree, is not highly religious, 
and whose own mother was employed.23 The corresponding representation 
of regime effects (based on coefficients from models Ic and IIc) can be found 
in Figure 8.2, where bars represent predicted probabilities for each regime.
Figure 8.1 reveals considerable within-regime heterogeneity in support 
of full-time motherhood. In the following section, we consider these and 
other country-level differences in connection with recent literature on wel-
fare states and family policy.
implications for welfare state theory
Comparativist scholars see both material and cultural significance in dis-
tinctions among welfare state regimes. The material effects of variability 
in state-funded social services and income transfers are obvious. The cul-
tural effects are the taken-for-granted understandings of work, gender roles, 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9Mothers of School Children Should Stay Home
Figure 8.1. Espousal of full-time maternal care: Probability of agreement, 
by country.
n o t e :  Values are predicted probabilities of agreement with the corresponding statement, 
calculated from models Ib and IIb of Table 8.3. Probabilities are for a hypothetical 30-year-
old employed woman who is single, has no children, has no university degree, is not highly 
religious, and whose mother was employed. The top and bottom bar graphs are presented 
with different scales to facilitate inter-country comparisons within each panel.
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family relationships (including the nature of childhood), and the role of 
the state that congeal over time. These normative understandings in turn 
strengthen public support for specific brands of welfare statism, resulting in 
path-dependent trajectories of social policy development. regime-specific 
cultures of the market, the state, and the family are thereby crystallized, as 
suggested in Esping-Andersen’s (1999) observation that: “Genetics clearly 
do not create preferences and beliefs. What might account for this is soci-
ety itself with all its institutions, incentive systems, and inscribed norms of 
proper conduct” (p. 172).24
Family policy experts and feminist scholars have, however, challenged 
the material and cultural coherence of the Esping-Andersen typology on 
the grounds that it pays insufficient attention to within-regime variability 
in state-sanctioned gender relations and family structures. The mainstream 
welfare state literature suffers, they argue, from a preoccupation with in-
come maintenance and job security of core workers (“decommodification”) 
and glosses over important differences in the degree to which national so-
cial policies facilitate female employment and help ease burdens associated 
with family care (Daly 2000; O’Connor 1999; Orloff 1993, 1996; Sainsbury 
1996).25 For example, in countries where the state seeks to increase female la-
bor force participation (or stem fertility declines), generous child care services 
Figure 8.2. Espousal of full-time maternal care: Probability of agreement, 
by regime.
n o t e :  Values are predicted probabilities of agreement with the corresponding statement, 
calculated from models Ic and IIc of Table 8.3. Probabilities are for a hypothetical 30-year-
old employed woman who is single, has no children, has no university degree, is not highly 
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are provided, and dominant normative understandings of childhood and 
parenthood do not include long periods of full-time maternal care. When, 
on the other hand, welfare policy is built around a male breadwinner model, 
the state supports lengthy maternity leaves and/or subsidizes the (male) fam-
ily wage to allow mothers to withdraw completely from the labor force. The 
state-sanctioned gendered division of earning and caring roles is thereby 
legitimized and naturalized (Mahon 2002b).
In the following paragraphs, we briefly discuss existing evidence on 
within-regime variability in state provision of child care services, a key in-
dicator of “defamilialization” (i.e., loosening of households’ welfare and 
caring responsibilities).26 We then consider the extent to which these policy 
differences correspond to the patterns of cross-national variability in atti-
tudes that are revealed in Figure 8.1.
Among countries classified as “conservative” in the Esping-Anderson 
typology, much heterogeneity in family policy provisions has been docu-
mented. The French and Belgian states are commonly identified as excep-
tional within this cluster because they provide preschool education for all 
children age 3 to 6 years and offer relatively good publicly funded services 
for younger children.27 The Dutch state has recently been moving toward 
a relatively generous provision of child care support as well, although it 
long resisted loosening of its strong familialist traditions (Bussemaker and 
van Kersbergen 1999; Morgan 2006). Substantial differences are also found 
among the highly familialist societies in the conservative group. For exam-
ple, the southern European countries of Italy and Spain have relatively well-
developed systems of public preschool that accommodate most 3- to 5-year-
olds (Mahon 2002a), whereas Japan (sometimes described as a “Confucian” 
welfare state) is characterized by high rates of dependency on multigenera-
tional families and very little in the way of publicly funded preschool or 
child care (Jones 1993).
Significant internal variability in state support for maternal employment 
has also been observed within the social–democratic group, where Norway 
provides the least generous support for public child care (Leira 1992; Sains-
bury 1999a); and within the liberal group, where Australia and Canada 
have been identified as better providers of maternity leave and child care 
coverage (Mahon 2002a; O’Connor 1999).
The comparative literature likewise suggests much heterogeneity among 
formerly socialist societies. Both during and after the communist era, child 
care coverage has been good in the former German Democratic republic 
(GDr),28 but relatively poor in Poland and the region that is now the Czech 
republic, perhaps because of the continuous cultural influence of Catholic 
religious doctrine in the latter two regions. Hungary appears to have fallen 
somewhere in between Poland and the GDr with regard to child care policy 
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(Hagemann 2006; Heinen 2002; Mahon 2002a; Michel 2006). Slovenia, a 
relatively affluent country in the group, developed an extensive system of 
public care and education for young children that has been kept more or less 
intact throughout the transition period (Stropnik 2001).
Evidence is also emerging that “varieties of welfare capitalism” exist 
within the developing world (Pribble 2006; rudra 2007). This heterogene-
ity is attributable in part to cross-national differences in exposure to the 
global economy and pressures from international financial institutions for 
neoliberal-style structural adjustments (rudra 2002, 2007).29 Although 
available information on child care and preschool coverage does not allow 
systematic comparison across our developing countries, some features of 
Brazilian society would seem to support more generous provisions. These 
include a more inward-directed development strategy, more universalistic 
welfare state traditions (which, however, fall considerably short in practice), 
and the expressed commitment of the Brazilian state and the national femi-
nist movement to expanding child care provisions.30
To what extent do these national differences in family policy map on to 
patterns of within-regime variability in women’s attitudes? Within both the 
social–democratic and conservative regimes, we find that support for full-
time maternal care tends to be weaker in countries that have been identified 
as having the most extensive public-sector provisions for child care and edu-
cation. Danish and Swedish women are, accordingly, less likely than their 
Finnish and Norwegian counterparts to support full-time maternal care of 
children regardless of age. With respect to school-age children, France, Bel-
gium, and the Netherlands stand out within their conservative group as 
particularly supportive of maternal employment. French and Dutch women 
are, however, no less likely than their counterparts in other “conservative” 
countries to support full-time maternal care of very young children. This 
age dependence may be attributable to state subsidies for lengthy maternity 
leaves in France and the Netherlands. Women in the highly familialist coun-
tries of the Mediterranean region (i.e., Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus) and 
Japan show no greater tendency to support stay-at-home mothering than do 
their counterparts in other conservative states.
Within the liberal group, we find much heterogeneity but no consistent 
pattern of cross-national variability across indicators. Attitudinal patterns 
are strongly dependent on the age of the child. With regard to employ-
ment of mothers with preschool children, the odds that a woman will sup-
port stay-at-home mothering is, for example, several times stronger in New 
Zealand than in Israel. Both countries fall close to the liberal group aver-
age with respect to care of school-age children, however.31 Israeli women’s 
views on the care of preschool children may be attributable to that country’s 
long tradition of community-based education (often religiously oriented) for 
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preschool-age children.32 We have no ready explanation for the very high 
value in New Zealand on the same measure. The difference between Aus-
tralia and New Zealand with respect to employment of mothers with very 
young children may be partially attributable to the relatively well-developed 
Australian system of child care supports that grew out of a feminist–labor 
alliance during the 1970s and ’80s.33
In the group of formerly socialist societies, we find correspondence of 
attitudes with national cultural traditions as well with the types of insti-
tutional support for female labor force participation that were developed 
under communism. East German and Slovenian women, for example, view 
maternal employment considerably more favorably than their counterparts 
in Poland and the Czech republic, where the historical influence of Catholic 
religious doctrine on family practices and state policies was evident even dur-
ing the communist era.34 This contrast highlights the resilience of traditional 
customs and cultures in the face of massive institutional transformation. But 
the large differences observed between East and West German women with 
respect to maternal employment suggest that family policy regimes can have 
enduring normative effects. Attitudes in the East and West may eventually 
converge in reunited Germany, but our data point to strong cultural legacies 
from socialist institutions in the Eastern Länder (see also rosenfeld, Trappe, 
and Gornick 2004; rudd 2000). The odds of advocating full-time mater-
nal care of school-age children is, for example, nearly five times higher for 
West German women than for their counterparts in the East, who showed 
roughly similar patterns of employment prior to World War II.35
Turning to the group of developing nations, Brazilian women are less 
likely to object to maternal employment than their counterparts elsewhere 
in the developing world. As suggested earlier, this difference may be attrib-
utable to the stronger government and popular support for publicly funded 
early-childhood education and the weaker influence of neoliberal antistat-
ism in Brazil. A broader sample of developing countries is necessary before 
any general conclusions can be drawn about this group.
Women’s views about maternal employment indeed vary across stan-
dard welfare state regime types (Figure 8.2), presumably because their expe-
riences with state policies related to family welfare supports, taxation, and 
employment influence their understandings of what constitutes “normal” 
motherhood and childhood.36 These understandings in turn help sustain 
feedback loops and path-dependent trajectories of policy development within 
regime types. But our results also provide support for feminist critiques, 
which hold that standard typologies of welfare state regimes obscure cross-
national variability in defamilialization of caring responsibilities. Norms of 
maternal care documented here do in fact correspond to important within-
regime differences in child care and family policies. A strong state role in 
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harmonizing market and family roles may help disseminate “family values” 
that legitimize a greater public-sector role in the care and education of young 
children.
Future research should use over-time data and multilevel modeling to 
explore further the spatial variability in norms of motherhood. Application 
of over-time data (for either qualitative or quantitative analysis) would al-
low researchers to identify more clearly the direction of causal relationships 
and to gain a better sense of the relative importance of attitudinal diver-
gence and convergence in global economies and societies. More rigorous 
examination of the intermediary mechanisms driving observed patterns of 
cross-national variability may be facilitated by a formal multilevel model-
ing approach. The theoretical literature points to a number of macrolevel 
covariates that might be relevant in this regard. These include rates of female 
labor force participation, levels of economic prosperity, urban concentration 
of the population, timing and speed of industrialization, preschool enroll-
ment rates, service-sector size, strength of the feminist movement and leftist 
parties, and female representation in parliaments. Given recent evidence of 
significant micro/macro interactions in the determination of household divi-
sions of labor, researchers should also attend carefully to how national and 
regional factors may mediate effects of individual-level variables on norms 
of motherhood.
conclusion
Our analyses support the following empirical conclusions: First, beliefs 
about the appropriateness of maternal employment vary a great deal cross-
nationally, even among women with similar configurations of sociodemo-
graphic characteristics. Second, some of this cross-national variability in 
beliefs about mothering corresponds to differences in welfare state regime 
types. And third, within-regime variability corresponds to differences in na-
tional family policy provisions that have not yet received much attention 
from mainstream welfare state scholars. These findings are consistent with 
arguments positing a coconstitutive relationship between welfare state re-
gime types on the one hand and societal understandings about work, gender 
roles, and childhood on the other. They also suggest that feminist scholars 
are right to call for greater attention to within-regime variability in policy 
efforts aimed specifically at reconciling market and caring work.
There is much evidence that individual behavior and household divi-
sions of labor are strongly conditioned by welfare- and family-policy regimes 
and the associated norms of motherhood (Cooke 2007; Esping-Andersen 
1999; Gornick and Meyers 2003; Lewis 2006; Mandel and Semyonov 2006; 
Mayer 2001).37 The very low rate of maternal labor force participation in 
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contemporary West Germany, for instance, reflects the interaction of power-
ful ideological and structural forces:
[M]others abide by the institutional steering of their life courses prescribed 
for them by legislation and backed up by normative expectations of col-
leagues, friends, and families. These dual measures—the external policy 
instrument and the expectations of their normative environment—combine 
to produce a nearly insurmountable prescribed pattern for the labor-market 
participation of mothers with children under three years old: that is, they 
stay at home. (Bird and Gottschall 2004, p. 296)
The overdetermination of German stay-at-home motherhood stands in stark 
contrast to the normative and institutional environment in Sweden, where:
Swedish policy makers effectively legislated the demise of the male bread-
winner family in the late 1960s and early 1970s, making it financially oner-
ous for one parent to be home full-time. . . . This created strong demand 
for the continued expansion of the Swedish day care system while softening 
divisions between advocates of working mothers and defenders of the male-
breadwinner model. (Morgan 2006, p. 114)
Both of these accounts recognize the mutually constitutive relationship be-
tween established social policy regimes and normative expectations regard-
ing maternal employment and the role of the state. Countries are by no 
means culturally homogeneous,38 but they do clearly differ in what Kremer 
(2006) calls dominant “ideals of care.”
Although international differences in state-sanctioned ideals of mother-
hood and the family are striking, it is possible that the worldwide diffusion 
of neoliberal ideology and trends toward regional integration and economic 
globalization may alter the logic of path dependence in national welfare state 
provisions. rianne Mahon (2002b), for instance, suggests that the expan-
sion and institutional formalization of the European Union has contributed 
to a growing “hybridization” in family policies and injection of new ideas 
into national societies. Such tendencies could imply a gradual convergence 
in normative ideals of care across countries and regime types.
In interpreting results of our analyses, we have suggested that notions 
regarding where and by whom child care should be provided are attribut-
able in part to shared experiences with national welfare- and family-policy 
regimes. These experiences congeal into common normative understandings 
of motherhood, childhood, and the role of the state, and they influence the 
extent to which mothering is seen as compatible with paid employment. 
The resulting cultural understandings of motherhood and childhood are re-
flected in the actions and agendas of policy makers, employers, and social 
movement activists, and they are manifested in subsequent waves of policy 
development. An active state role in harmonizing market and family obli-
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gations legitimizes maternal employment and public child care and further 
increases demand for policies that defamilialize care. A powerful feedback 
loop is thus completed.
notes
We thank Lynn Prince Cooke, Claudia Geist, and the volume’s editors for 
helpful comments.
1. On the relationship between family policy arrangements and child-rearing 
ideals, see Mahon (2002a, b) and Kremer (2006). Esping-Andersen (1999) and 
Svallfors (2007) offer more general discussions of normative feedback effects 
emanating from welfare state institutions. The alternate causal pathway—from 
public preferences to policy provisions—is considered by Brooks and Manza 
(2006).
2. American and international studies indicate, for instance, that nonem-
ployed, partnered women do a larger share of routine housework than their em-
ployed counterparts (Bianchi et al. 2000; Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005).
3. We have also computed weighted models with very similar results. Any 
significant differences are noted.
4. responses were taken from the following survey question: Do you think 
that women should work outside the home, full-time, part-time, or not at all 
under the following circumstances: after marrying and before there are children, 
when there is a child under school age, after the youngest child starts school, af-
ter the children leave home.” We do not distinguish between full- and part-time 
employment because of tremendous cross-national variability in definition and 
prevalence of part-time work.
5. Although we considered other survey items, many of them tapped into 
multiple attitudes and therefore present ambiguities of interpretation and cross-
national comparison.
6. As expected, men are generally more likely to espouse full-time maternal 
care than are women.
7. The logistic regression equation takes the following form: log[Pi/(1 – Pi)] 
= a + bXi, where i denotes the ith sample respondent, Pi represents the probability 
that respondent i holds the belief in question, a is the model intercept, and bXi 
represents a vector of covariates (Xi) and their slopes (b). Predicted probabilities 
are calculated as e(a + bXi)/1 + e(a + bXi).
8. Women reporting “full-time,” “part-time,” or “less than part-time” activ-
ity are counted as employed. Overall, less than 2% of women reported working 
“less than part-time.” Most of these women are from countries where part-time 
employment is defined as 15 to 35 hours per week (10–29 hours in Great Britain 
and Denmark, 10–39 hours in the Philippines). The “less-than-part-time” cat-
egory also includes a small number of women who were temporarily not working.
9. The “household composition” variable is not available for Slovenia, 
Israel, Cyprus, and Brazil. For Australia, the total given on this variable appears 
to include missing values. For these four countries, we determined presence of 
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children based on variables giving the numbers of preschool- and school-age chil-
dren in the household.
10. Although we would have liked to control for differences in economic 
class position, such comparisons were unfeasible as a result of complications in-
volved in determining class positions of nonemployed and marginally employed 
women.
11. Multiplying a coefficient by –1 gives the effect on the log-odds that a 
woman disagrees with the respective statement (i.e., finds maternal employment 
acceptable).
12. exp(0.878) = 2.406.
13. exp(0.297)/(exp(–0.365 + 0.297 + –0.291)) = 1.927. Because we have 
included main and interaction terms for employment and the presence of children, 
the main “employment” effects pertain to women with no children at home, and 
the main “child” effect pertains to nonemployed women.
14. When sample weights are applied, the positive effect of marriage be-
comes statistically significant in models Ia and IIa, and the effects of having 
children (for both employed and nonemployed women) become statistically sig-
nificant in model Ic.
15. exp(1.219) = 3.384.
16. Qualification for means-tested benefits is based on financial need. Uni-
versal welfare benefits, in contrast, are targeted toward all those who fall within 
particular social categories (e.g., families with children, citizens older than age 
65, the unemployed).
17. To allow for greater investment in primary education, these organiza-
tions tend to emphasize low-cost, nonformal provisions for young children 
(rosemberg 2003).
18. Esping-Andersen (1997) in fact describes the current Japanese welfare 
state as a hybrid system, which fuses the corporatism and familialism of the 
conservative regime with the market emphasis of the liberal regime. Because our 
focus is on family-related policy and values, we classify Japan as a conservative 
regime. We follow Esping-Andersen’s 1999 typology in classifying the Dutch wel-
fare state as conservative. See Kouloumou (2006) on family policy in Cyprus.
19. Although no clear link is evident between the strength of women’s move-
ments and the extensiveness of family policy provisions (Morgan 2006), feminist 
organizations undoubtedly have an ideological and agenda-setting effect within 
their respective national contexts. See also Sainsbury (1999b) on different strands 
of feminism and their policy implications.
20. exp(1.412)/(exp(–0.778) = 8.935.
21. We also note the following interregime differences in strength of covari-
ate effects: Coefficients for religiosity tend to be smaller in developing and liberal 
countries, and the presence of children (among nonemployed women) is a weaker 
predictor of attitudes in developing and socialist regimes.
22. Application of the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) allows us to con-
sider both parsimony and explanatory power in selecting the best-fitting model. 
By this standard, inclusion of country or regime effects must be justified on the 
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basis of improved model fit. The computational formula for BIC is shown in the 
footnote to Table 8.3. For more information, see raftery (1995).
23. We have also computed regime-specific models for which parameter es-
timates for all individual-level covariates are allowed to vary across regime types. 
Country effects for these models correspond very closely to those shown in Figure 
8.1 for the pooled models.
24. In Esping-Anderson’s (1999) terms, therefore, Homo liberalismus, Homo 
familius, and Homo socialdemocraticus become culturally dominant in the re-
spective welfare state regimes. These ideal typical homines exhibit, he argues, 
preferences and cultural logic that are both reflected in and promoted by the cor-
responding policy regimes.
25. Decommodification refers to the “degree to which the individual’s typi-
cal life situation is freed from dependence on the labor market” (Esping-Andersen 
and Korpi 1987, p. 40). Feminist scholars have pointed out that women who spe-
cialize in extramarket care work are dependent on families, rather than markets, 
for their welfare. Their independence therefore requires not decommodification, 
but a lessening of their reliance on families (Orloff 1993). Esping-Andersen (1999, 
pp. 60–67) acknowledges important intra-regime difference in relations between 
the family and the state, but argues that his original classification of regimes re-
mains useful for capturing some differences in state efforts to defamilialize caring 
responsibilities.
26. A familialist system is one in which public policy is organized around 
the presumption that families will carry the principle responsibility for members’ 
welfare.
27. regarding provisions in France and Belgium, see Bussemaker and van 
Kersbergen (1999); Meyers, Gornick, and ross (1999); Mahon (2002a), and Mor-
gan (2006). Important ideological dissimilarities with the Nordic countries have 
been identified. In particular, programs in France and Belgium are intended to 
increase fertility and improve early childhood education more than to facilitate 
maternal employment and promote gender equality.
28. All-day supervision for nursery-, preschool- and school-age children was 
provided on a universal basis in the former GDr. This supported—some would 
say enforced—female labor force participation rates that were high even com-
pared with other socialist countries. Although child care provisions have been 
scaled back in the East German Länder, they continue to be considerably more 
generous than in the West (rosenfeld, Trappe, and Gornick 2004).
29. Insulation of the economy from international competition allows greater 
state discretion to intervene in the economy and expand its role in provision of so-
cial services. Interestingly, rudra (2002) finds that exposure to international mar-
kets decreases state welfare spending in developing, but not developed, countries.
30. The Brazilian feminist movement has placed priority on child care since 
the 1970s. The national constitution of 1988 mandates federal government pro-
vision of free daycare and preschool to all children younger than 7 years of age. 
This policy has not yet been implemented, however. Similar gaps between de jure 
and de facto coverage have been identified with respect to other sorts of universal 
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entitlements in Brazil. On Brazilian social policy, see Connelly, DeGraff, and Le-
vison (1996); Huber (1996); and Barrientos (2004).
31. Northern Ireland is a notable outlier on this indicator. Even there, only 
a small minority of women object to employment of mothers with school-age 
children.
32. The Israeli welfare regime has both liberal and social–democratic ele-
ments (Sabbagh, Powell, and Vanhuysse 2007). With regard to attitudes toward 
employment of women with very young children, Israeli women look more like 
their Nordic than their liberal counterparts.
33. In a comparative analysis of family life in Australia, New Zealand, and 
Canada, Baker (2001) notes that child care provisions for infants are in especially 
short supply in New Zealand. She also describes strong social pressure for at-
home mothering in both Australia and New Zealand.
34. Because our models control for individual religiosity, we here refer to 
societal-level effects. The policy provisions and norms of family life that grow out 
of the dominant religious doctrine are presumed to influence attitudes of even 
those persons who are not highly religious.
35. exp(0.896)/(exp(–0.667) = 4.773. See also Cooke (2007) on divisions of 
domestic labor in East and West German Länder.
36. See also Geist (2005) on interregime differences in the gendered division 
of domestic labor.
38. Variability within regions of Switzerland, Hungary, and the United 
Kingdom have, for example, been described by Bühler (1998), Bicskei (2006), and 
Wincott (2006), respectively. See also Duncan (2000).
37. recent comparative analyses suggest that living in a country character-
ized by conservative family policies or low rates of female employment may imply 
more gendered divisions of housework regardless of an individual woman’s em-
ployment status or personal attitudes (Breen and Cooke 2005; Fuwa 2004; Hook 
2006).
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Marriage makes headlines. Although the majority of people around the 
world have experienced marriage as a part of their daily life, marriage is 
not a mundane subject. We are fascinated by changes in marriage, which 
is apparent by the coverage the changes receive in newspapers around the 
world. In July 2007, Hong Kong, a South China Morning Post headline 
read, “The challenge of finding ‘Mr. He’ll Have To Do’ in 2036.” In Lon-
don, the Guardian reported “Number of marriages at new low.” In Cape 
Town, South Africa, the Cape Times discussed “Explosion in fake weddings 
to foreigners ‘a national crisis’.”
Marriage is more than a private, personal relationship. It is a social insti-
tution or “a dominant system of interrelated informal and formal elements—
customs, shared beliefs, conventions, norms, and rules—which actors orient 
their actions to when they pursue their interests” (Nee 2005, p. 55). As other 
chapters regarding the division of household labor demonstrate, our inti-
mate relationships, including marriage, are not all that unique to us. We tend 
to marry similar to how other people around us marry. This is because we 
do not merely act as independent actors in our interpersonal relationships. 
rather, our most private relationships and actions within them are shaped 
by, and in turn reinforce, the larger institutional system of marriage.
Marriage, an institution that has always shown the stamp of the particu-
lar culture, is undergoing changes that are reflected in new practices, rules, 
and beliefs. Although the pace of change differs from country to country, so-
ciologists point to a broad-based shift in the values that underpin the marital 
institution—that is, in the fundamental principles that motivate people to 
marry and that contribute to the success of marital relationships. This chap-
ter leverages on this cross-national variation in the meaning of marriage to 
test a hypothesis about the implications of changing cultural beliefs about 
the institution of marriage for the domestic organization of the household. 
I examine cross-cultural variation in the institution of marriage and how 
dominant beliefs about marriage within countries are associated with the 
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division of housework in marriages. In particular, I apply the theoretical 
work of Anthony Giddens (1991, 1992) to study if the intimacy-based insti-
tution of marriage is related to a more flexible and less traditional division 
of housework between women and men.
the institution of marriage
Jennifer Brigid O’Malley was married last evening to Michael Patrick Dil-
lon. The rev. David P. Callahan, a roman Catholic priest, performed the 
ceremony at St. Mary’s Church in Franklin, Mass. . . . The couple met in 
2003 while working for Mr. [John] Edwards’s first presidential campaign, 
Mr. Dillon in the press department and Ms. O’Malley in the field. (Wedding/
celebrations, 2007)
As this wedding announcement highlights, one institutionalized pattern in 
marriage is for people to marry people like themselves. We talk about the 
serendipitous fortune of finding our one true love. In reality, there isn’t too 
much unanticipated about our mates. We tend to marry people of similar 
social classes and educational levels, and common ethnic or religious back-
grounds (Kalmijn 1998). For example, in Canada, a country known for its 
open immigration policies and ethnic diversity, only 3 percent of unions 
are “mixed,” or comprised of partners from different visible, ethnic groups 
(Milan and Hamm 2004).
The practice of marrying people from common backgrounds, or ho-
mogamy, is often believed to enhance marital success. When individuals 
come from a similar background, it is argued, there is a shared history that 
increases compatibility in values and makes it easier to build and continue 
intimate relationships. Homogamy is not solely about shared values and 
compatibility, however. Social pressure to marry within a particular group is 
also related to reproducing and maintaining boundaries between dominant 
and threatened social classes, ethnic groups, and religions. Couples who 
cross these lines can experience discrimination and negative reactions from 
family and others. This can add pressure to a marriage, leading to lower 
satisfaction and stability (Amato et al. 2003; Fu, Tora, and Kendall 2001; 
Heaton 2002). Yet there is also evidence that working through these chal-
lenges can make relationships stronger (Heller and Wood 2000; rosenblatt, 
Karis, and Powell 1995).
Marriage has also been socially defined as an indicator of a secure and 
successful life (Cherlin 2004; Edin 2000; Edin, Kefalas, and reed 2004).
Until their marriage last fall, Elana and James Nanscawen weren’t fussy 
about their living situation. Their one-bedroom rental in the financial district 
was perfectly adequate, if small. . . . By spring, though, they were growing 
impatient to buy a bigger place. (Cohen 2007, p. 6)
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As described in this article from the real estate section of the newspaper, 
adequate income and housing for building a family life are believed to be 
ingredients of that security and success. These institutional beliefs influence 
individual choice to marry. Studies in North America find that people often 
choose not to marry if they believe that they do not have sufficient material 
resources to make a marriage last long term (Edin, Kefalas, and reed 2004; 
Smock, Manning, and Porter 2004).
Indeed, a lack of adequate resources can serve as relationship stres-
sors, leading to decreased satisfaction and increased likelihood of divorce 
(Bradbury and Karney 2004; Huston and Melz 2004). The accumulation 
of shared resources, including a house, children, and joint bank account, 
also increases commitment to the relationship, because they make it more 
cumbersome for the couple to split up, even if one of the partners no longer 
wants to stay (Johnson, Caughlin, and Huston 1999; Treas 1993).
“What’s keeping people together is their love and commitment for each 
other,” Professor Musick said, “and that’s fragile . . . the evolving rules of 
marriage provide both opportunities and pitfalls. . . . There may be greater 
potential to find fulfillment in relationships,” she said, “but that possibility 
and the expectations that come from it may lead to greater disappointment 
for some” if the expectations aren’t fulfilled. (roberts 2007, p. 1)
This newspaper article summarizes a relatively new pattern in the in-
stitution of marriage. Burgess and Locke (1945) described the shift from 
institutional to companionate marriages. During the period when marriages 
were culturally defined as institutional, the focus was not the individuals 
in the marriage or their feelings toward each other. On the contrary, it was 
the relationship of the extended families, and the political and economic 
interests between them, that the marriage brought together. With the shift 
to companionate marriages, the institutional focus of marriage turned to 
the individuals in the marriage and their feelings of love toward each other 
(Coontz 2005). With this new approach to marriage, individuals were ex-
pected, however, to sacrifice their individual identity for the couple identity. 
In companionate relationships, a rigid, gendered division of labor existed, 
and satisfaction was expected to come from successfully fulfilling one’s so-
cially prescribed gender roles within marriage, even if it entailed a suppres-
sion of individual needs or desires (Cherlin 2004).
Anthony Giddens (1991, 1992) proposes that a new transition in the 
institution of marriage is taking place. relationships, including marriages, 
he argues, are shifting to become pure relationships, which are increasingly 
centered on intimacy. It is a balanced, reciprocal partnership that forms 
the basis and continuation of these relationships. Individuals do not sacri-
fice but rather maintain their own identity and independence, and pursue 
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self-development while in these relationships (Cancian 1987). With the in-
creased focus on intimacy, relationships take on new forms and dynamics, 
including more flexibility and equality in the division of housework.
In marriage institutionalized as pure and intimacy based, according to 
Giddens (1992), there is less focus on marrying someone from the same social 
backgrounds. Partners are not chosen based on social criteria such as social 
class, ethnicity, or religion. Everyone is free to pick any partner without ex-
ternal restriction. In these relationships, a “shared history” comes not from 
a common background or social position, but develops through a process of 
exchange, communication, and interaction with each other over time. Part-
ners grow to know each other and become compatible. Likewise, it is through 
“mutual disclosure” that partners begin to trust and develop attachment to the 
pure relationship. This process replaces the role that similar backgrounds and 
social pressures once played in fostering trust and holding couples together.
Nonetheless, Giddens (1992) acknowledges that intimacy is a weaker 
glue than external pressures. As a result, marriage is becoming less secure 
and more likely to end through divorce. At the same time, however, people 
increasingly want the marriage to end if they are no longer receiving the 
intimacy and associated support that now is expected to come from relation-
ships. In this changed institution of marriage, people want—and now have 
the option to find—intimacy elsewhere.
Associated with this, when the accumulation of resources in marriage 
was previously viewed as enhancing stability, in the context of intimacy-
based marriage, children and homes form “inertial drag,” making it harder 
to leave the relationship when people are no longer having their needs met 
(Giddens 1992). In other words, when lifelong stability is no longer the ex-
pectation or goal, stabilizing investments in the union are more costly than 
beneficial. Thus we see a trend toward partners, particularly those who are 
cohabiting or in pure relationships, keeping their incomes in separate bank 
accounts and even maintaining separate homes (Levin 2004; Treas and Wid-
mer 2000; Vogler 2005).
The emphasis on intimacy as the basis for marriage also changes dynam-
ics between partners in the relationship, according to Giddens (1992). Inti-
macy leads to a process of democratization and negotiation. Previously, the 
institution of marriage was characterized by set hierarchies and roles, largely 
based on gender. With changes in marriage, these set roles are replaced by 
an ongoing process of discussion and bargaining to decide who does what in 
the relationship. As a result, “a division of labour might be established, but 
not one simply inherited on the basis of preestablished criteria or imposed by 
unequal economic resources brought to the relationship” (Giddens 1992, p. 
195). Under these dynamics, we would expect the division of housework to 
be less defined by traditional gender roles and more equally shared.
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In the years since Giddens’ work on pure intimate relationships, there 
have been few empirical tests of his theory. Gross and Simmons (2002) focus 
on individual approaches to marriage and cohabitation in the United States 
and find evidence for greater autonomy and relationship satisfaction among 
individuals in pure relationships. However, they do not test to determine 
whether pure relationships are related to greater equality in the relation-
ship. rather, they include the division of household labor as an indicator in 
their measure of pure relationships. Some evidence for Giddens’ ideas comes 
from studies that find that the division of housework is less traditional and 
more equal between women and men in cohabiting relationships—those re-
lationships that often fit the definition of pure relationships (Blumstein and 
Schwartz 1985; Davis, Greenstein, and Gerteisen Marks 2007).
Jamieson (1997) is skeptical of Giddens’ work on intimacy-based rela-
tionships, including the argument that an increased emphasis on intimacy in 
relationships will lead to gender equality. She acknowledges that couples, as 
Goodnow and Bowes (1994) found, can develop an intimacy, caring-based 
democratic process of negotiating housework that results in ungendered as-
signment of household tasks and thereby “do things differently.” Yet she 
notes that, for the most part, this is not the standard in marriage or co-
habitation. She cites a wide range of studies that show that although there 
might be differences in the degree of inequality, the division of housework 
remains unequal today despite changes in women’s roles, reported egalitar-
ian gender ideologies, and the option to cohabit rather than marry. Indeed, 
she highlights, intimacy itself is often unequal, with women doing more of 
the emotional work than men (Cancian 1987; Hochschild 1989).
There is evidence that greater equality in the division of housework can 
make partners, particularly women, feel closer, happier, and more satisfied, 
including sexually, in their relationship (Amato et al. 2003; Gottman 1999; 
Pimentel 2000). But is an institutional focus on intimacy as the expectation 
for marriage related to more equality? To test this idea, I move back from 
this individual-level analysis of relationships and focus on the institution of 
marriage characterizing a culture. I examine whether a country-level, insti-
tutional focus on intimacy in marriage is related to how couples within the 
context divide the housework.
study of giddens’ ideas
In this section, I test Giddens’ ideas by looking at institutionalized beliefs about 
the institution of marriage. There are two parts to the study. First, I present 
data on how countries vary in their beliefs regarding marriage. Second, I 
consider whether greater focus on intimacy-based marriage within countries 
is related to a less gendered division of housework between spouses.
180 The Cultural Influences on Housework
Dominant Beliefs about Marriage across Countries
What is culturally defined as important in marriage? Is intimacy considered 
important to marriage in all countries? Or do some cultures continue to 
place the most importance on marrying within one’s own social background 
and having adequate resources? In other words, are there different patterns 
across countries in the system of beliefs, practices, and rules about marriage? 
In this first part of my analysis, I want to measure how countries differ re-
garding the institution of marriage.
One source of data to do this is the integrated European and World Val-
ues Surveys. The European and World Values Surveys are cross-nationally 
comparative surveys based on nationally representative samples of individu-
als in more than 80 countries from North and South America, Asia, Europe, 
Africa, the Middle East, and Australia (Inglehart et al. 2004). Data come 
from the early to late 1990’s.1 People were asked to answer the following 
question: Here is a list of things which some people think make for a success-
ful marriage. Please tell me, for each one, whether you think it is very impor-
tant, rather important, or not very important for a successful marriage?”2
A. Faithfulness
B. An adequate income
C. Being of the same social background
D. Mutual respect and appreciation
E. Shared religious beliefs
F. Good housing
G. Agreement on politics
H. Understanding and tolerance
I. Happy sexual relationship
J. Sharing household chores
K. Children
To understand variation across countries in shared beliefs about marriage, 
each country received an aggregate score of the percentage of people within 
the country who believe that each of the previous qualities are very impor-
tant. I then used factor analysis to examine patterns in what is believed to 
be important in marriage across countries. Are some qualities considered 
more important in some countries and less important in others? Are there 
common themes across countries in what are considered key ingredients for 
marriage? Table 9.1 shows the patterns that I found across countries.3
Three types of patterns in marriage beliefs appear across countries. First, 
countries where many people believe having the same social background is 
very important to marriage are also countries where many people say that 
sharing religious beliefs and agreeing on politics is very important. These 
countries place greater emphasis on marital homogamy, or marrying people 
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with a common background. In the second set of countries, resources are 
seen as central to a successful marriage. Not only are many people likely to 
report that adequate income is very important in these countries, but also 
that good housing and children are essential for marriage. A third pattern 
reflects Giddens’ concept of pure or intimacy-based relationships. In these 
countries, marriage is believed to be best if based on equal exchange. These 
are the countries where people respond that interaction-based qualities are 
very important: faithfulness, respect and appreciation, understanding and 
tolerance, happy sexual relationship, and sharing of household chores.
Table 9.2 shows how each of the countries rank with regard to the pat-
terns in marital beliefs. Some countries are consistently high or low on the 
scales. For example, Chileans place high importance on all marital criteria, 
whereas Finns give minimal importance to any of the criteria. The other 
countries tend to vary quite a bit across the measures. In Sweden, marriage 
is defined as intimacy based, with low importance placed on homogamy or 
resources. Japan and Brazil are just the opposite. In these countries, lower 
importance is placed on intimacy and higher importance is placed on ho-
mogamy and adequate resources. Northern Ireland and the United States 
rank high on both intimacy and homogamy, but lower on the importance 
of resources. russia ranks high on the need for adequate resources. In gen-
eral, there is a tendency for less importance to be placed on the need for 
resources in wealthier countries, there is greater emphasis placed on shared 
social background or homogamy in countries with histories of social class 
inequalities and religious and racial tensions, and there is more importance 
placed on intimacy in marriage in countries where there is less pressure 
overall to marry, as seen by later age at marriage and nonmarital births. The 
measures of homogamy and resources are most highly correlated (r = 0.59), 
whereas intimacy is only weakly correlated with resources (r = 0.15) and 
moderately correlated with homogamy (r = 0.40).4
Having established different patterns in beliefs, I now take a closer look 
at the intimacy measure, the focus of Giddens’ work. Countries vary quite a 
bit on the importance they place on intimacy. This is apparent when examin-
ing the separate indicators of intimacy.
ta b l e  9 . 1
Patterns in beliefs about what is very important for a successful marriage
Homogamy Resources Intimacy
Same social background Adequate income Faithfulness
Shared religious beliefs Good housing respect and appreciation
Agreement on politics Children Understanding and tolerance
Happy sexual relationship
Sharing household chores
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As shown in Table 9.3, nearly all the Americans and northern Irish 
report that faithfulness is very important to a successful marriage. In com-
parison, just under three quarters of russians and Japanese place similarly 
high importance on faithfulness. russians, along with Portuguese, likewise 
place comparatively lower importance on respect and appreciation, un-
derstanding and tolerance, and a happy sexual relationship. At the same 
time, 95% of the Dutch report respect and appreciation as very important, 
87% of Swedes place high importance on understanding and tolerance, and 
77% of Mexicans say that a happy sexual relationship is very important. 
Of particular interest in this chapter, lesser importance is placed on sharing 
household chores, but there is also substantial variation across countries. 
Only 10% of Japanese say that sharing household tasks is very important 
to a successful marriage. In Poland, 55% report that sharing housework is 
very important.
These five indicators—faithfulness, respect and appreciation, understand-
ing and tolerance, satisfying sexual relationship, and need to share house-
work—together comprise the measure of the extent to which marriage is 
ta b l e  9 . 2




Mexico Hungary United States
United States Mexico Sweden
Brazil russia Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland Poland Belgium
Poland Slovakia Poland
Japan Brazil Norway
Spain Czech republic Mexico






Great Britain Slovenia Slovenia
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Hungary Switzerland Spain





Czech republic Netherlands russia
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defined as preferably intimacy-based within the country. As outlined earlier, 
Giddens (1992) predicts that marriage emphasizing intimacy should lead to 
a less traditional division of labor between partners. This idea is tested in the 
next section of this chapter.
intimacy-based marriage institutions 
and the division of household labor
Within countries where marriage tends to be defined as intimacy centered, 
are women less likely to do the housework and men likely to do more? We 
enter this section with some support already for this argument. In the gen-
eral cross-national patterns of beliefs about important qualities for marriage, 
sharing of household chores correlates with other measures of intimacy. As 
Giddens (1992) predicts, intimacy in marriage is associated with valuing 
more equal and flexible roles in the relationship. But is intimacy-based mar-
riage also associated with actual behaviors related to housework—in par-
ticular, a less traditional division of tasks?
ta b l e  9 . 3










Chile 92 96 90 74 62
United States 94 92 83 71 47
Sweden 89 94 87 60 52
Northern Ireland 94 84 82 67 47
Belgium 89 91 83 67 42
Poland 87 88 78 66 55
Norway 91 93 84 62 34
Mexico 81 88 82 77 47
Great Britain 90 81 81 65 50
Hungary 85 87 80 70 41
Netherlands 87 95 87 51 33
Switzerland 81 90 86 68 33
France 80 89 79 73 40
Austria 86 89 84 64 30
Slovenia 81 89 83 64 36
Denmark 84 85 79 56 41
Slovakia 81 81 79 59 31
Spain 80 79 76 60 36
Czech republic 73 87 86 56 24
Germany 85 81 81 48 20
Finland 82 86 69 52 29
Brazil 76 73 70 72 37
Latvia 78 75 66 53 26
russia 72 68 62 50 28
Japan 73 74 77 28 10
Portugal 74 66 59 41 23
aPercent of respondents reporting a quality is very important for success in marriage.
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In this part of the analysis, I combine the country-level measure of inti-
macy-based marriage with individual-level data on the division of housework 
and the characteristics of partners in intimate relationships. The goal is to 
test whether couples are less likely to divide the housework along traditional 
gender roles within countries where the institution of marriage is intimacy 
based. The analysis consists of two steps. First, the individual characteristics 
of partners are used to explain the division of housework. Then, controlling 
for these individual-level characteristics, I examine whether the division of 
labor between partners becomes less traditional across countries as greater 
emphasis is placed on intimacy in marriage in the culture overall.
The individual-level data are from the 2002 International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP) Family and Changing Gender roles module. The ISSP 
consists of cross-nationally comparative surveys. Data on individual-level 
variables and the macrolevel intimacy measure are available for 27 country 
contexts: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Czech republic, Denmark, France, 
Finland, Germany (East and West), Great Britain, Hungary, Japan, Latvia, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, northern Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, rus-
sia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.5 
Only married couples are included in the analysis, for a total of 17,647 re-
spondents across these countries.
In the ISSP, the division of housework tasks between spouses is measured 
using the following question: In your household, who does the following?
A. Does the laundry
B. Cares for sick family members
C. Shops for groceries
D. Does the household cleaning
E. Prepares the meals
The responses, recoded to reflect the gender of the partner, include
1. Always the man
2. Usually the man
3. About equal/both together
4. Usually the woman
5. Always the woman
The answers to the questions were summed and the mean score of given 
responses was used as the household score for each respondent. The scores 
range from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating that the man does all the housework 
and 5 indicating that the woman does all the housework.
This task-based measure of women’s and men’s involvement in tradi-
tional female tasks is used instead of a relative hours of housework measure 
because Giddens’ argument focuses on gender negotiation and flexibility in 
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tasks, which is best indicated by men’s involvement in traditionally women’s 
tasks rather than their overall housework hours.
Across the 27 countries, the average division of housework score is 3.98, 
indicating that women do more of the housework than men. There is signifi-
cant variation across countries. Housework allocation is most traditional in 
Japan where the average score is 4.3, approaching women always doing all 
the tasks all the time. Housework is most equal in Sweden, Finland, and the 
United States, where average scores are 3.7. It is important to note, however, 
that even where housework is comparatively equal, women do most of the 
housework. A score of three would indicate equality on housework tasks, 
and no country in the study approaches that level of equality. And in no 
country do men do more of the housework tasks than women.
The first line of Table 9.4 shows the average division of housework across 
countries, controlling for individual- and country-level characteristics. The 
next six lines of Table 9.4 show the characteristics of individuals that are 
associated with more or less traditionalism in the division of housework. A 
positive sign indicates that if a characteristic is present or has a higher value, 
women do more of the housework relative to men. A negative sign means a 
less traditional division of housework or the more housework men do.
As shown in Table 9.4, the results are consistent with the research litera-
ture on the division of household labor (Fuwa 2004; Nomaguchi and Milkie 
2003; Geist, Chapter 11, this volume). The older a person is, the more tra-
ditional the division of labor. Women are more likely than men to report 
gender inequality in housework. As Claudia Geist emphasizes in Chapter 
ta b l e  9 . 4
Model testing the relationship between individual characteristics 
and country-level measures of intimacy-based marriage 
on the division of housework
Variable Division of Household Labor
Average division of housework 3.77
Individual characteristics
 Age +
 Is a woman +
 Woman makes more than man –
 Has a university degree –
 Has children at home +
 Believes women should work for pay –
Country characteristic
 Institution of marriage based on intimacy –
(+) indicates that if a characteristic is present or has a higher value, women do more of 
the housework relative to men. (–) means a less traditional division of housework or the 
more housework men do.
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11, men report that they do more of the housework than women report men 
doing. When women earn more than their male partners, they do less of the 
housework and men do more. People with university degrees report a less 
gendered division of labor than those with less schooling. When children are 
present in the household, women do more of the housework. When people 
believe that women should work outside of the home for pay, the division of 
housework is less traditionally divided between women and men.
In the final stage of the analysis, I add the country-level measure for an 
intimacy-based institution of marriage. I use hierarchical linear modeling, 
which makes it possible to examine whether the division of housework is 
less traditional in those countries where marriage is defined as intimacy 
based, controlling for the individual characteristics that explain the division 
of housework (Hox 1995).
As shown in the last line of Table 9.4, the average score on the division of 
housework measure is lower in countries where it is generally believed that 
marriages are best based on understanding, respect, support, and equal ex-
change.6 In other words, the housework is less traditional and more equally 
shared when the marriage is institutionalized as intimacy based. This sup-
ports Giddens’ (1992) hypotheses about pure relationships. When the insti-
tution of marriage shifts to focus on intimacy, it is likely that relationships 
will be more democratic, characterized by negotiation of arrangements be-
tween partners through open exchange and discussion rather than set roles 
imposed on the relationship by external norms and practices.
Jamieson (1997), however, is also correct. An increased institutional-
ization of intimacy-based marriage seems to make the division of house-
work less gendered and more equal, yet far from ungendered and equal. As 
noted before, in all countries women, on average, do more the housework 
than men. Institutionalized norms and expectations of intimacy decrease 
inequality by 0.06 on the housework measure for each 1-unit increase on 
the intimacy measure, on which there are 4 units across the countries. As Ja-
mieson (1997) notes, gender inequality in the division of labor is rigid, per-
sisting over time and place, regardless of cultural and demographic changes 
(Brines 1994).
discussion of intimacy-based marriage
So what should we conclude about the trend toward intimacy-based mar-
riage? Some people view this cultural trend as weakening the institution 
of marriage characteristic of an individualistic culture concerned primarily 
with personal and immediate gratification (Amato 2004). Others see these 
changes as an improvement in the institution of marriage. Intimacy-based 
marriage can be interpreted as freedom from the structural and patriar-
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chal constraints of institutional or companionate marriage (Amato 2004). 
Changes in marriage have always raised concern and debate (Smock 2004). 
As Giddens (1992) notes, there are undoubtedly simultaneous benefits and 
costs to pure relationships, and the consequences of intimacy-based mar-
riage are complicated. In this conclusion, I consider some of the ideas raised 
in the debates around these recent changes in the institution of marriage.
In many cultures, social networks are weakening, and we have less con-
tact with neighbors and friends (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Brashears 
2006; Putnam 2000). Intimate relationships in some places have become 
the primary and often only source of emotional and social support. Indeed, 
it has been argued that marriage, when defined and practiced as intimacy 
based, actually reinforces this situation. Marital relationships now take peo-
ple away from other social ties, weakening community with other relatives, 
neighbors, and friends (Gerstel and Sarakisian 2006). As a result, the quality 
and quantity of social ties vary by marital status, with never-married and 
divorced people reporting less integration and support (Acock and Hurlbert 
1993; Umberson et al. 1996).
In this new context, a marital work ethic has developed (Hackstaff 
1999). Marriage is defined as not as a given, permanent relationship but 
something to work on continually and improve. This is apparent in the 
growing culture of marital therapy, filled with media advice on improving 
the love and interaction in marriage. Some have argued that this approach 
to marriage has created an idealized image of marriage that is unattainable 
(Gillis 2004). The efforts can and do fail, and as a result, we see more people 
ending relationships and ending them sooner than before. But the institution 
itself is not obsolete. The majority of people still couple and marry at some 
point in their lives. In this new context, individual relationships are sup-
posed to dissolve when they are not meeting the needs that the relationship 
is supposed to meet (Giddens 1992).
The institution is also changing so that the needs of both partners are 
being met more equally. Part of this process lies in the patterns in house-
work. It has been argued that men traditionally received more emotional, as 
well as health and economic, benefits from marriage, with married women 
experiencing more distress and depression than married men (Bernard 1972; 
D’Arcy and Siddique 1985; Mugford and Lally 1981; Schumm et al. 1985; 
Waite and Gallagher 2000). These discrepancies are at least associated in 
part with traditional inequalities in the division of housework and the ex-
ternal imposition of roles based on gender (Freidan 1963). Gender gaps in 
emotional benefits, for example, should decrease when housework is shared, 
because women’s happiness increases as men do more of the housework, 
whereas men lose some of their satisfaction as they do more (Amato et al. 
2003). The increased sharing of housework in intimacy-based marriage, as 
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highlighted in the following news story, should thus lead to more equal shar-
ing in the benefits of marriage.
The Miel family had fish last night—prepared by Marciano Miel, and on 
the table by the time his wife got home from work. The 36-year-old avionics 
technician was up before dawn yesterday for his eight-hour shift at Bombar-
dier Inc. At 3:30 p.m., he picked up his son, Quin, from daycare, shopped 
for groceries and then performed the nightly miracle that was previously the 
preserve of mothers: cooking dinner with a hungry, active 20-month-old un-
derfoot. (Galt 2006, p. B1)
As the institution of marriage changes over time and across cultures, the de-
bates and discussions regarding the consequences will undoubtedly continue, 
inspiring newspaper headlines of concern and surprise. If the institution of 
marriage becomes increasingly intimacy based, however, what currently is 
quite newsworthy, like the previous story of a man doing the unpaid work 
in the family, might well become a mundane pattern of everyday life.
notes
1. The data come from the 1999–2000 wave for 20 of the countries. Seven 
countries were not included in this wave and so data from the 1990 wave were 
used. When data were available for both waves, results were usually quite consis-
tent over time.
2. Some responses were excluded because of missing data or lack of fit with 
other indicators. These include willing to discuss problems, spending time to-
gether, talking a lot, same ethnic background, and living apart from in-laws. A 
measure of intimacy was created—adding the items willing to discuss problems, 
spending time together, and talking a lot—for the countries where data were 
available. It is nearly perfectly correlated (r = 0.97) with the measure of intimacy 
used here.
3. results are based on principal components analysis. Confirmatory analy-
sis reveals three factors with eigenvalues more than 1. Loadings of the items on 
the factors range from 0.68 to 0.94. Cronbach alphas on the three scales range 
from 0.84 to 0.89.
4. Some readers may wonder whether a relative importance measure for each 
dimension is more appropriate. The questions in the European Values Survey/
World Values Survey do not ask respondents to rank “importance” and so they 
are not necessarily doing so. Furthermore, as shown in the results, high impor-
tance might be placed on all three areas in some countries. Theoretically, the con-
cern of this chapter is with the importance of intimacy, regardless of how impor-
tant resources and homogamy also are. Empirically, the components developed 
with the relative measures are less clear. The factor analysis with the original 
absolute indicators results in high loadings with three clear dimensions.
5. Germany is combined for the country-level measures, but East and West 
Germany are separate for individual-level data in the multilevel model.
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6. The analysis was also run with a version of the intimacy measure that 
does not include the sharing of housework item to be sure that the effect was not 
primarily attributable to attitudes toward sharing the housework. The two ver-
sions of the measure are highly correlated (r = 0.98) and result in similar findings. 
The results presented here use the measure based on the five indicators including 
the sharing of housework. The model was also run with the United Nations Gen-
der Empowerment Measure and divorce rates on the country level. The effects of 
intimacy-based marriage did not change.
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This chapter considers a puzzling discrepancy in two macrolevel findings 
from the research on housework in Germany. On the one hand, there has 
been high stability in traditional patterns of the division of household labor 
between German women and men, as numerous studies show (Bundesmi-
nisterium 2003; Künzler et al. 2001). On the other hand, there is substantial 
evidence that individual gender ideologies and gender relations have been 
changing. A growing number of women and men have modernized attitudes 
toward maternal employment (Adler and Brayfield 2006) and the sharing of 
housework (Künzler 1999). To understand this contradiction between liber-
alizing gender attitudes and persistently traditional behaviors, this chapter 
draws on social psychological theory and qualitative interviews with mar-
ried and cohabiting couples to study the microlevel processes that support 
or discourage the renegotiation of housework arrangements. We address 
the following questions: How can the discrepancy between attitudes and 
behavior be explained? What can we learn about it from a comparison be-
tween East and West Germany, where different norms pertaining to gender 
roles and gender relations were apparent (Braun, Scott, and Alwin 1994; 
Trappe 1995; Treas and Widmer 2000) and still are (Künzler 1999; Scheller 
2004)?
Explanations developed in the past do not match the empirical find-
ings described. According to one approach advanced by prominent femi-
nist authors (Beck-Gernsheim 1992; Hochschild 1989), the reason for the 
very slow change in the division of housework is that there is a “cultural 
lag” between modernized economic realities (namely, women’s growing la-
bor force participation) and the persistence of traditional gender ideologies. 
This explanation contradicts the empirical evidence of changing ideologies. 
A second explanation cannot hold either, although it at least acknowledges 
the change in individual attitudes. This change of individual attitudes, so the 
line of the argument goes, does not result in a change of behavior, because 
latent gender norms undermine the intellectual agreement over equal shar-
c h a p t e r  t e n
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ing of household matters (Koppetsch and Burkart 1999). This explanation is 
not satisfactory, because it does not answer the question of how traditional 
gender norms can override new attitudes.
The stability of the labor division between heterosexual partners is 
especially puzzling if one agrees that individualization—as a process free-
ing individuals from traditional institutions and reintegrating them in new 
ones—has advanced, particularly during the past decades (Beck 1992; Lest-
haeghe and Sirkyn 1988). Like Yodanis notes in Chapter 9, we observe that 
new attitudes of partners have contributed to a quantitative and qualitative 
change in the prevalence and meaning of marriage (Meyer 2006; Nave-Herz 
2002). This is at least true for West Germany. The East German situation is 
more ambiguous for two reasons: (1) the economic independence of partners 
during the German Democratic republic (GDr) era partly changed tradi-
tional gender ideologies, and (2) the rapid economic and cultural change af-
ter 1990 discredited explanations that assume a certain mutual dependency 
between normative and economic factors in society. Since the 1960s, the 
prevalence of marriage has declined and the number of unmarried couples 
has increased (Nazio and Blossfeld 2003). Since the 1970s, fertility rates 
have been low (Conrad, Lechner, and Werner 1996). rates of illegitimate 
births are steadily rising. There are increasing numbers of succession unions 
that give rise to step-parent relationships. Furthermore, pair relationships 
have been established in which partners consistently maintain two separate 
households. Despite these changes in couples’ relationships, the division of 
housework, a core activity within couples, seems hardly affected by these 
developments. This puzzle suggests the need to examine individual coping 
with housework and the housework-related interaction processes between 
the partners to gain a better understanding of the microlevel process that 
links the attitudes and behavior of partners. Our aim is to explain the stabil-
ity of the labor division in pair relationships and to explore the possibilities 
for initiating long-term change in housework patterns.
After describing housework as the interaction of individual behavioral 
strategies, this chapter introduces a typology developed from qualitative 
data. The typology integrates the three different pair integration modes in 
modern relationships and their corresponding housework-related behav-
ior. The differences in the three types between East and West Germany are 
emphasized. In the end we will face another paradox. We can show that 
traditional couples in the East are, on a pragmatic basis, more egalitarian 
in behavior, as we would expect on the basis of the relatively traditional 
gender ideologies that they endorse. These findings suggest that change in 
housework patterns is more complex than described in research to date. 
Cross-national and comparative research can help to explain the trajectories 
of change in housework patterns.
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housework as interaction of 
individual coping strategies
If we investigate housework in Germany from a comparative perspective, 
we have to reflect on the persisting differences in family cultures between the 
eastern and western part of the country that developed during the more than 
40 years of separation for both regions. There are more unmarried couples 
in East Germany, and far more children are born in a nonmarital union—
about 50% compared with 26% in the West (Meyer 2006, p. 341). In East 
Germany there are many more employed full-time women with children 
(Engstler 2001). The “child-related marriage” (Nave-Herz 2002)—meaning 
the coincidence of birth of first child, marriage, and women cutting back on 
employed work—is a social phenomenon in the West, but not in the eastern 
part of Germany (Huinink and reichart 2008; Klaus and Steinbach 2002). 
According to our own analyses, the probability of a nontraditional division 
of household labor in different kinds of living arrangements differs between 
East and West Germany: In East Germany, this depends on the institution-
alization of the relationship (married or not) whereas in West Germany it 
depends on whether there are children within the household (Huinink and 
röhler 2005, p. 136). This means not only that a majority of East Germans 
rejects marriage as an institution in which to bring up children, but also that 
marriage is the living arrangement that divides persons who implement a 
traditional labor division from persons who do not. West Germans usually 
marry if they have children, but even if couples with children stay unmar-
ried, they establish traditional housework arrangements (see also Gupta 
1999).
In the search for more satisfying explanations of the dynamics of the 
household labor division in pair relationships, it seems useful to look in 
closer detail at the microlevel housework-related pair interaction. The struc-
tural, cultural, and institutional differences between East and West Germany 
call for a new theoretical framework for investigating change in housework 
patterns. This framework must refer to housework as a result of individ-
ual action and interaction between the partners, and it must recognize the 
changing affective basis of modern pair relationships (Giddens 1992; Luh-
mann 1986). By emphasizing adaptive coping, this chapter demonstrates 
why the housework arrangements of individual couples persist or change 
against a backdrop of societal institutions.
The basis of our theoretical model of housework-related coping behavior 
is widely used social psychological theories on coping with stress (Lazarus 
and Folkman 1984) and on adaptive control behavior (Heckhausen and 
Schulz 1998; Hoff and Lempert 1990; rotter 1966), as well as social con-
structivist theories on emotion management and the use of gender-typical 
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strategies (Hochschild 1983, 1990). Our approach reflects the behavioral, 
the cognitive, and the emotional aspects of individuals’ dealings with house-
work. Our assumptions are as follows:
The particular division of housework that has been established within 
a relationship is perceived and evaluated by the actor according to his or 
her expectations. Stress occurs if the expectations concerning the labor divi-
sion between the partners are not met. Then, negative emotions occur that 
have to be managed. That is, strategies of developmental control are used 
to diminish the cognitive and emotional dissonance between the real house-
work situation and the ideals related to the person’s self-concept that de-
termine personal expectations. The self-concept of a person contains ideals 
like being an orderly person, being a cooperative partner, being competent 
in certain household tasks, or being especially interested in some of them 
or not.
Emotion management is necessary in both primary and secondary con-
trol strategies or ways of coping. A strategy of primary control is seen in 
an action undertaken to change the division of housework according to 
individual expectations. A strategy of secondary control is used if a cogni-
tive restructuring takes place to adapt to the circumstances, and the expec-
tations are accommodated to the existing division of housework (Heck-
hausen and Schulz 1998). In the first case of taking action, emotion work 
is used to prepare for a certain action to alter the domestic arrangements; 
for example, feelings of love may be suppressed to be able to engage in 
an argument with the partner. In the second case of adaptation, emotion 
management helps to adapt one’s own perception to the contents of the self-
concept and the situation; for example, anger about the partner’s limited 
participation in housework may be suppressed, and positive feelings about 
his engagement in other spheres of the relationship may be highlighted (see 
röhler 2006a, pp. 114–143). A key point here is that changing housework 
arrangements or persevering with unsatisfactory ones both place demands 
on individuals.
Individuals use these different coping strategies with housework, and 
they are guided by certain mechanisms that are part of their self-concepts, 
as will be explained later in this chapter. The individual coping behaviors 
of the partners interact with each other and lead to an outcome at the pair 
level—namely, stability or change in the labor division within the house-
hold. With this concept, we provide a model for answering the questions of 
why an unsatisfactory traditional division of housework persists unchanged 
through individual action and of how the emotional, cognitive, and struc-
tural aspects work together in this process. In particular, we will investigate 
whether East and West Germans, given their different contexts, pursue the 
same strategies.
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love in pair relationships
Modern love is an emotion based on a complex cultural program, as Yo-
danis describes in her discussion of marriage in Chapter 9. In very general 
terms, love can be described as the longing to live one’s life in the bodily 
zone of another person (Dux 1994). With this general definition as back-
ground, three important dimensions can be distinguished (compare Huinink 
and röhler 2005, 23 ff.).
First, love is an emotion that calls for physical closeness and sexual 
interaction. It generates a deep emotional bond that aims at acknowledging 
all aspects of the other’s personality. As an emotion, love frames rational 
behavior because of the exclusive relevance of the loved partner. Even short-
term irrationality can be perceived as long-term rational, because it facili-
tates costly decisions and investments yielding beneficial consequences only 
in the long run—for example, in the decision to raise children (Frank 1988). 
Second, love is a symbolic code of communication (Luhmann 1986) that al-
lows expressing, generating, simulating, and rejecting emotions. This is the 
cultural norm of romantic love that demands openness and authenticity in 
the interaction of the partners. Third, love can be understood as a resource 
for identity construction. It gives the loved person unconditional and au-
thentic recognition that is essential for personal integration. Love is a special 
form of social capital. Love can only be used as resource if both partners 
love each other. This is because of the extremely particularistic character of 
love (Foa and Foa 1980): Only if both partners appreciate each others’ love 
can each feel acknowledged as a “whole person” and realize intimacy, the 
concurrence of souls (Giddens 1992). Self-affirmation, therefore, can only 
be accomplished if the partner is fully acknowledged, too, because only then 
can the signs of love passed on by the partner be used for identity construc-
tion (Honneth 1995).
Giddens (1992) describes the transformation of romantic love into pure 
love. romantic love stands for the traditional “bourgeois” marriage and 
pure love equals exchange-oriented egalitarian unions. This definition of 
love seems too narrow because it applies only to certain types of relation-
ships that we call affectual–traditional and affectual–associative (described 
later). Instead, all kinds of modern relationships rely on modern romantic 
love as we defined it. Giddens (1992) points out, and we follow him with 
this, that modern love not only makes people exclusively orientate toward 
another person, but it also lets them map out a mutual future that allows the 
affirmation of the self. This modern love is essential for all kinds of pair rela-
tionships nowadays. We assume that even in conflicting relationships, there 
must be at least remnants of this kind of love, because such a relationship 
could not be stabilized over time only through habitation, companionship, 
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and so forth. Identity construction supplied by love has become a central 
reason why partners enter and stay in modern pair relationships.
Before elaborating the model with material from our study, we briefly 
introduce the empirical data on which our analyses rely.
data and sample construction
We apply the problem-centered interview (Witzel 1995), a method of data 
collection that has gained some prominence in qualitative research in Ger-
many. Focusing on a single topic, we generated narratives that allowed the 
reconstruction of housework-related coping episodes. This interview method 
was combined with a standardized questionnaire that included scales for 
measuring sociopsychological factors in the coping model (e.g., gender ide-
ologies, locus of control, control strategies, self-esteem, pertinacity, and 
flexibility) and dimensions of the partnership presumed to influence the 
perception and dynamics of housework issues (quality of the relationship, 
satisfaction with it, exchange orientation, and communal orientation).
The sample includes 64 heterosexual couples (or 128 interviewed per-
sons) in different living arrangements (married or unmarried, with or with-
out children, socialized in East Germany [former GDr] or West Germany 
[old Federal republic of Germany (FrG)]). For an overview, see Table 
10.1. The underlying assumption of this sample construction was that dif-
ferences in housework-related coping behavior could be identified with re-
spect to these characteristics. Analysis of these data validated a typology of 
pair interaction over the division of housework that is outlined in the next 
paragraph.
general types of housework-
related pair interaction
The interpretation of the interview material started from a complex theoreti-
cal framework that differentiates between three types of housework-related 
coping behavior. In opposition to the mainstream of research on housework, 
one that focuses on the volume and share of work done within the house-
hold and neglects the impact of the specific type of interaction in intimate 
relationships, these three “ideal types” (Idealtypen after Weber [1978]) take 
into consideration the interplay of love and household activities. We ap-
plied here a typology of social relations that was established by Max Weber 
(1978, pp. 40–43), who distinguished between associations (Vergesellschaf-
tung) based on rational reasons (means–ends calculations) and communal 
relationships (Vergemeinschaftung) based on emotional bonds (affectual 
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The main assumption of the classification presented here is that all con-
temporary partner relationships are based on the modern code of romantic 
love as described earlier; that is why the partners’ feeling that they belong 
together can be described as founded on an affectual reason in the Weberian 
sense. Because they are love based, all kinds of contemporary pair rela-
tionships can be considered as affectual communal relationships (affektuelle 
Vergemeinschaftung [Weber 1978, p. 40]). This assumption is not a banal 
one. Although the importance of love for modern relationships is widely 
acknowledged (Giddens 1992; Hahn and Burkart 1998, 2000), the interplay 
of romantic love and housework-related interaction has not been systemati-
cally considered in research to date.
Although all pair relationships in the western world are based on the 
same type of love, there are differences in the ways of dealing with the 
housework issue and, dependent on that, in how work and love interrelate. 
Weber’s terminology is used here not only to classify modern pair relation-
ships as affectual communal ones (in short, affectual relationships), but also 
to differentiate the housework aspect and grasp the interrelation of love and 
work. For categorizing the housework aspect, we use Weber’s differentiation 
between communal relationships based on traditional norms and associa-
tions based on exchange orientation (Interessenausgleich), and based on as-
sociation of preferences (Interessenverbindung).
Thus, three possible ways of interrelating love and housework can be 
distinguished. A distinction can be made between affectual–traditional re-
lationships (affektuell–traditionell), in which traditional gender roles domi-
nate the housework-related behavior; and affectual–associative relation-
ships (affektuell–vergesellschaftet), in which individualized partners deny 
the relevance of strict gender roles and want to share housework equally. 
Yet another relationship type can be called affectual–pragmatic (affektuell–
pragmatisch). Each person tries to organize the household according to his 
or her own personal preferences, which means that justice or equality is 
not a primary aim of the partners. The latter type is especially interesting, 
because individualization is not linked to the pursuit of equality, but rather 
to the free pursuit of individual preferences. The affectual–pragmatic rela-
tionship is a case that has not been considered previously in the research 
on traditional versus egalitarian couples. The three types, which were all 
represented in the data, can be described in more detail.
As one variant of the interrelation between pair integration and house-
work-related interaction, the affectual–pragmatic type opens new perspec-
tives on the future of housework. Individuals in these relationships are highly 
individualized. Housework organized according to each partner’s prefer-
ences fits their individualistic practices of self-realization. For the integration 
of the relationship, the sharing of work between the partners is unimportant 
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as long as both can follow personal preferences, even if this entails large 
inequality of workloads. The mode of integration is not justice, but rather 
the acknowledgment of the partner’s self with all his or her idiosyncrasies, 
including attitudes toward housework. There is no reason to negotiate over 
fairness. Instead, it is important to acknowledge all facets of the other part-
ner’s self that are important to that person. The relationship concept of these 
partners is an association of two autonomous people who give each other 
sufficient freedom to pursue self-realization.
With this type of relationship, the partner who has the least interest in 
household activities has an advantage, because this person can wait until 
the other one gets active and, thus, profit from the partner’s greater interest 
in domesticity. This is because most products of housework—like a clean 
kitchen or a tidied up living room—are public goods within the relationship 
(Huinink and röhler 2005, p. 17). The partner cannot easily be excluded 
from enjoying them. This mechanism supports, even in this individualized 
context, a traditional division of household labor. As a result of gender so-
cialization, women have higher standards for and derive greater satisfaction 
from housework (Allen and Hawkins 1999; DeVault 1991; Hawkins, Mar-
shall, and Meiners 1995). Thus, they have a greater interest in household 
labor and its outcomes.
Gender differences in standards and interests are one reason for the 
persistence of the traditional division of household labor. They offer a more 
convincing explanation of the prevalence of the traditional labor division 
even in egalitarian unions than the concept of “latent gender roles” (Kop-
petsch and Burkart 1999), because they reflect seriously the empirical evi-
dence of fading gender roles. Because the prevalence of traditional gender 
ideologies has declined in all western countries (Künzler 1999), it is not con-
vincing that they should, nonetheless, be latent operant. Instead, our study 
shows that mechanisms like lower or higher interests in certain household 
activities lead to traditional arrangements despite the modernized attitudes 
and behavioral strategies of the partners.
The partners in the second type of pair relationship, the affectual–as-
sociative, are individualized, too. However, they are also exchange oriented 
and understand their relationship as a balance of give and take. They nego-
tiate about the just share of the work to be done and its payoffs. If they do 
not come to an agreement, this might give them cause to separate, because 
the affective part of the relation is quite strongly connected with the in-
strumental part. Even if both partners agree on how to share equally, they 
often fail for different reasons in daily life. This is relevant for the coping 
behavior of the partners. Individuals use secondary strategies of control to 
reconcile the egalitarian ideals from their self-concepts with their unequal 
practice of housework. According to our data, some partners achieve this by 
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devaluating household labor as unimportant to the equality theme in their 
relationship. Others create myths of equality that ignore the facts (for a good 
example of such a myth see Hochschild [1990]).
The principle of least interest is relevant in affectual–associative relation-
ships, too, even though the connection is not as strong as in the affectual–
pragmatic type of relationship, because the individual interests are bound 
by equality norms. However, differences of interest in certain household 
tasks can easily lead to conflict because partners are exchange orientated 
and therefore refuse to invest more in housework than the partner. This rela-
tionship type is highly affected by the birth of children (Huinink and röhler 
2005), which leads to a considerable shift to a more traditional division of 
household labor. Then, these unions have to undertake even greater effort to 
hide inequality through myths of equal sharing or to disconnect housework 
and equality issues in their self-concepts.
The affectual–traditional type involves relationships in which partners 
act according to overtly held gender roles. Here the interaction of partners’ 
strategies stabilizes traditional housework arrangements. We can describe 
two subtypes that were clearly distinguished in our data. One is to be found 
in middle-class couples where housework is part of the “affectual” romantic 
love arrangement, and, thus, the man’s (symbolic) involvement in house-
work is taken as a sign of love (Gager 1998). In these couples, the household 
and household labor is an important aspect of the pair’s affectual communal 
integration (Vergemeinschaftung). The husband has to show his concern 
about household tasks, responsibilities that include not only fulfilling his 
traditional gender role duties but also “helping” his wife readily with her 
tasks if she asks. The maintenance of a comfortable home is a shared goal 
for the partners, and contributing to it is the best way to show one’s love to 
the partner. In this relationship type, love and housework go hand in hand. 
By contrast, the second affectual–traditional subtype is represented by the 
working-class family where spheres are strictly separated by gender; the man 
is the breadwinner and the woman is the homemaker. In this subtype, the 
household is only a context for adequate gender role display, and, therefore, 
there is no linkage between housework and emotions of romantic love.
a new need for restructuring and 
structuring mechanisms
The existence and the characteristics of the three types prove that the decline 
of gendered social role demands does not automatically lead to equality 
in the division of household labor as hoped by feminist researchers in the 
1970s and later. Instead of a linear development toward greater equality, a 
more complex conclusion can be drawn: The implementation of modern 
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relationship codes results in a new need for restructuring in pair relation-
ships, because old role structures have been disappearing and new ones are 
not yet in place. Equal sharing of housework is only one possible outcome, 
but for different reasons, it is the most demanding possibility for a new 
housework structure. To make this argument more plausible, we discuss 
structuring mechanisms that are part of the person’s self-concept and guide 
housework-related coping strategies. The interactions of the strategies, 
used by each partner, result in specific patterns of labor division within the 
household.
Several mechanisms represented in our data work together in meeting 
the need for structuring in pair relationships, and they lead to different re-
sults (röhler 2006a, pp. 284 ff.):
1. First are gender ideologies—specifically, normative models about what 
men and women are supposed to do or not to do. Gender ideologies can con-
tain traditional role models, role change models, or egalitarian models. The 
egalitarian ones face grave problems in implementation, as several studies have 
shown (Huinink and röhler 2005; Koppetsch and Burkart 1999).
2. Competencies of the partners are another possible criterion for decid-
ing how to divide housework. Because human capital and competencies differ 
between partners, an efficient division of labor could be established based on 
these differences (Becker 1991). A competence-focused labor division, how-
ever, still leaves work for which neither partner is competent. This remainder 
could be given to the partner who is less reluctant to do it, could be shared 
equally, or could be substituted with purchases of personal services and mar-
ket goods.
3. Another strategy is to take the preferences of the partners into account. 
Each partner only carries out tasks that he or she likes or at least does not 
mind doing. Again, the similar problem arises of how to share the activities 
both partners dislike.
4. As an alternative, the lesser interest of one partner—a result of lower 
standards for order and cleanliness or a lower value placed on housework—
can be a basis for the decision about dividing the household labor. A low or 
high interest in housework is not necessarily dependent on the self-concept 
of the individual, but can also be a result of instrumental interests in certain 
household goods. In one case in our sample, for example, the man’s working 
place was the common household of the partners. Because he was there all day 
and had to organize his work tasks efficiently, he was strongly interested in 
high standards of order. This strong interest was strictly the result of his work-
ing situation and was not a part of his self-concept. He denied being a very 
orderly person. The partner with lower interest can profit from the housework 
done by the more strongly interested partner, and the more this partner pre-
tends to be disinterested in this household public good, the greater the part-
ner’s profit. If the lower interest is authentic, however, there is no profit at all 
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for this partner. To make demands for equal sharing of work could be seen as 
unfair to the less interested partner.
5. An additional mechanism works as a result of the transaction costs as-
sociated with changing the housework division in a couple. These costs can 
be considerable and are widely neglected in the research on housework so 
far. New skills and motivations must be learned. Time-consuming discussions 
about standards, evaluations, and fairness have to be undertaken. To avoid 
forgetting the new arrangements, daily routines and habits have to be changed 
(Kaufmann 1999).
6. Last, “doing gender” strategies may be used by the individuals to sta-
bilize their self-concept as man or woman (West and Zimmerman 1987). If 
masculine and feminine identities are related to housework, they tend to sta-
bilize traditional patterns of housework, because domestic interactions offer 
images and behavioral routines for being a “real man” or “real woman” in 
the realm of the home. Less often, female or male identity can be constructed 
through nontraditional behavior, if modernized self-concepts are held by the 
individuals.
These six structuring mechanisms—gender ideologies, competences, 
preferences, interests, transaction costs, and identity construction—inter-
play in a complex way in each relationship in the process of establishing 
and changing a certain labor division within the household. They play dif-
ferent roles in the three relationship types. Based on the empirical findings 
of our analyses, we may describe the interaction between love as the basis of 
relationships and the housework-related coping behavior using the structur-
ing mechanisms (röhler 2006a, pp. 287 ff.). Our account stresses the most 
important mechanisms for each relationship type, so not every mechanism 
is discussed for every type. Furthermore, for systematic reasons, we consider 
relationships in which both partners hold the same attitudes and therefore 
rely on similar mechanisms. This is based on the reasoning that partners 
who share attitudes are the ones who enter relationships in most cases.
In affectual–pragmatic relationships, the modern code of romantic 
love is fully developed and applies to all areas of the relationship, including 
housework. This code includes giving highest priority to the loved person, 
acknowledging the loved one as a unique individual, and communicating in 
an authentic style (Huinink and röhler 2005, pp. 19–32). The development 
of the selves of the partners and the pursuit of their common interests are in 
the foreground. Individual preferences are, therefore, the main guidelines for 
the relationship, and this is true for the division of housework, too. Compe-
tencies play a certain role, but only if they correspond with liking the activity 
in which one is competent. The principle of least interest is in place, but it 
does not lead to conflict, because not being interested in a certain household 
task is a preference that has to be respected and is not a matter for discussion 
204 The Cultural Influences on Housework
in the understanding of both partners. Even if the division of household 
labor is very unequal between the partners, no stress and related coping be-
havior will occur as long as this inequality is consistent with the preferences 
of the partners. In our data, one woman acknowledged the effort her partner 
put into housework, because she knew that it was a meaningful activity for 
him whereas she considered it a waste of time for herself. She recognized 
his preference for household labor, although she had different preferences. 
This example shows that the basis of an affectual–pragmatic relationship 
is the acknowledgment of each other’s preferences to value the partner as a 
unique personality.
Because partners in affectual–associative pair relationships have mod-
ernized gender ideologies, their behavior is guided by gender norms of equal-
ity. In heterosexual relationships, housework shared between a man and a 
woman becomes a cardinal policy issue as a field of fairness between the 
genders. That is why discrepancies in certain areas of housework have a high 
potential for conflict in these relationship. Strategies to resolve or at least to 
avoid conflicts include substituting personal services and market goods for 
the partners’ housework and sharing the rest on 50/50 terms. The principle 
of least interest is also important in affectual–associative relationships. Dif-
fering interests between the partners can be a source of conflict, because a 
fair division can only be negotiated if there is agreement on standards, and 
the overall amount of housework is consensual. In our data, some couples 
find housework too bothersome (i.e., the transaction cost too high and the 
emotional work too onerous) to fight over, but tend to establish a traditional 
labor division even though they acknowledge the irony of their situation. 
Their shared irony is a means for the partners to reassure each other that the 
ideal of gender equity is not being given up, but only postponed because of 
the difficulties of realizing this ideal in daily life. In our data, both partners 
in one couple were completely aware that his doing the bicycle repairs for 
her was traditional behavior and not in line with their egalitarian under-
standing of their relationship; however, they admitted that they could not 
help it. They used a traditional way of structuring household labor, because 
it was the least costly one to them given their competencies and habits. In 
mocking their gender-typical behavior, they attached a new meaning to it. 
By pointing out the humorous incongruity in their situation, they confirmed 
their relationship code against the empirical evidence.
Traditional gender ideologies are the guidelines for housework-related 
behavior in affectual–traditional pair relationships. Conventional gender 
roles dominate competencies and preferences, although they are apt to 
align with one another. The role behavior is ritualized in separated gender 
spheres, as is seen among unskilled, working-class people. Another variant 
follows the image of “gender characters” (Koppetsch and Burkart 1999), 
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whose complementary competencies work together in making a comfortable 
home. Although couples of this subtype refer to competencies, this reference 
is strictly bound to essentialist gender qualities because it assumes that men 
and women have certain and different competencies within the household. 
In this subtype, love and housework are the result of the same principles: 
The man and the woman bring, by nature, different competencies to estab-
lish a harmonic relationship.
comparing east and west german couples
In light of these models, we can compare East and West Germany by analyz-
ing the narratives of individuals who grew up in the GDr or FrG before 
German reunification in 1990 (see Table 10.1). The differences in individual 
coping strategies for housework, as well as differences in the interaction 
of these individual strategies on the pair level, can be interpreted in part 
as result of pre-1990 socialization processes in two different cultures, and 
in part as a result of different experiences after the reunification in 1990. 
Experiences after the reunification have differed for East and West Ger-
mans, because the two distinctive cultures continued to persist and because 
the West German institutional structures that were implemented in East 
German society met with completely different conditions—in particular, a 
weaker economy. The East–West comparison focuses on the differences in 
the prevalence and characteristics of the three types of interrelation between 
love and housework-related behavior, as observed in our data. Although all 
types can be found in western and eastern parts of Germany, our analysis 
shows that there are two major differences in the housework-related coping 
behavior between East and West Germans.
One difference in housework coping relates to the different degree of in-
dividualization in the two parts of Germany. The affectual–associative inter-
action type is more common and its characteristics are more distinct in West 
Germany, especially among highly educated persons. These individuals have 
a strong exchange orientation that motivates them to negotiate even against 
the interests of the partner to minimize their own input into housework and 
to maximize their own benefits from the production of household goods. 
The affectual–associative East Germans are much more reluctant to carry 
negotiations to an extreme, but rather try to integrate the interests of their 
partners in their strategy. These differences in behavior seem to support the 
plausible expectation that West Germans would follow more individualized 
self-concepts. They see themselves as being more independent in their pair 
relationship and they allow an agreement only on the basis of giving room 
to both partner’s preferences. East Germans are more willing to subordinate 
their preferences under a shared collective norm. These interpretative results 
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are reproduced with the standardized data from our study. By combining 
codes established from narrative passages with questionnaire answers in a 
mixed-methods analysis, we demonstrate for our limited sample that West 
Germans have a stronger individualistic orientation, whereas a communal 
orientation gains more ground among East Germans (Huinink and röhler 
2006).
The second difference is that the affectual–traditional type of relation-
ship is more widespread in East Germany. In addition, it is found in all East 
German socioeconomic groups, whereas it is associated only with certain 
educational and status groups—namely, the working class—in West Ger-
many. Despite the dominance of the affectual–traditional interaction type 
in East German relationships, the division of housework is somewhat more 
egalitarian there. The time partners invest in housework is more balanced 
and men are engaged in traditionally female domains of housework (par-
ticularly child care, but also cooking and cleaning). This is the result of a 
less ideological approach to household labor that enables men to partici-
pate in housework even when they hold traditional gender ideologies. The 
weaker importance of gender ideology does not mean that the household 
production is free from a set of agreed gender norms couples have to fol-
low. However, in West Germany, traditional ideology and practice are more 
closely tied together than in East Germany, as Cooke (2006) has reported. 
This leaves fewer opportunities for men and women to act with disregard 
to gender roles than is the case in East Germany. In our data, we found a 
traditional East German couple where the man was unemployed. Despite 
the clear traditional division of labor and well-separated gender spheres that 
both partners described, he had no problem telling us that he, for example, 
cleaned the bathroom because he had more free time than his full-time em-
ployed wife. However, his conservative gender ideology was not affected by 
his dissonant practice (röhler 2006b).
One structural explanation for the East–West differences in the data 
builds upon the degree of labor force participation of women in the former 
GDr and FrG, including contemporary rates of full-time employment. In 
the GDr, full-time employment was the normal working status for men and 
women since the early 1970s, and private lives had to fit these requirements. 
The management of family life was bound into strict time schedules: getting 
up early, bringing the children to the day nursery, working in the firm, pick-
ing up the children and doing shopping, doing housework, enjoying some 
leisure time, and preparing for bed. These tied time schedules fostered rule-
structured behavior in the East Germans’ daily lives. Even though the rules 
did not always follow traditional gender norms and allowed for exceptions 
in behavioral conventions to manage the strict time schedules, this fact did 
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not encourage a critical gender discourse on time use to develop. However, 
rule-structured behavior made it possible to disregard gender roles on a 
practical basis. Men had to contribute to get all the household tasks done 
in time. Thus, both partners participated in housework and child care, al-
though the women remained in charge of managing family life.
In keeping with these reflections, our mixed-methods analysis shows 
that East Germans—independent of characteristics of their gender ideolo-
gies—take for granted labor market participation of married women and 
mothers, whereas West Germans hold a stable ideology of housewife–moth-
erhood (Huinink and röhler 2006). This finding corresponds with empirical 
evidence from representative studies in Germany showing that the full-time 
work of mothers, in particular, is more considered and realized in East Ger-
many than in West Germany (Dornseiff and Sackmann 2003).
Thus, the different degree of labor force participation in former FrG 
and GDr caused differences in self-concepts between the East and the West 
that have persisted after the reunification of the two countries. Of course, 
another part of the explanation is that families in the East faced greater 
economic necessity after reunification, so they still have to accommodate 
working wives. But the full picture can only be drawn if we recognize that 
the structural conditions of the GDr era formed egalitarian attitudes to-
ward women’s employment and caused pragmatic behavior with respect to 
gender roles.
Another explanation for the differences between East and West Germans 
is a cultural one. Competition between individuals was much lower in East 
Germany than in West Germany because of their different policy regimes. 
The state policies in the GDr did not encourage individuals to claim their 
interests, but rather to subordinate them to the working collective and its 
norms (Scheller 2002). Pair relations were a means for individuals to protect 
themselves from the pressure of public norms, but the communal orientation 
that was propagated for public and private life influenced the behavior in 
all spheres of society. Official policy statements called upon the men (and 
also the children) to “help” the women with household labor. They did 
not emphasize traditional gender rules, although they were implicitly pres-
ent. Thus, men were “allowed” to participate in typically female household 
activities. In West Germany, people are raised to fight for their individual 
interests and for their status in society. Traditional pair relationships follow 
the societal status order, too, meaning that men are expected to be superior 
and women subordinate. It is not as easy for traditional West German men 
to engage in housework, because they lose status, power, and their “gender 
honor” when they do “women’s work” around the house (Koppetsch and 
Burkart 1999).
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conclusion
Despite the new need for restructuring after traditional role behavior fades, 
change in the division of housework labor is difficult to bring about. The 
mechanisms that replace traditional roles (like competencies, preferences, 
interests, transaction costs, and identity construction) result in more dif-
ferentiation in housework patterns. Nevertheless, traditional patterns will 
not necessarily decline, because housework will fall to the partner who has 
more domestic competencies, more favorable and stronger preferences, a 
higher interest or lower transaction costs in household labor, or an identity 
that is linked more closely to household issues. This is true mostly for the 
female partner who is socialized to identify with the household and related 
activities, and has often higher standards, competencies, and interests in do-
ing housework. Women’s typically greater identification, interest, standards, 
competencies, and housework management abilities lead to arrangements 
between the partners that maintain a traditional pattern of labor division.
In sum, it can be argued that, despite the greater variety of housework 
patterns, processes of everyday interaction in pair relationships stabilize 
traditional housework arrangements, even in those couples where partners 
have modernized gender ideologies and love relationships. Early feminist 
research in the United States addressed the mechanisms we found here and 
their unequal distribution among spouses (Mainardy 1968). Although Mai-
nardy (1968) pointed to competencies, preferences, male and female identi-
ties, housekeeping standards, and the principle of least interest as underly-
ing mechanisms, her classic paper failed to take men’s position seriously. 
Different standards, for example, were seen only as a male excuse not to 
share the work around the house. Our findings add to this view that dif-
ferent standards are a call for negotiation between the partners about the 
definition and amount of housework as a precondition for any agreement 
on fair sharing.
Our results give us an answer to the paradox from the beginning of this 
chapter why so little change in traditional housework patterns has taken 
place despite individual gender norms being widely modernized. Our answer 
avoids the shortcut of arguing that latent gender norms are the reason for 
the stability of the traditional gender division and points instead to dif-
ferent mechanisms in the self-concepts of the individuals that guide their 
housework-related coping behavior.
However, these new mechanisms also have the potential to individual-
ize couples’ arrangements and, thus, bring about even greater variety on the 
micro level in spouses’ interaction. Specifically, the spread of the preference-
based affectual–pragmatic type of pair interaction can cause greater dif-
ferentiation in housework patterns. Whether this differentiation will foster 
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nontraditional housework arrangements will depend, in part, on supporting 
(or nonsupporting) structures in society. For example, the availability of day 
nursery care or equal opportunities for men and women in the labor market 
can work to balance partners’ negotiating power about sharing housework. 
Second, the direction that the development of housework division takes will 
depend on institutional mechanisms that educate men and women in house-
work and parental abilities. Only if the level of interest, competencies, and 
standards is more equal does an equal sharing of housework have a chance 
to develop in a pair’s daily interaction.
The results of our qualitative analyses can be related to newer quantita-
tive studies that have investigated the process traditionalizing the division 
over the duration of the pair relationship. For West German couples, not 
only do traditional couples become more traditional by increasing special-
ization, but also nontraditional couples undergo a process of traditional-
izing their labor division from the beginning. This is consistent with U.S. 
results that find men doing less housework and women doing more when 
they marry or begin to cohabit (Gupta 1999). It also parallels Australian 
reports for the transition to cohabitation, marriage, and parenthood (Baxter, 
Hewitt, and Haynes 2008). Some change is the result of normative changes 
from egalitarian to complementarity norms with the birth of the first child. 
In other words, the understanding of fairness shifts from an equal sharing 
of housework to the complementary specialization of the women as mother 
and housewife, and the man as the earner and provider (Grunow, Schulz, 
and Blossfeld 2007).
We show that influential factors include not only norms, but also other 
mechanisms like standards, competencies, and interests in regard to house-
work. These subjective and skill mechanisms have been largely neglected so 
far by quantitative research and need more investigation. In a cross-national 
analysis, however, Treas (2008) points to these factors to explain why wives 
in more traditional marriages are less likely than other married women to 
turn to their husbands in an emergency for even casual household help. The 
comparison between East and West Germany shows that even under the same 
institutional setting, different individual strategies and outcomes are possible. 
For further investigation of the prospects of labor division within pair rela-
tionships, not only norms and economic power relations (Fuwa 2004) have 
to be investigated, but also different family cultures (Yodanis 2005; and in 
this volume) and mechanisms on the behavioral level that have been proved 
to influence the labor division in couples (Breen and Cooke 2005).
We can see from our analysis in this chapter that housework is deeply 
embedded in modernized romantic love relationships that function more 
and more on the basis of the full acknowledgment of the partner’s person-
ality in all its aspects. However, if we ask how love works together with 
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housework coping and partner’s daily interaction, we get different types of 
love–housework interrelation with characteristics that vary dependent on the 
context. As we learned, in East Germany, affectual–traditional couples (as 
a result of GDr socialization) find more pragmatic ways to do housework, 
and this results in more egalitarian housework patterns. In West Germany, 
the ideology and the practice of housework are more closely tied together, 
and traditional ideology does not allow for egalitarian behavior. This faces 
us with another paradox. Under specific conditions, traditional relationship 
codes can go along with egalitarian behavior. Our results point to the need 
for cross-national comparative studies to understand how context affects 
the behavioral manifestation of housework-related interaction styles.
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The fact that women do more housework than men has been documented 
in a broad variety of countries. Whether the focus is on hours of housework 
or on who is responsible for the stereotypically female tasks that make up 
the bulk of household chores, studies of North America, Europe, and Asia 
all find that women perform a larger share of housework than their partners 
(Bianchi et al. 2000; Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005; Haas 1981; South and Spitze 
1994; van der Lippe 1994). Studies in the United States have gone further 
and show that couples do not always agree on how much work each of the 
partners does around the house (e.g., Kamo 2000). In particular, wives do 
not report as much household work to be done by their husbands as the lat-
ter claim for themselves. Gender disparities in reporting have obvious impli-
cations for a better understanding of the allocation of labor in the home. We 
do not know, however, whether the gendered reporting patterns identified 
for the United States represent another example of “American exceptional-
ism” or whether they are one instance of a more universal reporting asym-
metry for this type of data.
To the extent that different countries—or different sorts of countries—
display different patterns of gender reporting disparities, these biases have 
the potential to distort our understanding of household labor in cross-na-
tional context. Although these reporting differences present a methodologi-
cal challenge, they also present a significant opportunity to enhance our 
understanding of gender inequality. Gender discrepancies in reporting may 
arise from a number of different social processes. They may signal genu-
ine misperceptions arising from men’s and women’s distinctive standpoints, 
or they may be self-serving distortions and thus reflect contested gender 
relations.
In this chapter I present data on the gender gap in reporting for 35 coun-
tries.1 Although my analyses cannot provide a final assessment of the extent 
and the consequences of housework reporting differences, the results from 
this chapter can assist researchers in weighing the implications of gender 
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reporting gaps for their own cross-national comparisons. To gain greater un-
derstanding of the social processes underlying the reporting gap, I compare 
the housework reporting gap across countries in three different ways:
1. I relate the gender reporting differences for housework hours and for 
housework tasks to country-level gender inequality.
2. I examine gender reporting differences regarding the perceived fairness 
of the division of labor and relate it to macrolevel gender inequality.
3. I examine the interrelatedness between fairness assessments and house-
work reporting gaps, to consider whether gendered housework reporting gaps 
relate to contentiousness in gender relations.
housework measurement
Women universally perform more household labor than men. The gender 
imbalance in the amount of household labor done by men and women, how-
ever, varies across different types of housework (Blair and Lichter 1991). Pro-
ponents of a gender perspective have argued that different housework tasks 
take on gendered meanings and are, thus, a way to enact normative gender 
relations (South and Spitze 1994; Twiggs, McQuillan, and Ferree 1999). 
Women are predominantly responsible for routine and repetitive housework 
tasks, which also take up the majority of total housework time (Twiggs, Mc-
Quillan, and Ferree 1999). However, Twiggs, McQuillan, and Ferree (1999) 
also point out that there is a hierarchy within the gender-typed tasks. For 
example, although both laundry and washing dishes are usually considered 
female-typed housework activities, men are much less likely to do the laundry 
than the dishes. Because of the gender typing of specific tasks, measures of 
the division of household labor have not only addressed time spent in house-
work, but also responsibility for specific tasks—measured either in terms of 
(estimates of) the actual time or as reports on who does the task more often. 
As Sayer demonstrates in Chapter 2, men’s and women’s housework hours 
are becoming more similar over time across many countries. Along the same 
lines, there also seems to be a decline in the gender typing of different tasks, 
although this convergence and desegregation of domestic labor occurs slowly 
(Bianchi et al. 2000; Gershuny and robinson 1988).
Although the study of domestic labor has become an established field 
within the social sciences (see Coltrane [2000], Marini and Shelton [1993] 
and Shelton and John [1996] for a review), there is an ongoing debate about 
the limitations and advantages of different measurements of housework and 
the division of housework between partners. One of the challenges of mea-
suring housework lays in the blurry line between routine and leisure activi-
ties (e.g., preparing dinner vs. trying a new recipe for fun). Moreover, there 
is great potential for doing multiple housework tasks at the same time (e.g., 
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multitasking in the form of doing a load of laundry while cooking dinner). 
This makes accurate reporting of time spent in domestic labor rather dif-
ficult for most respondents. In addition, because housework is so integral 
to everyday life, recollection problems may be more severe than for other 
activities or events that stand out more in respondents’ memories.
Juster, Ono, and Stafford (2003) as well as Lee and Waite (2005) have 
undertaken systematic comparisons of three different approaches to mea-
suring both housework and the domestic division of labor. These three ap-
proaches include retrospective reports of housework time, the time diary 
approach, and the experience sampling method. A fourth approach to mea-
suring housework is examining the primary responsibility for a number of 
different tasks. rather than focusing on time spent on housework, respon-
dents, usually only one per household, are asked who is responsible for 
specific tasks. The advantage of this measure is that it reflects the division of 
labor within a household. It does not, however, provide information about 
the actual amount of housework performed.
The most prevalent approach to measuring housework time is respon-
dents’ retrospective survey reports of housework. Either one or both part-
ners are asked about the time spent on total housework over some period 
(e.g., the previous week) or, alternatively, are asked about the time spent 
on specific housework activities. This approach has the advantage of be-
ing easily implemented, especially if information is collected from only one 
respondent per household, who may also report on the activities of other 
household members. Combining housework time across all tasks into one 
summary measure seems to be less effective in efforts to understanding vari-
ation in housework or in linking housework to other measures of well-being 
(Coltrane 2000). However, if only because of multitasking, double counting 
may be a problem when absolute time spent is asked for a number of differ-
ent tasks separately (Lee and Waite 2005).
Another measurement method that is often considered superior is the 
“time diary” approach. respondents are asked to record their time use for 
all activities, usually for the previous day. Although these reports are re-
garded as more accurate than survey questions, this method is very time 
intensive and, consequently, more expensive to carry out. Juster, Ono, and 
Stafford (2003) show that time diary measures and traditional survey ques-
tions correspond closely when the activities measured occur regularly and 
are externally structured, and if the trend over time, rather than a specific 
level, is of main interest.
Lee and Waite (2005) introduced the experience sampling method 
(ESM), which they describe as a “diary-like” method. respondents wear a 
device that prompts them to report their primary and secondary activities 
eight times a day (at random intervals spread out over the day). Comparing 
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their measure with the more established approaches discussed earlier, they 
emphasize the potential for underreporting in task-based measures. Lee and 
Waite (2005) point out that different housework measures produce signifi-
cantly different estimates: ESM-based measures yield significantly lower 
housework time estimates than survey measures. They also find that the 
gap between husbands’ and wives’ reports of one another’s activities differs 
across measures. The largest gender gap in housework is found based on 
wives’ retrospective survey reports, and the smallest is obtained based on 
ESM estimates that only count primary activities.
gender discrepancies in reporting of housework
Because few studies interview both partners, most analysts have to rely on 
only one person’s report about couples’ domestic division of labor and part-
ners’ time spent on housework tasks. If information is collected from both 
partners, there is usually some discrepancy between the two reports, and 
reports from both partners are often averaged in an effort to improve the 
reliability of the measures (Coltrane 2000). Generally, differences in house-
work reports between partners can stem from different sources: overestima-
tion of one’s own housework, overestimation of the work of one’s partner, 
underestimation of one’s own housework, or underestimation the work of 
one’s partner. Self-reports on overall time spent have been found to be par-
ticularly prone to overreporting (Coltrane 2000). Both men and women in 
the United States have been found to inflate their reports, but it is thought 
that men do so more than women (Coltrane 1996; Kiger and riley 1996; 
Marini and Shelton 1993; Press and Townsley 1998).
Granbois and Willett (1970) found reporting differences between spouses 
to be randomly distributed rather than associated with systematic individ-
ual or couple characteristics. Nevertheless, there are a number of possible 
theoretical reasons underlying the reporting differences between partners. 
Given how strongly gendered the measured activity is, social desirability 
factors may lead individuals to over- or underreport the housework they 
are doing. Kamo’s (2000) results suggest that both social desirability and 
resentment toward household labor play a role in the reporting biases. No 
clear explanation has been found for the fact that husband–wife reporting 
discrepancies are stronger for men’s housework hours than for women’s 
(Kamo 2000). One speculation is that men overestimate their own contribu-
tions to fit better the model of a supportive husband, even though they may 
not do much work at home. Of course, some of the housework reporting 
discrepancies may be a result of a lack of information. But although these 
reporting differences may in part reflect the fact that partners do not know 
exactly how much housework the other is doing, they may offer a glimpse 
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at the contentious issue of domestic labor as it relates to power and conflict 
within a couple.
gender discrepancies in the perception 
of the fairness of housework
An unequal division of labor can lead to feelings of unfairness if the inequal-
ity is seen as unjustified. When examining the perceived fairness of house-
hold labor arrangements, evidence suggests that women are more prone 
to feel that the division of labor is unfair to them, whereas men may be 
more likely to judge the distribution of tasks as fair (DeMaris and Long-
more 1996). However, the criterion for judging an arrangement as fair is 
not an equal division of labor. Lennon and rosenfield (1994) find that men 
evaluate housework arrangements as fair if they contribute 36% or more, 
whereas women perceive the division of household labor to be fair if they 
do 66% or less. Of course, individuals’ gender ideology is another major 
determinant of whether inequalities in housework are perceived as inequities 
(Greenstein 1996).
There has been extensive research on the possible consequences of per-
ceived unfairness. Many studies have focused on the negative mental health 
impact of an unfair division of labor (Frisco and Williams 2003; Glass and 
Fujimoto 1994; Lennon and rosenfield 1994; ross and Mirowsky 1988; 
ross, Mirowsky, and Huber 1983). Moreover, perceived injustice can also 
have implications for a broad range of everyday emotions (Lively et al. 
2008). Fairness evaluations are important because not only unfairness (that 
is, inequity at the expense of oneself) has a negative impact on emotions and 
well-being, but being aware of doing less than the fair share (being unfair to 
one’s partner) also takes a toll (Lively et al. 2008).
men’s and women’s reports of housework 
and perceptions of fairness
No systematic comparative research investigates whether there is cross-
national variation in the extent of the housework reporting differences be-
tween men and women. Discrepancies in reports of housework and percep-
tions of fairness of domestic labor arrangements may provide a reflection 
on how contested the domestic division of labor is. Moreover, examining 
these issues in a comparative perspective provides the unique opportunity 
to situate the gender discrepancies in reports of housework and fairness in 
a larger context.
Cross-national variation in housework reports, the gender gap in house-
work reporting, and fairness evaluations can be expected as a result of the 
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different social contexts in which housework is performed. Numerous stud-
ies, including the chapters in this volume, have shown that context matters 
for housework and the couple’s division of labor above and beyond indi-
vidual and couple characteristics (Baxter 1992, 1997; Coltrane 2000; Fuwa 
2004; Fuwa and Cohen 2007; Geist 2005). Although Baxter (1997) finds 
only a limited impact of macrolevel gender equality on the division of labor, 
a number of studies suggest that policies may influence how gender roles are 
defined in the family (Fuwa and Cohen 2007). I have found in a previous 
study (Geist 2005) that women’s individual-level assets are less effective in 
reducing their housework in less egalitarian countries, a finding consistent 
with Fuwa (2004). In this book, this message of contextual influences is 
spelled out in Chapters 4, 7, and 8, among others. These findings argue for 
likely cross-national variation in social desirability standards for housework 
and different gender role contexts in which men and women report their 
housework. Consequently, it is only logical to expect variation in the gender 
differences in housework reporting and assessments of fairness as well.
hypotheses
In this chapter I assess whether there are systematic context patterns in the 
gender discrepancy in housework reporting. In particular, I am interested in 
how the context of gender inequality may shape reports. Inegalitarian so-
cieties are generally characterized by women’s specialization in housework 
and men’s focus on market work. There is reason to believe that men and 
women may agree more about what they each do around the house in these 
unequal societies. Whether strict gender specialization is “efficient” (Becker 
1981) or whether women’s economic dependency on husbands helps to 
frame female housework responsibilities as part of a package deal, couples 
are apt to accept the existing division of labor. Sharp differentiation in the 
roles of men and women will encourage people to compare their house-
hold responsibilities with those of others of their gender, instead of using 
their partner as point of reference. In societies with traditional gender roles, 
women lack established cultural frameworks for scrutinizing who does what 
and interpreting traditional housework patterns as unfair. Moreover, they 
lack incentives to misreport their own and their partner’s efforts strategi-
cally to highlight injustice. Therefore, I expect the gender reporting gap to 
be smaller in less gender egalitarian countries and larger in more egalitarian 
environments.
Of course, one could also make the alternative argument that unequal 
societies encourage greater gender reporting gaps. Men might minimize their 
household helping and women inflate their domestic efforts to present a 
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socially desirable image of following traditional gender roles. To the extent 
that men and women in gender inegalitarian societies do not share the same 
skills sets or take on the same chores, they may be less reliable reporters on 
how much time it takes the partner to do the household work (Treas 2008). 
Moreover, the greater volume of housework that falls to women in these 
societies might, in and of itself, cause them to see unfairness and grudgingly 
overstate their efforts and understate their husband’s. In short, it is possible 
that less gender egalitarian societies will show greater, not fewer, gender 
disparities in reports about housework than will more egalitarian societies. 
This leads to two alternative hypotheses:
H1a: Gender discrepancies in reporting of housework time and tasks are 
smaller in countries with more gender equality.
H1b: Gender discrepancies in reporting of housework time and tasks are 
larger in countries with more gender equality.
As noted earlier, the societal context of gender equality has various fea-
tures that might either encourage or discourage women from interpreting 
the household division of labor as unfair. Therefore, two alternative hypoth-
eses can be stated:
H2a: Gender disparities in perceptions of housework fairness are smaller in 
societies with more gender equality.
H2b: Gender disparities in perceptions of housework fairness are larger in 
societies with more gender equality.
These arguments, of course, hinge on the assumption that household 
arrangements and societal context give rise to situations that affect men 
and women differently. At least under some conditions, housework may 
become a contentious area of gender relations. Women, who are disadvan-
taged in the division of housework, may become resentful, even if men do 
not perceive injustice in their housekeeping arrangements. It is reasonable 
to expect that gender differences in housework reporting are linked to these 
gender differences in perceptions of fairness. Specifically, I hypothesize the 
following:
H3: Gender discrepancies in housework reporting are larger when gender 
disparities in the perception of housework fairness are larger.
data and measures
Using data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2002, I 
describe men’s and women’s reports on housework time and the division of 
household tasks for 35 countries, which includes East and West Germany 
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as two countries because they were surveyed separately. The ISSP is an on-
going program of cross-national collaboration on surveys covering topics 
important for social science research; this particular module focuses on is-
sues pertaining to family and gender issues. I first examine the gender gap 
within each country in reports of housework time, followed by an investiga-
tion of the division of labor for specific tasks. Moreover, I compare men’s 
and women’s views about the fairness of the household division of labor 
cross-nationally.
I restrict the sample to respondents who indicate that they have a part-
ner, regardless of their marital status. Because information on sex of partner 
is not available, all coupled respondents are assumed to have partners of the 
opposite sex. I only include observations from those who live in a household 
with at least two adults and provide complete information on their own 
and their partner’s housework along with information about the division of 
labor and fairness. This results in 25,963 observations from 35 countries. 
Sample sizes vary by country, ranging from 266 for East Germany to 1325 
for Spain.
Absolute Housework: Self and Partner Measures
respondents were asked: On average, how many hours do you personally 
spend on household work, not including child care or leisure activities? They 
were further asked how many hours the partner spends doing housework in 
a typical week. Both measures were truncated at 50 hours per week for the 
purpose of this study. For housework time, general measures seem to work 
better, whereas the division of work is better assessed by asking respondents 
about specific tasks. A general measure of housework time avoids the prob-
lem of double reporting pointed out by Lee and Waite (2005), who suggest 
that reports of housework time that are based on sums for specific tasks 
overestimate housework time because multiple tasks may be completed at 
the same time.
Because both partners were not surveyed, the data do not allow the 
comparison of housework reports within couples; however, because the ISSP 
is representative at the country level, I compare the average accounts of part-
nered men and women within countries. I distinguish between self-reports 
and partner evaluations, which are based on men’s and women’s report of 
their partners. Again, the comparison of men’s and women’s housework 
and other gender differences is at the aggregate level and does not refer to 
within-couple differences. For some of the analyses, I create measures of 
gender disparities by taking the difference of women’s self-reports and men’s 
assessment of female housework time. To create the gender gap measure for 
men’s housework time, I subtract women’s assessment of male housework 
time from men’s self-reported housework time.
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Domestic Division of Labor: Task-Based Measures and Fairness
In addition to the question of overall time spent on housework, the ISSP 
surveys ask respondents questions about the responsibility for six different 
household tasks. They are asked to indicate: Who in your household does 
the following thing? For each task (laundry, small repairs, caring for sick 
family members, shopping for groceries, household cleaning, and prepar-
ing meals), respondents were asked to state whether it was “always” the 
respondent, “usually” the respondent, “about equal/both together,” “usu-
ally the spouse/partner,” “always the spouse/partner,” or whether the task 
is done “by a third person.”2 For the analyses presented in this chapter, I 
report the differences between female and male respondents in the pro-
portion reporting that the female partner is “usually” or “almost always” 
responsible for laundry, shopping, and nursing the sick. For the male-typed 
task of household repairs, I report the differences between the proportion 
of male and female respondents indicating that the male partner is mainly 
responsible.
The study also includes a measure that lets respondents evaluate their 
housework contributions and the fairness of domestic labor arrangements. 
They are asked to indicate whether they do much more, a bit more, about 
their fair share of housework, or bit or much less than their fair share of 
housework. I distinguish between three different groups: those who do much 
more or a bit more than their fair share, those who indicate that they do 
roughly their fair share, and those who do a bit less or much less than their 
fair share. I calculate the gender gap in fairness perceptions by subtracting, 
for each country, the percentage of women from the percentage of men in 
each country who indicate that they are doing their fair share of housework, 
no more and no less, because this also implies that their partner is also doing 
her/his fair share.
Cross-National Variation in Gender Equality
I use three measures to account for cross-national variation in gender equal-
ity, broadly defined. First, I create an estimate of the average total house-
work burden, which is based on the total of average men’s and women’s 
housework self-reports. Although not a direct measure of (in)equality, this 
measure represents the overall centrality of domestic labor in a society. Sec-
ond, I create a country-specific measure of men’s share of housework hours 
for this total housework burden. This measure of the average share of men’s 
housework participation captures the societal referent against which respon-
dents may evaluate their own household work and the division of labor 
at home. Third, I use a measure of women’s status in society that is not 
based on housework; the gender empowerment measure (GEM) is compiled 
by the United Nations Development Program (2006) and is a composite 
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that reflects gender inequality in parliamentary representation, economic 
participation,3 and women’s power over economic resources, measured by 
comparing female and male estimated earned income.
men’s and women’s accounts of housework
In a first analytic step, I examine housework reports from all 35 countries 
to determine whether the gender discrepancies reported for the United States 
hold elsewhere. In all countries, women report spending more time on domes-
tic chores than men. On average, across all countries, women spend about 
19 hours per week on housework. Men, on the other hand, report doing 
housework for about 8.5 hours each week. The variation across countries is 
substantial. Women in Norway and France report spending the least amount 
of time on housework, with about 12 hours per week. Women in Brazil and 
Chile report the longest hours, a weekly housework total of about 28 and 
29 hours, respectively. The variation across countries is smaller among men: 
Japanese men report the least amount of housework with about 3 hours per 
week, whereas men in russia and the Philippines report the longest time do-
ing housework of any men, at about 14 hours per week, on average.
Even more interesting than the differences in the self-reported house-
work time for men and women across countries is the extent to which men’s 
and women’s accounts differ when describing the housework of their part-
ners within countries.4 Men, across all countries, estimate women to do 
just slightly less than the amount of housework that women estimate for 
themselves—around 19 hours per week (about 10 minutes less than wom-
en’s self-reports). Women, on the other hand, think that men spend about 
7 hours, or about 1.5 hours less than men’s self-reported housework time. 
Table 11.1 provides a listing of the gender gaps for all countries, showing 
the differences between women’s and men’s reports regarding female house-
work time and the difference between men’s and women’s reports of male 
housework time.
There is considerable variation across countries in the gender dispari-
ties in housework reporting. Figures 11.1 and 11.2 compare the partner and 
self-reports for men’s and women’s housework hours. Countries that fall 
on the line show no difference between self-reports and partner reports. If 
a country is placed above the line, this indicates that self-reports are higher 
than the partner reports. Observations below the line show that partner 
evaluations are higher than self-reports.
As Figure 11.1 shows, in Slovenia, Hungary, Japan, and Flanders, the 
differences between women’s reporting of men’s housework and men’s self-
reports are smallest; men’s reports are higher than women’s accounts of 
male housework performance, but this difference is less than 30 minutes 
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per week. In seven countries, men overestimate their own contribution by 
30 to 60 minutes (or women fail to give them credit for 30 to 60 minutes 
of their actual housework performance). In the remaining 22 countries, this 
difference is 1 hour or more. Only in West Germany and Poland are men’s 
housework self-reports lower than what wives and partners report; in West 
Germany, this difference is only about a quarter hour, but in Poland men’s 
self-reports are almost 45 minutes lower than what women report for their 
partners.
ta b l e  1 1 . 1
Gender disparities in housework reports (in hours)
Country
Women’s Housework Time  
(women’s reports - 
men’s reports)
Men’s Housework Time  
(men’s reports - 
women’s reports)







Czech republic –0.62 1.31
Denmark –0.29 1.33
Finland 0.73 0.61
Flanders (Belgium) –0.22 0.39
France –0.76 1.84
Germany (East) –1.35 0.69
Germany (West) –0.09 –0.27








New Zealand –1.31 1.61












United States –1.29 2.50
N = 25,963.
s o u rc e :  Author’s calculations, ISSP 2002
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Figure 11.2 shows that across all countries combined, there are few 
differences between women’s housework self-reports and men’s accounts 
of women’s housework, yet there are substantial cross-national differences. 
In seven of the countries, women’s reports of their own housework exceed 
men’s accounts of female housework by 30 minutes or less, whereas this 
difference is less than 1 hour per week in another four countries. In another 
eight countries, however, this gender disparity in accounting of women’s 
housework exceeds 1 hour.
In the remaining 16 countries, women’s accounts of their own housework 
are lower than the partner reports. In four of the countries, the overestima-
tion by male partners (or underreporting by women) is relatively small, with 
less than 30 minutes per week. In six countries, overreporting by women 
(or underestimation by partners) is between 30 minutes and 1 hour, and in 
another six countries (East Germany, the United States, the Netherlands, 
Bulgaria, New Zealand, and Taiwan), this difference exceeds 1 hour.
To examine whether there is systematic cross-national variation in this 
gender reporting gap, I examine the link between gender equality measures 
and housework reporting differences. Table 11.2 outlines the direction of 






































































































































































Men’s housework (by partner)
Figure 11.1.  Men’s self- and partner reports.
s o u r c e :  Author’s calculations, ISSP 2002
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I find that there is a greater gender reporting gap for both women’s 
and men’s housework times in countries with a higher housework burden. 
Higher levels of gender empowerment are linked to fewer discrepancies for 
reports on women’s housework, but there is no such association regard-
ing reports on men’s. This finding provides partial support of hypothesis 
H1a, which posits that gender discrepancies in reporting of housework are 
smaller in countries with more equality. However, more gender equality in 
the form of men’s participation in housework is associated with a larger 
gender gap in accounts of men’s housework time, providing partial support 
for hypothesis H1b.
the division of domestic tasks
Having examined gender differences in reports on housework hours, I next 
turn to specific household chores. In line with the findings of prior research, 
reports regarding the domestic division of household tasks are gendered. 
Male respondents report that female-typed tasks are distributed more equally, 
whereas women’s accounts of the division of household tasks minimize men’s 
role. Laundry, cooking, and cleaning are activities heavily dominated by 
Figure 11.2. Women’s self- and partner reports.





























































































































































Women’s housework (by partner)
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women; according to both men’s and women’s accounts, these female-typed 
tasks are “almost always” done by the female partner in the majority of 
households. On average, the proportion of male respondents who indicate 
that women are mainly responsible for laundry is about 7 percentage points 
lower than for female respondents. The average gender differences for the 
other tasks are even larger, perhaps because relative consensus on laundry 
reflects a particular male aversion to this one task. The proportion of women 
who report that they are mainly responsible for taking care of sick family 
members and shopping is 15 and 11 percentage points larger than men’s 
reports for these tasks.
The majority of men and women agree that it is mostly men who do 
the repairs around the house, but there are substantial gender differences in the 
proportions: about 81 percent of men indicate that it is usually or almost 
always the male partner who does the repairs, yet only about 67 percent of 
female respondents state this.
In a next step, I examine how the three gender context measures are as-
sociated with the gender disparities in the reporting of the female and male 
housework tasks. The results in the columns Female-Typed Tasks and Male-
Typed Tasks of Table 11.2 show that measures of context gender equality 
are not significantly associated with the reporting gap for female housework 
tasks. I do find, however, that higher levels of gender empowerment are 
linked to greater disparities between men and women in the reporting of 
ta b l e  1 1 . 2




























(% men: do my 
fair share -  




+ + NS NS NS
Men’s share of total 
housework




– NS NS + NS
aBecause the GEM is not available for four of the countries, N = 31.
+ and – indicate positive and negative associations that are statically significant with p < 0.10. NS indicates that associa-
tions are not statistically significant at that level.
N = 35
s o u rc e :  Author’s calculations, ISSP 2002
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responsibility for repairs, the sole male-typed task available for investiga-
tion. This finding provides additional support for hypothesis H1b, which 
links greater levels of gender equality to larger reporting gaps.
the fairness of the domestic division of labor
Thus far, I have considered gender differences in housework efforts based 
on self- and partner reports. Next I investigate the extent to which men and 
women differ in their assessments of the fairness of their domestic arrange-
ments and whether gender gaps in perceived fairness relate to societal gender 
equality. Overall, about 45% reported doing their fair share of housework. 
This proportion is somewhat larger among men (49%) compared with women 
(42%). More than half the women sampled (54%) think they do more than 
their fair share, whereas 43% of men admit that they do less than their fair 
share. Table 11.3 provides an overview over the discrepancies in fairness be-
tween male and female respondents for all countries and shows the substantial 
cross-national variation. In Taiwan, Japan, and Portugal in particular, women 
are more likely than men to report that they do their fair share of housework. 
In 10 of the countries, the gender disparities in fairness assessment are less 
than 5 percentage points. In Norway, the agreement between men and women 
is amazingly small: 47.55% of men indicate that they thought they did their 
fair share compared with 47.53% of women who did so.
In the remaining countries, a higher proportion of men compared with 
women state that they do their fair share of housework. Within this group, 
the range is wide. The countries with the largest gender disparities are the 
United States, Ireland, France, Australia, the Philippines, and Flanders, 
where the proportion of men who claim that their share is fair is between 
18 and 23 percentage points higher than among women.
Analyses examining the link between the gender gap in fairness assess-
ment and measures of inequality (see Table 11.2, rightmost column) find no 
association between the gendered fairness assessments and the overall vol-
ume of housework. I find that only the share of total housework taken over 
by men is positively associated with gender difference in fairness reports: 
In countries where men participate more, they may feel that they are doing 
their fair share, whereas women continue to report doing more than their 
fair share. These findings support hypothesis H2b, which suggested that 
greater gender equality is associated with greater gaps in men’s and women’s 
assessment of housework fairness. Similarly, higher levels of gender empow-
erment are also associated with larger gender differences in views about 
fairness in domestic labor arrangements. These results provide additional 
support for hypothesis H2b.
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(% men do my 
fair share -  
% women do my 
fair share)Laundry Nurse Sick Shopping
Cross-country average 7.20 14.94 10.50 15.73 7.65
Australia 7.62 23.72 14.76 16.53 19.80
Austria 9.24 21.42 16.53 21.46 7.37
Brazil 6.49 16.88 13.29 8.67 2.87
Bulgaria 4.20 11.96 16.63 12.73 4.28
Chile 9.55 15.11 14.70 –0.42 –4.45
Cyprus –2.47 7.57 15.78 13.03 –0.93
Czech republic 5.28 12.23 8.18 6.28 13.18
Denmark 6.89 12.65 5.72 9.84 6.35
Finland 4.93 9.86 12.08 13.43 6.64
Flanders (Belgium) 3.87 21.26 10.57 20.95 23.48
France 12.55 13.97 15.01 12.26 18.77
Germany (East) 5.11 1.25 6.50 16.04 6.13
Germany (West) 4.66 17.22 10.57 14.63 5.92
Great Britain 6.39 14.39 7.52 3.73 13.26
Hungary 2.60 1.19 –4.11 19.99 –3.14
Ireland 8.17 17.20 18.40 15.23 18.43
Israel 4.53 14.44 10.70 20.56 8.73
Japan 6.34 13.32 –1.06 6.78 –7.03
Latvia 7.60 4.81 8.07 12.69 9.44
Mexico 19.64 17.31 12.06 14.47 8.4
Netherlands 2.89 10.11 7.89 16.62 17.63
New Zealand 8.33 16.91 9.42 4.11 17.71
Northern Ireland 6.67 19.48 5.56 13.05 17.00
Norway 8.36 13.13 12.98 10.90 0.02
Philippines 22.13 29.14 21.39 9.00 22.36
Poland –2.45 5.62 –0.36 19.10 9.18
Portugal 6.72 29.26 10.69 5.89 –5.98
russia 3.39 11.73 5.33 13.66 3.57
Slovakia 6.68 19.28 11.31 10.11 15.99
Slovenia 5.26 11.52 5.28 6.87 –0.66
Spain 10.57 20.44 17.25 15.13 1.93
Sweden –1.32 9.74 5.99 23.10 7.34
Switzerland 6.84 15.06 10.48 11.35 –4.49
Taiwan 7.42 6.34 3.89 17.46 –9.45
United States 11.50 23.76 14.39 15.73 18.12
aNumbers indicate the percent of female respondents who report that they are almost always or usually responsible 
for the specific task less the percent of male respondents who report that the female partner is almost always or usually 
responsible.
bNumbers indicate the percent of male respondents who report that they are almost always or usually responsible for 
the specific task less the percent of female respondents who indicate that the male partner is almost always or usually 
responsible.
N = 25,963.
s o u rc e :  Author’s calculations, ISSP 2002
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Multivariate Analyses of Reporting Discrepancies
In a final step, I examine how the various reporting discrepancies are related 
to each other as well as to what extent the association between contextual 
factors and reporting gaps remains stable after they are considered jointly. 
Table 11.4 shows five models for each of the five discrepancy measures. 
Model 1 examines the impact of the all three aspects of gender inequality 
context jointly; models 2 through 5 include other measures of gender gaps in 
housework reporting. Looking at women’s housework time, I find that total 
housework hours are a fairly stable predictor of discrepancies, supporting 
hypothesis H1a.
Table 11.4 further illustrates that the association between men’s share of 
total housework hours and the gender reporting gap for men’s housework is 
robust: The more men participate in housework, the greater the difference in 
men’s and women’s assessment of men’s housework time, once again provid-
ing support for hypothesis H1b.
The reporting gap for “female” tasks is linked to total housework hours, 
mirroring the results for the gender reporting gap for women’s total house-
work and supporting hypothesis H1a. However, reports of the division of la-
bor for female-typed tasks are also positively associated with the other mea-
sures of reporting differences. For male-typed tasks, total housework hours 
are also fairly robustly associated with reporting differences, and higher lev-
els of gender empowerment are linked to greater discrepancies, even when 
other factors are considered, further supporting hypothesis H1b. However, 
there does not seem to be a close link between reporting gaps regarding male 
housework tasks and reporting gaps in other measures of housework.
Finally, I examine gender differences in the fairness assessments, and I 
find a positive association with men’s share of total housework hours, even 
when other factors are included. Table 11.4 also shows that fairness discrep-
ancies are not significantly linked to gender discrepancies in housework time 
or division of labor reports. My results provide no support for hypothesis 
H3, as I do not find that gender differences in accounts of men’s or women’s 
housework time are linked with gender disparities in fairness assessments.
conclusion
Overall, I find considerable similarities between men’s and women’s self-
reported housework time and the housework reports by partners. However, 
a number of revealing differences demonstrate that the male–female report-
ing disparities found in the United States exist in other countries as well. 
In all the countries examined in this chapter, women report spending more 
time on domestic chores than men. Across all countries, women’s accounts 
of their own housework time are very similar to men’s estimates of women’s 
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Women’s housework time (women’s reports - men’s reports)
 Total housework hours + + NS + +
 Men’s share of total housework NS NS NS NS NS
 Gender Empowerment Measure NS NS NS NS NS
 ∆ Men’s housework time NS
 ∆ Female-typed tasks +
 ∆ Male-typed tasks NS
 ∆ Fairness discrepancy NS
Men’s housework time (men’s reports - women’s reports)
 Total housework hours NS NS NS NS NS
 Men’s share of total housework + + + + NS
 Gender Empowerment Measure NS NS NS NS NS
 ∆ Women’s housework time NS
 ∆ Female-typed tasks +
 ∆ Male-typed tasks NS
 ∆ Fairness discrepancy NS
Female-typed tasks (women’s reports - men’s reports)
 Total housework hours + NS + + +
 Men’s share of total housework NS NS + NS NS
 Gender Empowerment Measure + + + NS NS
 ∆ Women’s housework time +
 ∆ Men’s housework time +
 ∆ Male-typed tasks NS
 ∆ Fairness discrepancy +
Male-typed tasks (men’s reports - women’s reports)
 Total housework hours + + + NS +
 Men’s share of total housework NS NS NS NS NS
 Gender Empowerment Measure + + + + +
 ∆ Women’s housework time NS
 ∆ Men’s housework time NS
 ∆ Female-typed tasks NS
 ∆ Fairness discrepancy NS
Fairness discrepancy (% men: do my fair share - % women: do my fair share)
 Total housework hours NS NS NS NS NS
 Men’s share of total housework + + + + +
 Gender Empowerment Measure NS NS NS NS NS
 ∆ Women’s housework time NS
 ∆ Men’s housework time NS
 ∆ Female-typed tasks NS
 ∆ Male-typed tasks NS
∆ indicates gender reporting discrepancy. + and – indicate positive and negative associations that are 
statically significant with p < 0.10. NS indicates that associations are not statistically significant at that 
level. 
N = 31.
s o u rc e :  Author’s calculations, ISSP 2002
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housework performance. For men, on the other hand, self-reports of house-
work time exceed women’s reports of men’s housework time by about 1.5 
hours. If housework is a contentious aspect of gender relations, it seems that 
men’s, not women’s, contributions are at issue.
These averages obscure the considerable cross-national variation in gen-
der disparities in reports of both men’s and women’s housework time. In 
eight countries, men’s reports regarding women’s housework exceed wom-
en’s self-reports by 1 hour. However, in the remaining 16 countries, women’s 
housework self-reports are lower than the reports from men. The gender 
disparities regarding men’s housework are 1 hour or greater in 22 out of the 
35 countries. In four countries, however, men’s self-reports exceed women’s 
accounts of men’s time by less than 30 minutes, and in two countries (West 
Germany and Poland), men’s housework self-reports are lower than what 
wives and partners report.
As expected based on prior research, male respondents report that fe-
male-typed tasks are done more equally, whereas women’s accounts of the 
division of these tasks minimize men’s role. There is also a large gender 
disparity regarding home repairs—women paint a more egalitarian picture 
than men for this traditionally male chore. Similar to the findings for ab-
solute housework time, there are considerable country differences in the 
disparities between men’s and women’s reports for the division of labor for 
specific tasks.
When asked about fairness of the division of labor at home, slightly 
less than half of respondents state that they do their fair share of house-
work, men more so than women. In most countries, a higher proportion of 
men than women state that they do the fair share of housework. In 10 of 
the countries, however, there are only small differences between men and 
women; in Taiwan, Japan, and Portugal, women are more likely than men 
to report that they do their fair share of housework.
Bivariate and multivariate analyses at the country level show that the 
gendered context at the societal level (in the form of average total house-
work load, men’s share of housework hours, or gender empowerment) is 
linked to the gender gap in reporting of housework and its fairness. I find 
that higher housework loads are linked to wider reporting gaps for women’s 
housework and the division of housework tasks. Greater participation of 
men in housework hours is associated with larger gender gaps in the report 
for men’s housework time and also increased gender gaps in fairness assess-
ments. In addition, I find evidence that higher levels of gender empowerment 
are associated with gender gaps in the reporting of male-typed tasks.
results largely support hypotheses H1b and H2b, which expected larger 
gaps in housework and fairness reporting in the context of greater gen-
der equality. Higher levels of male housework participation are associated 
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with greater gender disparities in the reports of men’s housework (but not 
women’s) as well as fairness assessments. This indicates that in countries 
where men perform somewhat more housework, they may overestimate 
their housework performance because it deviates from “traditional” mini-
mal participation; alternatively, women may underestimate their partners’ 
efforts perhaps to maintain that they are the ones who still do considerably 
more housework.
Higher levels of gender empowerment in a society may result in women 
taking more credit in the division of housework tasks, or not giving credit 
to men’s participation. Women may be more comfortable voicing frustra-
tion with housework arrangements and may not feel the need to sugarcoat 
their partner’s limited housework contributions in their reports of who does 
what at home.
My findings also provide limited support of hypothesis H1a, which 
posits that in the context of greater gender equality, housework reporting 
differences are smaller. I do find evidence that the gender reporting gap 
for women’s housework time is positively associated with the total house-
work burden (which implies smaller gaps in countries where couples do less 
housework overall). However, the link between the total housework burden 
and the greater gender gap in the reporting of the division of female-typed 
tasks only appears in the multivariate context. Moreover, the bivariate as-
sociation between housework burden and the gender reporting discrepancy 
for men’s housework time disappears when considered jointly with the other 
context factors.
When I further examine the interrelationship of the various gender dis-
parity in housework measures and fairness assessments, I find only limited 
evidence that they are closely linked. The results show that gender gaps in 
the division of labor for “female” tasks are linked with reporting disparities 
regarding absolute housework hours (for both men and women). Moreover, 
discrepancies in the reports for traditionally female tasks are also linked 
with gender differences in fairness reports. These findings suggest that per-
ceptions of fairness are not directly linked to housework time and the divi-
sion of labor, but perhaps are rooted in the extent to which expectations 
are thought to be met. The association between gaps in fairness reports 
and reporting differences regarding female-typed tasks may reflect women’s 
growing frustration with the division of labor in this domain and their ex-
pectation for men to step up in those traditional female domains.
The results presented in this chapter provide clear evidence that there 
are gender discrepancies in the accounts of housework time, division of 
tasks, and the fairness of the domestic division of labor. It is not surprising 
to find some differences between men’s and women’s reports, both because 
the data here are national averages, and because gender differences have 
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been reported for the measurement of other indicators that concern couples, 
such as fertility intentions or couples’ sexual activity.
However, both the magnitude and the considerable cross-national varia-
tion in these gender disparities makes the gender differences in the reporting 
of housework time, tasks, and fairness particularly noteworthy. The results 
from this chapter have a number of implications for future comparative 
research on housework. First, researchers who study housework informa-
tion for both partners in a couple based on one partner’s reports may want 
to examine the aggregate gender differences in reporting for their sample of 
interest: How do average self-reports different from what is attributed by 
partners? My findings suggest that greater housework burden, men’s share 
of housework hours, and societal gender empowerment all may have some 
effect on gender differences in the perception and reporting of domestic 
labor and its perceived fairness.
Given a reported trend toward fewer hours spent on housework, con-
cerns may become less pressing over time that higher housework burden is 
associated with greater gender reporting discrepancies for women’s house-
work time. However, the finding that greater participation of men in house-
work and women’s empowerment are associated with reporting differences 
in fairness and the division of labor are more troubling. At a time when men’s 
role at home is changing, and women’s positions in society are increasingly 
powerful, housework measures that rely on comparisons are more prone to 
reporting bias than questions about absolute time. When respondents are 
asked to compare their own contribution directly with that of their partner, 
frustrations and social desirability may more readily shape responses than 
when comparisons are more implicit.
This chapter demonstrates that gender differences in measurement are 
not exclusive to the United States and further shows that there are some 
systematic cross-national differences. Although the results from multivari-
ate analyses especially need to be treated with caution, this study provides 
clear evidence that those who examine women’s housework in countries 
with high housework burdens should be aware of possible distortions of 
measurement. However, studies that focus on men’s housework time, the 
division of labor, and those interested in fairness issues may face higher 
levels of measurement bias in more egalitarian settings. These measurement 
concerns are not only important for comparative research and those doing 
research on housework. All researchers who study couples are reminded 
of the possible distortion of reports based on individuals’ expectations, 
frustrations, and other dynamics that can affect measurement. Although 
there is no easy solution to gather “objective” data for most researchers, 
awareness of possible distortions to the data are important to keep in mind. 
Those who are very concerned about differences between self-reports and 
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partner attributions may choose to base their analyses exclusively on self- 
(or partner) reports. Future research on these issues should examine the 
extent to which differences in fairness assessments and women’s housework 
time have changed over time. This would shed further light on the extent 
to which the gender disparities are the result of a lack of information, in-
flation of one’s own contribution, or other motivations that underlie the 
phenomenon.
notes
1. For some of the macrolevel analyses presented later in the chapter, I only 
have data for 31 countries.
2. respondents in the Netherlands and Poland were asked whether the man 
or the woman was usually responsible.
3. The index includes gender inequality in the proportion of legislators, se-
nior officials, and managers, as well as women’s representation in professional 
and technical positions.
4. It is important to emphasize that I compare the average accounts of part-
nered men and women to each other within countries, not within couples.
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In recent decades, numerous studies have consistently noted a sizeable gap be-
tween the changes in women’s paid employment, women’s political empow-
erment, and the shift toward more egalitarian attitudes concerning gender 
roles in contemporary industrial societies on the one hand, and the minimal 
change with respect to the division of unpaid labor at home on the other. 
Housework and child care remain primarily “women’s work.” regardless of 
how household labor is defined, how it is measured, or in which country it 
is studied, research has consistently shown that women contribute a larger 
share of the household labor than men. Thus, change in gender roles has been 
asymmetric: By expanding their participation in the labor market and other 
public spheres, the roles of women have changed much more than the roles 
of men, who only modestly gained ground in household production.
Theories that aim to explain the division of household labor (see the 
summary in Treas, Chapter 1, this volume) have not been very successful in 
explaining the persistent patterns of domestic work. From the point of view 
of the new home economics, the resource-bargaining model, and the mari-
tal dependency model, the division of household labor in couples remains 
a puzzle. These theories adhere to the view that the relations underlying 
the division of labor in the household are fundamentally gender neutral. A 
change in time availability or the balance of resources, as well as change in 
attitudes, should produce a symmetric effect on men and women in hetero-
sexual couples. Empirical evidence does not support such predictions, giving 
rise to a growing stream of research that frames housework patterns as “gen-
dered.” Gender theorists argue that allocation of housework is much more 
than the reflection of time availability and rational choice. Housework is a 
symbolic enactment of gender relations. Its performance by either women 
or men helps express gender identities and reinforces gender relations within 
households. These theories locate gender itself at the core of the division 
of labor between men and women, and also predict asymmetric processes of 
change in gender relations in contemporary societies. They suggest that the 
c h a p t e r  t w e l v e
Concluding Thoughts on the Societal 
Context of Housework
Sonja Drobnicˇ
242 The Evaluation of Cross-National Research on Housework
equalization of gender roles is a much slower process than assumed by eco-
nomic and bargaining approaches, and consequently leads only to a modest 
change in the household division of labor.
Despite the ubiquitous effect of gender on housework, cross-national 
studies nevertheless display considerable variation in the amount and divi-
sion of household labor. These studies point to the need to take social con-
text into consideration systematically (Batalova and Cohen 2002; Bittman et 
al. 2003; Cooke 2006; Davis and Greenstein 2004; Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005; 
Knudsen and Wærness 2008; Singelmann et al. 1996). As in the case of paid 
employment, where the welfare state regime characteristics (Blossfeld and 
Drobnicˇ 2001) and institutional factors, such as the availability of child care 
options (compare with Gornick, Meyers, and ross 1998), help to explain 
differences in women’s employment decisions and labor market participa-
tion levels beyond the individual-level factors, the unpaid work in the home 
is also highly contingent on the sociopolitical context. Countries vary in 
the degree to which they support and reinforce women’s responsibility for 
unpaid work in the home and their dependence on the male breadwinner. 
Societal factors may also interact with individual factors in the sense that 
men’s and women’s individual assets have differing effects on the division of 
housework. The chapters in this volume contribute to this growing field of 
comparative research by building upon, integrating, and extending various 
sociological perspectives; applying a variety of data sources and methods; 
and opening new directions in thinking about and analyzing the household 
work. Let us briefly summarize the various aspects that characterize this 
volume over and above the topics covered in the individual chapters.
First and foremost, the volume is a testimony to the value of comparative 
research in sociology. It underlines the importance of comparative analysis, 
understood as the description and explanation of similarities and differ-
ences of conditions and outcomes among large-scale units, such as nations, 
societies, and cultures. Cross-national research forces us to systematize the 
context of comparison, both with respect to selecting measurements and 
with respect to explaining comparative similarities and differences (Smelser 
2003, p. 649). Only when comparing different societies does the importance 
of societal structures, policies, and normative expectations become visible, 
and only then can they contribute fully to the explanations for the behavior 
on the individual and household levels.
Some cross-national trend studies, such as Sayer’s Chapter 2 in this vol-
ume, have indicated a widespread pattern of men doing more housework and 
women doing less (Geist 2005; Gershuny 2000; Hook 2006). Nonetheless, 
much debate has been generated by conflicting interpretations of whether 
change among men is meaningful or whether the proportion of housework 
done by men is increasing as a consequence of decreased time spent on house-
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work by women. The proponents of the thesis that gap in household work is 
narrowing emphasize the extent of change rather than contemporary levels 
of gender inequality in housework. Other scholars juxtapose women’s rapid 
movement into paid work and continued responsibilities for domestic work 
against the continuing low participation of men in housework.
A number of chapters in this volume show that a cross-national com-
parison is a necessary precondition to understand stability and variability in 
household work in contemporary societies, and the context in which these 
changes occur. Sayer (Chapter 2) presents an analysis that indicates that 
there is a general trend in the decline of women’s housework and men’s 
increase in housework. However, the levels of change and the timing of 
declines in women’s hours spent on housework vary cross-nationally. The 
situation in an individual country can be assessed and understood much bet-
ter in a cross-national comparative framework than by studying it indepen-
dently. In a similar manner, van der Lippe (Chapter 3) shows that examining 
similarities and variations across countries helps us understand the extent 
to which the institutional context influences women’s behavior and to what 
extent own employment hours, characteristics of women themselves, and 
their immediate family situations have an influence on women’s household 
labor. Cooke (Chapter 4) examines a narrow set of liberal countries that 
are in many respects “similar”—Australia, Great Britain, and the United 
States—and nevertheless shows that these countries each have distinctive 
policy packages and different mechanisms through which state policies af-
fect employment and household organization of labor.
The policies that have been used to address work–family balance dur-
ing the past decades in various countries are reviewed by Dex in Chapter 5. 
These policies, such as child care services, parental leave, in-work benefits, 
and tax credits, are an integral part of the “societal context” that influences 
individuals’ and couple’s time in paid employment and unpaid work in the 
home. Dex reasons along Gershuny (2000) that state policies are but one 
element in a huge range of policies, institutions, infrastructure, preferences, 
and behavior patterns that overlap and reinforce each other. One single 
policy may not make any demonstrable difference if the task of producing 
equality in the shares of unpaid work within households is too ambitious 
to take on with policy changes that are realistic and politically acceptable. 
Nevertheless, each policy can contribute to a small step in this direction, 
and a cross-national comparison can contribute to a realistic assessment of 
the situation in a particular country, to a diffusion of policies, and also to 
a better substantiated analysis of causal relationships between policies and 
behavior than the single-country research can accomplish.
Cross-national differences in the gender gap in the performance of do-
mestic labor are also the topic of Chapter 6 by Gupta, Evertsson, Grunow, 
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Nermo, and Sayer. The focus is on economic gaps in women’s housework 
time. By comparing Germany, Sweden, and the United States, the authors 
find that inequality in women’s earnings translates into a gap in their house-
work time. The findings raise a question of whether the detected relation-
ship points to a more general link between class and gender in the sphere of 
household work, an indication that might easily be overlooked in a single-
country study.
Welfare state policies and, in particular, policies on child care in Euro-
pean societies are used by Pfau-Effinger (Chapter 7) as an illustration for 
her argument that arrangements of family and work can be comparatively 
analyzed and classified by the dominant family models upon which they are 
based. In this way, the macrolevel focus on cultural models can be used to 
analyze cross-national variations in care and—to a lesser extent so far—in 
housework. Similarly, cultural ideas of motherhood are explored by Charles 
and Cech in Chapter 8. Comparing attitudes toward maternal employment 
across 32 countries, their results suggest that institutional and social policy 
structures influence cultural understandings of motherhood, childhood, and 
the state, and that these understandings in turn help sustain state policies 
and their path-dependent developments. In single-country analyses, such 
highly powerful, but taken-for-granted, cultural ideals remain, for the most 
part, hidden and unexplored.
In a similar vein, Yodanis (Chapter 9) examines the relationship be-
tween beliefs about marriage and the division of housework across cultures. 
She demonstrates the link between the values of closeness and communica-
tion in marriage and gender equality in the division of housework. This line 
of examining differences and changes in marital ideals and family cultures 
is further pursued by röhler and Huinink (Chapter 10) in their study of 
East and West German couples. In addition to demonstrating the value of 
comparative research, their chapter also raises the question of the relation-
ship between attitudes and behavior in view of the persistence of traditional 
gender-skewed housework patterns in the face of modern or postmodern 
gender ideologies. Last, Geist (Chapter 11) resumes a large-scale compari-
son of almost three dozen countries to examine reporting discrepancies on 
the amount of household work by men and women. Examining these mea-
surement issues in a comparative perspective provides the unique opportu-
nity to situate the gender discrepancies in reports of housework and fairness 
in a larger context and may also provide a reflection on how contested the 
domestic division of labor is in different countries.
In this volume, analysis and discussion of the organization of household 
labor is for the most part limited to advanced economies of Europe, North 
America, and Oceania. Although a truly global perspective on domestic labor 
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is beyond the scope of this volume, several chapters in this volume (Chapters 
3, 8, and 11) include data on Asian and Latin American countries, which have 
been less often studied. In terms of female employment, attitudes toward ma-
ternal care of young children and gender discrepancies in reporting of house-
work time, these countries do not differ fundamentally and systematically 
from western market economies. However, similar to western countries, vari-
ability can be found within other societies that corresponds to local, cultural, 
economic, and institutional factors. Although it is not clear how the results 
in this volume might apply to countries with fundamentally different welfare, 
political, and familial structures, the limited results here suggest that it would 
be useful to extend sociological analyses to a broader range of societies.
To date, if comparative research on paid and unpaid work—much less 
the interaction between work and family—has been conducted, it has typi-
cally been limited to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) countries in North America, Europe, and advanced Asian 
and Pacific economies, where suitable data and research expertise are more 
readily available. But a more diverse range of countries and an analysis on 
a truly global level is essential for better understanding the national-level 
conditions and experiences of families as well as global processes and poli-
cies (Heymann, Earle, and Hanchate 2004). A particularly important aspect 
is the dramatic worldwide increase in the demand for domestic helpers and 
live-in workers. As the number of dual-earner couples has increased in the 
affluent countries, so, too, has the demand for domestic workers who carry 
out the household chores and caring tasks in private households. Domestic 
work is a large growth industry worldwide for migrant women (Anderson 
2000; Kofman et al. 2000; Zimmerman et al. 2006), and this complex phe-
nomenon has an impact on housework production in sending countries as 
well as in host countries.
The authors of all the chapters in this volume adhere to the value of 
cross-national comparative research. However, with the proliferation of 
cross-national data and the number of cases that are being compared, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to discern patterns and systematize findings 
in sociological research, even when only “comparable” western societies 
are included in the comparative analysis. One solution has been sought in 
grouping the countries according to various types of welfare regimes. Re-
gime here refers to the typical ways in which welfare production is allocated 
between state, market, and households, as suggested in the seminal three-
cluster typology of conservative, liberal, and social–democratic states by 
Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999). This typology has been fruitfully used by 
several authors in this volume, and its most important aspects for the house-
work allocation are outlined next.
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The conservative welfare regime supports women—in particular moth-
ers—who give priority to family activities. National policies are generally 
family oriented in the sense that they favor women’s economic dependence 
and stimulate them to choose domestic responsibilities in the household over 
paid employment. In other words, this welfare state regime tends to uphold 
the male breadwinner family model and gendered division of labor in the 
household. The social–democratic welfare regime emphasizes the principles 
of “egalitarianism,” “decommodification,” and “defamilialization” (Esping-
Andersen 1999). It supports entitlement to certain rights (e.g., welfare) that 
are not dependent on one’s market position and alleviates the household’s 
caring responsibilities through welfare state provisions. Thus, a defamilia-
lizing regime seeks to unburden the household and diminish individuals’ 
dependence on kin for their welfare. The social–democratic welfare state 
radically increases women’s choices in favor of employment, decreases her 
economic dependence, and provides the basis for more egalitarian domes-
tic role sharing by diminishing the resource gap between the spouses. The 
liberal welfare regime emphasizes the principle of individual freedom and 
responsibility, accepting the distributional consequences of market forces in 
terms of class and gender inequalities. Although its market orientation may 
prompt women’s employment, the liberal regime does little to stimulate it di-
rectly through public policy measures. Thus, this type of welfare state is less 
egalitarian and decommodifying than the social–democratic welfare state, 
but it, too, is defamilialistic. The market provides services that allow fami-
lies to outsource child care and household chores, which lightens the family’s 
responsibilities for its dependents and the burden of household work.
There is a prevailing agreement that institutional and policy regulations 
that we associate with welfare state regimes have a strong effect on women’s 
paid work. However, there has been much less interest in the effects of those 
factors on household work and the division of unpaid work in couples. Cer-
tainly, there is no one-to-one relationship between ideal welfare regimes and 
individual welfare states, and a country might in some aspects significantly 
digress from a “pure” welfare regime model. In fact, the strongest challenge 
to Esping-Andersen’s typology has come from feminist scholars who criti-
cize its failure to address issues of gender. Nonetheless, this volume shows 
that a typology of this kind is a useful heuristic in cross-national compara-
tive research on household work. Women in conservative welfare regimes do 
spend more time doing housework compared with women in other countries. 
And, the housework gender gap is smallest in the more egalitarian, social–
democratic countries and largest in the conservative countries, with the gap 
in English-speaking countries at intermediate levels. In this volume, Sayer, 
van der Lippe, Cooke, Gupta et al., Pfau-Effinger, and Charles and Cech all 
use the welfare regime typology to organize and frame their findings.
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However, the chapters in this book also demonstrate limitations of this 
typology, in line with previous critiques that the welfare regime typology de-
veloped by Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999) does not sufficiently correspond 
to cross-national variation in gender inequality. Again, this critique emerged 
particularly from the feminist perspective (see Lewis 1992; Orloff 1996; 
Sainsbury 1999). To accommodate the countries that do not fit into the 
three-world typology, van der Lippe extends the liberal, social–democratic, 
and conservative regimes by adding the Mediterranean, postsocialist, Latin 
American, and Asian cluster. Cooke finds distinctive patterns and differences 
among Australia, Great Britain, and the United States—that is, countries 
that belong to the same liberal welfare regime. Also, Pfau-Effinger’s cultural 
model of the family does not map to standard typologies of welfare regimes. 
She therefore introduces four family models prevalent in contemporary 
European societies: the male breadwinner/female part-time care provider 
model, the dual breadwinner/dual care provider model, the dual breadwin-
ner/external care model, and the dual breadwinner/extended family care 
model. It remains to be seen which typology or which combination of mod-
els provides the most useful framework for studying housework and gender 
relations in the household. Nonetheless, the quest for organizing framework 
is an important task to which the authors of this book contribute.
Third, although the chapters in this book systematically cover the aspects 
that have been identified in the research literature as relating to housework, 
they are also innovative in opening the field to promising new directions of 
research. For example, class inequalities and disparities in housework vol-
ume are two areas that demand further attention.
Class inequalities in the burden of housework are one new focus of 
analysis, particularly by Gupta et al. and Cooke. Whether families with an 
economic advantage simply have homes that are better arranged to stay 
clean (e.g., equipped with washing machines, free of mold and peeling paint, 
without messy children) or outsource more housework to paid helpers, the 
chapters in the book show that more prosperous women have a time use 
advantage vis-à-vis the poor when it comes to housework. Perhaps it is our 
own middle-class standpoint that has led female sociologists to focus on 
gender inequality to the neglect of class inequality in housework. Historians 
(Cowan 1983) have had a keener appreciation of the drudgery confronting 
working-class mothers, who struggle with overcrowded dwellings, the lack 
of labor-saving appliances or even running water, and no servants. In the 
United States, qualitative accounts also point to this problem today. One 
journalist writes of the mother in a deteriorating public housing project in 
Chicago who washed the dishes in the same bath tub used by her large fam-
ily, because the kitchen sink was always broken (Kotlowitz 1992). Because 
in the analysis by Gupta et al. it is the United States—with its unequal wage 
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structure—that shows the greatest class disparities in the burden of house-
work, their chapter reinforces the book theme of macro/micro linkages and 
shows that the crossroad between class and gender merits significant atten-
tion from the perspective of household labor.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the volume of housework matters, 
although nearly all the research has focused on the division and sharing of 
housework in couples. The variability in how much housework is carried out 
in the household may systematically depend on the welfare regime, gender 
culture in the country, and the social class of the household. Sayer confirms 
that the volume for women has dropped more than the volume for men has 
increased, with a subsequent decrease in the overall work being done in 
the house. Geist shows that perceptions of how much work a spouse does 
around the house differ between countries with a high volume of housework 
and a low volume. Van der Lippe shows that macrolevel indicators, such as 
enrollment in child care facilities, higher gender empowerment, and gross 
domestic product also determine the absolute time spent on housework. Un-
doubtedly, there are important macrolevel differences in housework needs 
and demands, in the availability of appliances, in domestic standards of 
cleanliness, in work processes, and other factors that invite further explora-
tion, such as the outsourcing of housework and the provision of household 
services by (immigrant) domestic workers.
Fourth, this book is a testimony to the value of different methodologi-
cal approaches to cross-national research. Large-scale, multilevel analyses 
allow us to pursue cross-country differences systematically, detect patterns 
at the individual and country levels, and explore the micro/macro linkages. 
However, a strategic, three-country case study like Cooke’s reveals associa-
tions and details that a multilevel analysis of three dozen countries cannot. 
Most chapters use quantitative methods. However, theoretically informed 
insights into the meaning that couples give to their relationships is offered 
by röhler and Huinink on the basis of qualitative interviews. Their analysis 
nicely shows how historical legacy and current joint institutional structures 
affect coping strategies of the individuals in the household, although qualita-
tive studies are necessarily limited in the number of “country contexts” that 
can be considered.
A wealth of data sources are used in the book: time diaries, surveys, in-
terviews. Each has its strengths and limitations. Time diary studies offer su-
perior data on time use over time, but the long series tend to measure fewer 
covariates than cross-national surveys. Cross-national surveys are rich in 
individual-level data, but until recently they covered relatively few countries. 
Furthermore, cross-national survey analyses that aim to wed the macro to 
the micro are often constrained because institutional indicators are not com-
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parable and available for all countries. Despite these frustrations, it is im-
portant to remember that there simply were not enough data three decades 
ago to support the sorts of quantitative analyses represented in this volume. 
The rapid development of new cross-national data—offering greater varia-
tion in contexts and additional time points—bodes well for future analysis. 
A mixture of various data sources is required for an optimal exploration of 
the complex organization of family life. Besides the sorts of data used in this 
volume, comparative ethnographies of housework, consumer expenditure 
data linked to time use information, and even natural experiments formu-
lated around the introduction of new household products could all enrich 
our understanding of household labor. Again—particularly when very dif-
ferent family systems and national contexts are involved—each of the data 
collection methods in cross-national comparison requires careful consider-
ation of measurement issues and conceptual definitions of housework. As 
pointed out by Eichler and Albanese (2007), implicit assumptions that un-
derline much of the empirical literature on housework have to be revealed 
and reexamined. Possibly activities that go beyond repetitive physical tasks 
should be recognized as important dimensions of housework, such as pro-
viding emotional support; maintaining contacts with kin and friends; resolv-
ing conflicts among family members; managing financial and health issues 
as well as planning and managing the overall organization of the household. 
Certainly, the articulation of housework with household management, child 
care, elderly care, and emotional support activities warrant more attention. 
Furthermore, the changing nature of housework over the life course should 
be acknowledged and studied accordingly.
Finally, the household division of labor is ultimately about intimate 
relationships and linked lives—the mother–child relationship, the father–
child relationship, the husband–wife relationship—as aptly demonstrated 
by Chapters 7 through 10. Particular cultural understandings have long sta-
bilized what we take to be the traditional gendered division of labor, but 
these understandings are being rewritten as much as behavior is changing. 
This is illustrated by women’s increasing employment and the subsequent 
reduction of women’s housework hours. As Dex suggests, the father–child 
relationship has been identified with Daddy Leave policies as being a rela-
tionship suitable for state management. To the extent that chores are inci-
dental to child care, more intimate relations between fathers and children 
may pay off not only in child outcomes, but also in more egalitarian divi-
sions of housework. Thus, turning the lens on housework implies exploring 
national contexts that harbor institutional and cultural arrangements, pub-
lic and private policies, complex relationships between individuals, as well 
as micro/macro linkages.
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